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THE DISTINCTION

BETWEEN

WORDS ESTEEMED SYNONYMOUS

IN THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE,

POINTED OUT,

AND THE PROPER CHOICE OF THEM

DETERMINED.

Useful to all who would either write or speak with Propriety and Elegance.

By the Rev. Dr. JOHN TRUSLER.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

THE THIRD EDITION,

WITH ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS.

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M,DCC,XCV.

There are some few words in this Work spoken of twice; but they are treated differently, and there is a repetition or two by accident.

ERRATA.

Page 85, voh ii. KINDNESS, &c. line 11, for confined *read* conferred.

THE

DISTINCTION

BETWEEN

WORDS ESTEEMED SYNONYMOUS.

Ridicule, Deriſion.

LAUGHTER in ſcorn is the common import of theſe words; but that of *ridicule* implies contemptuous merriment; that of *deriſion*, ſportive inſult.

We *ridicule*, in order to ſhew another his fault and induce him to amend. We never *deride*, but with the utmoſt contempt.

A friend will often *ridicule*; none but an enemy *derides*.

If we have done any thing deſerving *ridicule*, we ſhould endeavour to retrieve our character, leſt we become the *deriſion* of all who know us.

To *Cry, Weep.*

Shedding of tears is the general ſenſe in which theſe words are underſtood; but to *cry* implies ſhedding of tears audibly; to *weep*, ſhedding of tears ſilently.

Children commonly *cry*; grown perſons generally *weep*.

'Tis not the noiſe we make that denotes a greater or leſs meaſure of grief; for the ſilent *weeper* may be more diſtreſſed than one who *cries* aloud.

Crying is found, by experience, to give greater relief to ſorrow, than bare *weeping*.

To *Shake*, *Tremble*.

Both theſe words imply being agitated with a vibratory motion; but as this motion ſeems to ariſe from different cauſes, it renders the choice of them neceſſary.

Shake appears to me more applicable to a tremulous motion occaſioned by cold; *tremble*, to a like motion occaſioned by fear.

We *ſhake* with cold; we *tremble* with fear.

When the blood is chilled, we naturally *ſhake*. The very thought of danger will make the coward *tremble*.

The verb *ſhake* is often uſed in the active ſenſe; the verb *tremble* never. Thus we *ſhake* the houſe; *ſhake* a tree, *ſhake* hands, &c.

Pedigree, *Genealogy*.

Pedigree is our lineal deſcent from ſome anceſtor, ages back, pointed out; *genealogy* is a hiſtory of ſuch *pedigree*.

We trace our *pedigree*. We write our *genealogy*.

It is ſometimes neceſſary to examine into our *pedigree*, in order to claim or ſecure our property in lands. The tranſmitting of *genealogies* to poſterity, though they may be in ſome reſpect uſeful, is a ſtanding mark of the vanity of our anceſtors.

Diſcourſe, *Converſation*.

The general import of theſe words is the mutual intercourſe of ſpeech, but that of *diſcourſe* implies ſerious or ſet talk upon any particular ſubject; that of

of *converſation*, ſuch as is eaſy and familiar, and not confined to any particular topic.

Diſcourſe is generally formal; *converſation* commonly cheerful.

The attention of men is ſo much ſcattered by diſſipation, that when together, excluſive of buſineſs, they ſeldom enter into any *diſcourſe* that is improving: but their general *converſation* runs on things, in their nature, trifling and impertinent.

Impertinent, Impudent, Saucy.

Nothing is more general than the indiſcriminate uſe of theſe words, though none differ more among themſelves: if a man gives rude language, how common is it to ſay, he is an *impertinent*, *impudent*, or *ſaucy* fellow. One would imagine their peculiar ideas are ſo well known as to render it unneceſſary to take farther notice of them; but as ſome people never ſee the ſtumbling block, till they fall over it, it may not be unneceſſary to give them a perfect view of it: in order to which I need only define them.

Impertinent then means intruding and meddling with what no way concerns us. *Impudent* implies ſhameleſſneſs or want of modeſty. *Saucy* means inſolent and abuſive.

To ſhew a further difference between them, or give any examples of their uſe, would be needleſs.

Tongue, Language.

I know not whether in characteriſing theſe words I may fall in with the taſte of the public; but, according to my opinion, *tongue* ſeems to agree beſt with a corrupted *language*; that is, *tongue* appears to be more particular or provincial; *language* more general or national. Thus I would ſay the vulgar *tongue*; the mother *tongue*; the Yorkſhire *tongue*;

but the Engliſh *language*; the French *language*; the Spaniſh *language*.

That of the Indians may rather be called a *tongue* than a *language*: it being neither formal or regular.

The generality of people content themſelves with ſpeaking the *tongue* common to the place they are bred up in, without paying any regard to the beauties of their native *language*.

The word *tongue* may be alſo more elegantly applied, when we are ſpeaking of a living *language*; as the French *tongue*; the Spaniſh *tongue*, &c. *Language*, when we are ſpeaking of ſuch as is dead, and not at preſent ſpoken; as the Hebrew *language*; th Greek *language*; the Latin *language*.

Fuddled, Drunk, Intoxicated.

With reſpect to the firſt two of theſe words, *drunk* riſes upon that of *fuddled*: *fuddled* implying a leſs degree of inebriation; *drunk*, a greater. As to the word *intoxicated*, its greateſt diſtinction is, that whereas *fuddled* and *drunk* are ſeldom uſed in the figurative ſenſe, *intoxicated* is hardly ever in the literal.

Half a pint of wine will make ſome men *drunk*, when others ſhall drink a gallon, without being the leaſt *fuddled*. Good ſucceſs will ſometimes ſo *intoxicate* a perſon as to take him off from his buſineſs, and render him diſagreeable to all his acquaintance.

Bargain, Agreement, Contract.

Bargain is more limited, relating to ſale; *agreement* and *contract* are more general, implying any ſort of ſtipulation, with this difference between them, that *agreement* ſeems to denote a verbal one; *contract*, one that is written.

It is a mark of honeſty in dealing never to draw back from a *bargain* once made. Such is the unſteadineſs

dineſs of mankind that we are frequently obliged to enter into *contract*, in order to bind them to their *agreement*.

Mine, My own.

Though many are of opinion that the word *own* is added to the poſſeſſive pronoun *my*, by way of emphaſis, or corroboration only; yet cuſtom ſeems to have thrown into the idea of the expreſſion *my own* a greater degree of property, than into that of the word *mine*. Thus a workman, to whom certain tools have been appropriated by his maſter for the work he is employed on, might with propriety ſay theſe tools are *mine*, though at the ſame time they are not *his own*, being the property of his maſter. So again a wife may lay claim to the clothes ſhe wears, and ſay they are *mine*; though ſhe could not ſay with propriety that they were *her own*, being in reality the property of her huſband. On the other hand, the expreſſion, *my own*, may with elegance be uſed by the perſon in whom the ſole right of a thing is veſted.

Nigh, Near.

I will leave it to the deciſion of the curious, whether or no the word *near* is not a corruption of *nigher*, the comparative of *nigh*: be this as it may, *near*, in my opinion, implies a leſs diſtance than *nigh*. Thus I ſhould ſay, when we come *nigh* to ſuch a place we ſhould be *near* home: the *nigher* the enemy, the *nearer* the danger. As a farther proof of this, ſpeaking of the cloſe ties of kindred, we uſe the word *near* in preference to that of *nigh*, as implying a leſs diſtance or greater degree of conſanguinity between the two perſons. Thus my brother's

child is my *near* relation, or is *nearly* related to me.

We ſee then that *nigh* is uſed as an adverb only; *near* as an adjective.

Efficacious, Effectual.

With reſpect to theſe two words, that of *efficacious* ſeems not ſo powerful as that of *effectual*. The firſt gets the better of moſt obſtacles: the laſt of all.

By an *efficacious* remedy, we put an *effectual* ſtop.

Width, Wideneſs.

Width ſeems more applicable to things ſmall in themſelves; *wideneſs* to thoſe which are large. Thus we ſay the *width* of paper; the *width* of cloth; but the *wideneſs* of a ditch; the *wideneſs* of a field.

Adverbs compared with *Adverbial Phraſes.*

An *adverb* ſpecifies the particular manner in which a verb acts, as the proper quality of that action. An *adverb* is to the verb, what the adjective is to the ſubſtantive; the one being the modification of the verb, as the other is of the noun; and as the latter ſhews the particular light, in which an object ought to be conſidered in diſcourſe, ſo the former diſtinguiſhes the particular kind of action which the verb leaves partly undetermined. Thus the *adverb* expreſſes a conſtant qualification, which, in giving the verb a particular ſenſe, blends itſelf in ſome meaſure with it, and continues with it through all the duration of its action; whereas the *adverbial phraſe* expreſſes only a particular circumſtance of

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the action, which does not continue with it in all its extent. The *adverb* ſpecifies, characterizes the nature of the action; the *adverbial phraſe* points out only a partial modification, a particular circumſtance; for example:

A man who conducts himſelf *wiſely*, is wiſe in *all* his conduct; a man who conducts himſelf *with wiſdom*, acts *with wiſdom*, and ſhews wiſdom in his general conduct. The *adverbial phraſe with* implies only a *certain* influence; whereas the adverb *wiſely*, conveys the idea of *continual* prudence.

Where an act is placed in oppoſition to habit, the *adverb* is better applied to mark the habit, and the *adverbial phraſe* to indicate the act, as in the following expreſſions.

A man who conducts himſelf *wiſely*, cannot promiſe himſelf that all his actions ſhall be performed *with wiſdom*. An author who does not write *elegantly* in general, may occaſionally expreſs his thoughts *with elegance*. To reſiſt temptations *with courage*, and keep it up *couragionſly*, is the road to virtue. If it is not preciſely the habit which the *adverb* announces, it is at leaſt very proper to mark that habit; ſince it indicates a powerful and continued influence, which follows the verb through the whole courſe of the action, and expreſſes a diſtinctive character of that action.

Dread, Horror.

Dread implies habitual fear; *horror*, fear communicated with deteſtation.

We *dread* the loſs of character. A ſhocking tale will often harrow up the mind with *horror*. A wicked man lives in continual *dread* of future puniſhment, and the *horrors* of approaching death diſtract him.

Agony, Pang.

Agony is beſt applied to expreſs extreme pain of body; *pang*, extreme pain of mind. We ſay *agonies* or *agoniſing* pains, and the *pangs* of a guilty conſcience.

No one has a right idea of the *agonies* of the gout, but thoſe who have been afflicted with it; nor can any one deſcribe the *pangs* of a troubled mind. Our Lord was in ſuch great *agonies*, as to ſweat blood; but had no *pangs* ariſing from a wounded conſcience.

Board, Plank.

Theſe are both long pieces of timber ſawn into certain thickneſſes, but *board* implies a thinner piece than *plank*; a *board*, if put acroſs from boat to boat, to paſs from one to the other, will bend under us, and endanger our lives; whereas we may walk along a *plank* with ſafety.

Barns are generally encloſed with elm-*boards*, but floored with oak or fir-*planks*.

Board is rather a general term, whereas *plank* ſeems to imply a *board* of a certain ſize and length. Every *plank* is a *board*, but every *board* is not a *plank*.

Alliance, League.

The ties of parentage or friendſhip, the benefits ariſing from being on good terms, the aſſurance of ſupport in diſtreſs, are the general motives of *alliance*. *Leagues* have in view, the overthrow of a common enemy, or a defence againſt the enemy's attacks.

It is between kings that treaties of *alliance* take place, they enter into them, without any fixed term of duration, in the ſuppoſition, or hopes, that time will make no alteration in them; but in *leagues* between kings or perſons, they are generally ſettled for a fixed term.

The natural *alliance* of France and Spain is confirmed and ſtrengthened by a family compact. Alexander the ſixth, Maximillian and Lewis the twelfth, united themſelves by the *league* of Cambray, as if the re-union was to laſt for ever.

Alliances are generally framed between two or more powers. *Leagues* are entered into by many, and indeed by a great number of perſons.

We ſay the triple or quadruple *alliance*. The number of contractors are here limited. But the famous Italian *league*, which gave riſe to the ſocial war, was entered into by all the people of Italy. Rochelle, under Louis XIII. concluded a *league* with England, but there was no *alliance* between the two crowns.

Alliances have for their object, the mutual benefit of the contracting powers, or their reſpective ſubjects; ſuch as a peace cemented by the faith of friendſhip, or the ſtronger law of intereſt; whereas the object of a *league* is a common enterprize offenſive or defenſive.

The deſign of the quadruple *alliance*, was to pacify Italy, to bring about an agreement between the Empire and Spain, and to guarantee the execution of the great treaties of peace, &c. The object of the *league* of Smalcalde, was to ſupport new religions and their ſectaries; and that of the people of ancient Italy, to reſcue it from the tyranny of Rome.

Independant of ſtates and princes, theſe words have other ſignifications. *Alliance* implies ſomething honourable; *league*, ſomething diſhonourable. We ſay ſuch and ſuch a family are *allied*, or in *alliance* by marriage. A certain ſet of villains are in *league* together.

The word *league* is applied only to perſons; whereas *alliance* may refer to things. We may ſay it is the *alliance* of nature and art, that conſtitutes perfection; but we cannot uſe the word *league* in the ſame ſenſe.

Alliance implies a contract, a treaty. Thus we ſay a treaty of *alliance*; but we cannot ſay the ſame of *league*.

We form *alliances* for ourſelves. We enter into *league* againſt others.

Alliances are between the good. *Leagues* among the bad. Virtue *allies* herſelf with the holy. Vice *leagues* with the wretched.

We *ally* ourſelves to be happy; we *league*, to triumph.

In a figurative ſenſe, man is naturally in *alliance* with the whole univerſe, and in a kind of *league* with his own enemies againſt himſelf. The *alliance* of the ſoul with the body, is a matter beyond our comprehenſion. The *league* of the paſſions is more difficult to break, than to overcome a reigning one. Nature has made an *alliance* among all people; but *leagues* deſtroy that *alliance*. In the world, *alliances* are but ſlender ties; and *leagues* are little elſe than cabals.

Deteſtable, Abominable, Execrable.

Theſe adjectives ſeem to riſe upon each other gradually, and expreſs different degrees of averſion. We naturally hate a *deteſtable* thing; our ſpirit riſes at an *abominable* one; and an *execrable* one excites both indignation and horror: the firſt we cry out againſt, the ſecond we reprobate, and the third calls down our curſes.

Cataline, poſſeſſed of the greateſt qualifications, conſpiring againſt his country with all the powers of formidable vices, was a *deteſtable* citizen. T e

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weak and feminine Claudius, given up to debauched humour, was an *abominable* prince; and Cromwell, with the goſpel in one hand, and the ſword in the other, overturning a throne and cutting his ſovereign's throat, by the hand of an executioner, was an *execrable* ſubject.

It was a *deteſtable* pleaſure which Charles the Ninth of France took, in the infectious ſmell of the dead body of Coligny, when he ſaid, that "the body of a dead enemy always ſmelt delightfully." It was an *abominable* maxim of Nero and others, that in order to govern, it was neceſſary to divide the people; and it was an *execrable* wiſh of Tiberius, "that mankind had all but one head, that he might cut it off at a ſingle ſtroke."

Hypocriſy, which ſports with all the virtues, is a *deteſtable* vice. Avarice, which ſullies them, is an *abominable* one, and that barbarous fanaticiſm, which makes a virtue of violating, in the name of Heaven, all the laws of nature, is an *execrable* vice.

But the gradation is more obſervable in the following example, wherein *abominable* riſes upon *deteſtable*, and *execrable* upon *abominable*.

Denis the Tyrant, being informed that a very ancient woman, ſupplicated the Gods daily, to preſerve the life of her prince; and aſtoniſhed that one of his ſubjects ſhould ſo intereſt herſelf in his welfare, enquired of her the motives of her benevolence: "In my early days," replied this woman, "a *deteſtable* prince was upon the throne. I wiſhed his death and he died; but an *abominable* tyrant worſe than him, ſucceeded him; I offered my prayers to the ſame end, and they were gratified; and we have now a tyrant worſe than either, and this *execrable* monſter is thyſelf. If, therefore, it is poſſible to have a prince more wicked, was I to pray for a change, I ſhould dread to have thee replaced by this more wicked one: of courſe it is my earneſt ſupplication that I may not ſurvive thee!"

To *Mitigate, Moderate.*

Though theſe words are frequently uſed in a moral ſenſe to expreſs the ſame thing, they have a very different meaning. To *mitigate*, implies to correct or ſoften auſterities, and other analagous qualities; whereas to *moderate*, is to correct or ſuppreſs exceſs.

We *mitigate* the ſecurity of a cloiſter, by diſpenſations more agreeable to human nature. We *moderate* the paſſions of a haſty man, by repreſenting things in a light different to what he ſaw them in.

The bitterneſs of grief is *mitigated*, by ſympathy, or a participation of the diſtreſs. Ardent paſſions are *moderated*, in proportion, the further we advance from youth; as the heat of the climate is leſſened, the further we recede from the line.

To *Affect, Pretend to.*

To *pretend to*, means to have a pretenſion at heart, but to diſcover that pretenſion, by a ſtudied or ſingular conduct and manner is to *affect*. To *pretend to*, is within ourſelves; to *affect*, is to ſhew outwardly. He that *pretends to* have a certain quality, has, in fact, ſuch an opinion of himſelf: whereas, he who *affects* to have it, wiſhes to give us ſuch an opinion of him. The firſt believes it to be ſo, the ſecond wiſhes to have it thought ſo. Thus we may *pretend to* a thing, without *affecting* it, and we may *affect* a character without *pretending to* it.

You *pretend to* be a man of knowledge, but it does not follow that you *affect* the character, and boaſt of it. The hypocrite *affects* the virtues of a good man, but certainly he cannot *pretend to* have them. He acts, indeed, as if he *pretended to* them, but that is all. A well-bred man never *affects* a thing,

thing, becauſe he *pretends to* nothing. To *affect* a quality we have not, is hypocriſy; and to *affect* one we have, is that *affectation* of the mind, which, in boaſting of a quality abſolutely ſpoils it. He who *pretends to* a thing, ſoon betrays his pretenſion by the leaſt competition; whereas, he who *affects* it does not betray it, but ſhews it without the leaſt provocation.

We plainly ſee, and indeed we ſay, that a man *pretends to* a thing, when he is ſo ſenſible, ſo ſuſceptible, ſo delicate on the point, as where the leaſt doubt of it is ſtarted, to defend his pretenſions with warmth; but, when he comes to boaſt of it and blazon it forth on all occaſions, it is a mark of *affectation*. *Affectation* being ſtudied, concerted, voluntary, artificial and riciculous.

To *Free*, *Deliver*.

To *free*, according to the literal conſtruction, is to make free, or give a franchiſe. To *deliver*, is to reſtore to liberty. This franchiſe is a particular liberty, perhaps an immunity, an exemption, &c. whereas, the liberty I allude to, is that natural liberty which is the birth-right of every man.

But we will go further than the literal conſtruction, and conſider the words in a more extenſive view.

We *free* them, properly ſpeaking, from ſervitude, from ſlavery; we *deliver* from evil, from puniſhment.

We *free* an eſtate from rent-ſervice, from taxes, and all pariſh-offices. We *deliver* a country from enemies, from plunderers, and all that is a nuſance to it.

We *free* from ſubjection, from duty, from tribute, from engagements, a kind of ſervitude, that abridges us of a certain liberty. We *deliver* from a load, a weight,

weight, a burden, an embarraſſment, a labour, that interrupts our natural liberty.

Ceremonial etiquettes, puerile fears, popular prejudices, enſlave us: from theſe it would be an advantage to be *freed*. Importunate creditors and ſuitors, inquiſitive people and cenſors, incommode us; from theſe it would be a happineſs to be *delivered*.

The word *free*, then, implies an act of authority, of power, &c. for it muſt be power to break the yoke which power impoſes; whereas *deliver* requires only the method of doing it; for we can *deliver* by various means.

Thus we can *free* a ſlave that belongs to one's ſelf, as we are the maſter of his liberty; but to *deliver* him from ſlavery under another maſter, we muſt either purchaſe his freedom, or take him away by force.

We *free* from a ſtable, a permanent ſituation; we *deliver* from a tranſitory one. Thus we ſay the *freedom* of vaſſals; the *deliverance* of priſoners. Servitude is the inherited condition of a vaſſal, or bondman. Captivity, the accidental ſituation of a priſoner. So baptiſm *frees* us from the bondage of ſin; grace *delivers* us from temptation. In the firſt caſe we change our condition, in the ſecond, our ſituation.

The reader will find thoſe diſtinctions more or leſs marked, as to the common applications of theſe words, in the following examples.

The Americans *freed* themſelves from the Engliſh yoke, with the hopes of being *delivered* from anarchy and bondage; but it is oftener leſs difficult to get *free*, than to know we are ſo.

Rank *frees* us from certain duties, to impoſe on us greater. Falſe policy, *delivers* us from one embarraſſment, by throwing us into another.

In *delivering* ourſelves from a cenſor, we are not *free* from cenſure.

Proſperity

Proſperity will *deliver* us from particular misfortunes, but nothing will *free* us from the miſeries of life.

Every one has a reigning paſſion, which originates in his conſtitution, and determines his character; now, though we may *deliver* ourſelves occaſionally from its torments, we can never *free* ourſelves wholly from its dominion.

Farmer, Huſbandman.

The *farmer* is he who rents, or occupies the farm; the *huſbandman*, he who does the ſervile offices in that farm, that is, the labouring man whom the farmer employs. Thus, every *farmer* is a *huſbandman*, but every *huſbandman* is not a *farmer*.

It is impoſſible for a *farmer* to cultivate any extent of land, without the aſſiſtance of many *huſbandmen*.

Great, Illuſtrious.

When theſe words are applied to expreſs the character of a man, they are too often uſed as ſynonymous; whereas, no two words can convey a more different meaning.

An *illuſtrious* man, implies an exalted character, men in power, and the higheſt ſtations; whereas by the term, a *great* man, we advert to the internal faculties of the ſoul.

A *great* man is diſtinguiſhed by his great talents, by his eminent virtues, and his extenſive good actions; an *illuſtrious* man is known, indeed, by his great talents and utility to the public, but not by his great virtues.

He is truly a *great* man, who is able to overcome the greateſt difficulties, and by his ſtruggles with ſuch difficulties, are we to eſtimate his abilities, his cou-

rage,

rage, and his perſeverance. Epaminondas, in this ſenſe, was the *greateſt* man among the Greek commanders, his incitement to the enterpriſes he engaged in, was the pleaſure he felt in ſecuring the ſafety of, and procuring advantages to, his fellow citizens; of courſe, though not ſo *illuſtrious* a character as Alexander, he was greatly his ſuperior. Alexander acted from ambition and ſelf-intereſt, his whole thoughts were employed to aggrandiſe and gratify himſelf; of courſe, though a renowned warrior, and a king of great repute among kings, Alexander can only be called an *illuſtrious* or eminent man, while Epaminondas may be termed a *great* one.

Men with *great* talents, have laboured without intermiſſion, and with invincible induſtry, overcoming many difficulties, in order to make a ſhining fortune, and be *great*, as they call it, in the eyes of the common people, who eſtimate men's *greatneſs* by the extent of their power, the bulk of their riches, and the high ſtations they fill; but as ſuch men act from ſelfiſh motives, without any regard to the public good, they cannot be conſidered as *great* men; whatever talent they may have been poſſeſſed of, however great their ſucceſs, in acquiring the greateſt fortunes, the firſt offices in the ſtate, in a word, however *illuſtrious* they are.

We are naturally led to form compariſons between men of the ſame profeſſion, and give preference to thoſe, who, by ſurmounting great difficulties, are become eminent among their fellows. Thus they become *great* in their profeſſions, and we ſay a *great* poet, a *great* actor, a *great* orator, a *great* lawyer, a *great* phyſician, &c. But the appellation of a *great* man, can properly belong only to *great* ſpeculative geniuſes, attentive to perfecting, in any conſiderable degree, thoſe parts of human knowledge which are moſt conducive to the well-being of human ſociety: ſuch men become *great*, with the aſſiſtance of

illuſtrious

illuſtrious birth, great power, exalted reputation, vaſt revenues or public employments.

Thus, *great* implies rather a ſpeculative genius; *illuſtrious*, a practical one. Sir Iſaac Newton was a *great* man. Henry the Fourth of France an *illuſtrious* one.

In a word, a *great* man muſt be a great benefactor to the world at large, by maxim or truths moſt important in themſelves, well demonſtrated; or a great benefactor to ſome particular country, either by a wiſe and virtuous conduct, through a long courſe of years, or by rules and eſtabliſhments of vaſt moment, or by great advantages gained over its enemies.

Whereas a man may be *illuſtrious* without ſuch eminent virtues. Hiſtory has handed down to us, the memory of generals and ſtateſmen, who have diſtinguiſhed themſelves in their employments, and have done great ſervices to their country; but in all this they coveted high dignities, and aimed leſs at honour than honours; their actions have, indeed, been great, but their principles have been mean, vulgar, and little.

Theſe things conſidered, a truly *great* man will ever be an *illuſtrious* one; but the *illuſtrious* man is by no means always a *great* man.

To *Amaſs*, *Accumulate*.

To *amaſs* is to gather together, or heap up a certain quantity. To *accumulate*, adds, to amaſſing, an idea of plenitude. Thus we *amaſs* ſilver, proviſions, coals, &c. we *accumulate* riches, honours, crime upon crime.

The word *amaſs* implies treaſuring up, to be afterwards expended; whereas *accumulate* is but uſed to imply the hoarding up of covetous men.

The

The Romans always in a ſtate of war, had places where they *amaſſed* proviſions for a year. A man is no way the happier for *accumulating* wealth, unleſs he enjoys thoſe comforts which wealth affords.

To *Amuſe*, *Divert*.

In the proper ſignification of the word, to *divert*, ſignifies merely to turn the attention from one object to another; but cuſtom has annexed to it an idea of pleaſure taken in the object that engages us. But to *amuſe* does not always include an idea of pleaſure; and when it does, it implies a leſs pleaſure than the word *divert*. He who *amuſes* himſelf, has no other ſenſation than a diſcontinuance of wearineſs. We take a walk to *amuſe* ourſelves; we go to a comedy to be *diverted*. We may ſay of a thing calculated merely to kill time, that it is not very *diverting*, but ſtill it *amuſes*. We may alſo ſay, ſuch a piece *amuſed* me, but the other *diverted* me.

We cannot, however, ſay a tragedy is *amuſing*, becauſe the kind of pleaſure it communicates is ſerious and ſtriking; whereas the word *amuſe*, conveys an idea of want of importance in the object, and of a light impreſſion in the effect it produces. We may ſay with propriety, that cards *amuſe*, a tragedy intereſts, and a comedy *diverts*.

To *amuſe*, then, is to engage the mind lightly, ſo that it ſhall not perceive the weight of time or of work; to *divert*, is to occupy it agreeably, ſo that we ſhall not be ſenſible of time or employ, otherwiſe than by a ſucceſſion of pleaſure, or a pleaſure continued. When we *amuſe* ourſelves, time paſſes imperceptibly; when we *divert* ourſelves, we enjoy the time. Pleaſure is not a ſtranger to *amuſement*, ſince it is calculated to pleaſe, to attract us, to baniſh irkſomeneſs, and change our thoughts; but a pleaſure which only *amuſes* us is light, vain, frivolous,

lous, and futile. To *diverſion* pleaſure is eſſential, ſince 'tis by this that a thing occupies us, intereſts us, attaches us, and drags us; of courſe, the pleaſure that *diverts*, is for the ſame reaſon more lively, ſtronger, more ſtriking, and more ſenſible. I have already conſidered theſe words, but not ſo largely as I have done at preſent.

According then to the above diſtinction, almoſt any thing will *amuſe*, but almoſt any thing will not *divert*.

If we wiſh to *divert* an afflicted perſon, we muſt begin by *amuſing* his ſorrow.

Where we promiſe ourſelves great *diverſion*, it may be well, if we are only *amuſed*.

We may be tolerably well *amuſed* alone, but at ſuch times few things will *divert* us. Reading *amuſes* us; dancing *diverts* us. Old men will *amuſe* themſelves; young men can *divert* themſelves: indeed, nothing *amuſes* an old perſon more than to ſee young folks *diverted*.

Crime, Miſdemeanor.

Both *crimes* and *miſdemeanors* are acts committed, or omitted, in violation of public law, either forbidding or commanding; but *crime* denotes ſuch offences as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while ſmaller faults and omiſſions of leſs conſequence, are compriſed under the name of *miſdemeanors*.

Corporal puniſhments are generally annexed to *crimes*; pecuniary puniſhments to *miſdemeanors*.

Prorogation, Adjournment.

Theſe two words, applied to parliament, were anciently uſed as ſynonymous, but cuſtom has of late introduced a diſtinction.

Prorogation

Prorogation makes a ſeſſion of parliament, *adjournment*, only a continuance.

Bills read once or twice, muſt be recommenced and brought into parliament anew, if the houſe is once *prorogued*; which is not neceſſary if it be only *adjourned*.

The parliament *adjourn* themſelves in the Chriſtmas and Eaſter holidays; but they are *prorogued* by the king, at the end of the ſeſſion.

A Twelvemonth, Twelve Months.

There is a diſtinction between theſe in the conſtruction of the law. A *twelvemonth* implies a whole year, twelve calendar months, or 365 days; whereas *twelve months* implies twelve lunar months, or 336 days.

Epoch, Æra, Period.

Epoch is a certain period or inſtant of time, from which all calculations originate.

Æra is a ſeries of years thence reckoned, or numbered without end.

Period is a conſiderable interval of time, whoſe beginning and end are fixed and referred to.

Thus we ſay, that the year 1788, is the 1788th year of the Chriſtian Æra, and 6502d of the Julian period; and that the 753d year before Chriſt, is the *epoch* of the building of Rome.

Animal, Beaſt, Brute.

Animal is a generical term, which agrees with all organized and living bodies. An *animal* lives, acts, and moves of itſelf.

The

The word *beaſt* is often uſed in oppoſition to man. Man has a ſoul, which ſome philoſophers will not allow to *beaſts*.

Brute is a term of contempt, applied only when we ſpeak unfavourably. He gives way to his paſſions, like a *brute*.

If we conſider an *animal*, as a being that thinks, wills, acts, and reflects, we muſt confine its ſignification to the human ſpecies; if we conſider it as limited in all the functions which characterize will and underſtanding, and which it ſeems to have in common with the human ſpecies, we muſt confine it to *beaſt*; and if we conſider a *beaſt* in its higheſt degree of ſtupidity, and as acting contrary to the laws of reaſon and decorum, we ſhall call it a *brute*.

The word *animal*, then, marks a particular kingdom of nature, in oppoſition to the vegetable and mineral kingdoms. It is an *animal*, properly ſpeaking, which we conſider, when we treat of its peculiar organization, its natural functions, its ſpontaneous motions, particular operations, &c.

The word *beaſt* characterizes a claſs of animals in contradiſtinction to *man*. It is a *beaſt* we conſider, when we treat of an *animal* without reaſon, without underſtanding, without liberty, given up to inſtinct, to ſenſation, to its will, as a mechanical principle.

The word *brute*, indicates a ſort of *beaſts*, ſtill further deprived of ſentiment, and delivered over to the groſſeſt inſtinct; in contradiſtinction to thoſe which ſhew a degree of knowledge, ſagacity, underſtanding, ſenſibility, and docility, without forming them into particular claſſes. *Brutes*, ſays Pliny, are *animals*, whoſe tempers are hardened into an inflexible rigidity. Figuratively ſpeaking, we riſe upon the quality of *beaſt*, by ſaying *brute-beaſt*. For example; there are perſons who marry to ſatisfy their carnal luſts like *brute-beaſts*, that have no underſtanding.

Man

Man is an *animal* of the creation, but endowed with reaſon and underſtanding; which, if he loſes, he is but little better than a *beaſt*, and may at laſt, by unbridled paſſions, and giving way to impetuous ferocity, become a *brute* in nature.

Anterior, Antecedent, Preceding.

All theſe adjectives imply a going before, but yet require a particular choice, according to the ſubject-matter.

Anterior expreſſes that one thing is more before than another, and is oppoſed to poſterior; thus we ſay in anatomy, the *anterior*, or fore-part of the ſkull; in contradiſtinction to the poſterior, or hind part. So again, the *anterior* part, or the fore-front of a building; in oppoſition to the *poſterior*, or hind-front. *Anterior*, therefore, is rather a technical term, in the ſcience to which it is applied, and indicates a certain regularity of ſyſtem; whereas *antecedent* and *preceding*, denote that which goes before, but without ſuch formal regularity. Theologians ſay, *antecedent* councils, and we ſay *preceding* chapters. Here *antecedent* is oppoſed to ſubſequent; *preceding* to the following.

Antecedent, though properly denoting a priority of time, is rather uſed to indicate a priority of order and rank, place, or poſition in going before, has this particular circumſtance annexed, that it implies a certain relation, dependance or connexion of one thing on another. Thus, in logic, it indicates the principle, with its conſequence; in mathematics, that of induction from one term to another. In enthymeme, an argument is ſaid to conſiſt only of an *antecedent* and conſequential propoſition; in grammar, the *antecedent* has a neceſſary connexion with the ſubſequent.

Preceding

Preceding not only implies going before, but immediately ſo, without any intervening object of the ſame kind. The *preceding* event is, that which happened immediately before the one we are ſpeaking of; whereas *antecedent* may have many intervening ones, and of courſe denotes a vague and indeterminate priority. A *preceding* propoſition is cloſely followed by another, which may not be the caſe with an *antecedent* one.

The ſeventeen centuries ſince the birth of Chriſt, are all *antecedent* to the eighteenth century, that is, to the one we live in, but it is the ſeventeenth only that we call the *preceding* one.

Antecedent is often uſed as a ſubſtantive; *anterior* and *preceding* ſeldom.

Cave, Cavern.

No two words, in my opinion, are more diſtinct in their ſignifications than theſe; *Cave* is a hollow place under ground, formed by the hand of man; *cavern*, one formed by the hand of nature: thus we dig a *cave*, not ſo a *cavern*.

But where they are uſed to imply natural productions, there is certainly a great diſtinction between them. A *cave* is a ſmaller place than a *cavern*, and implies a receſs leſs dreadful, or tremendous; the former has been the retreat of hermits and miſanthropiſts, the latter the dens and haunts of wild beaſts. One conveys an idea of comfort, that of quiet, and refreſhing coolneſs; the other implies horror.

Caves are leſs deep and profound than *caverns*. Many men have hid themſelves and their property in *caves*, and have dwelt there in peace and ſecurity; but the *caverns* of the earth are vaſt hiatuſes, formed by the convulſions of nature; many of them

are

are unfathomable, and have never yet been explored.

We find *caves* frequently in the ſides of hills; whereas *caverns* are met with only in the mountains.

Love, Friendſhip.

Though theſe words are not often uſed in the ſame ſenſe, they at times have been, and therefore require ſome animadverſion.

Where *love* conveys no impure idea, but has been conſidered as platonic, writers have contended, that they mean one and the ſame thing; only when it firſt attacks the human heart, they call it *love*, but when *love* continues, it only ripens into *friendſhip*. Others deny this, and particularly Bruyere; he ſays, *love* and *friendſhip* exclude each other; for he who has experienced a violent *love*, neglects *friendſhip*; and he who has gone far in *friendſhip*, is no adventurer in *love*.

In my opinion, there can be no *love*, without ſenſuality. *Love* is, therefore, improperly applied between two of the ſame ſex. Two ſiſters or two brothers, may have an affection or *friendſhip* for each other, but to ſay they *love* one another, is an improper expreſſion. *Friendſhip* may ſubſiſt between perſons of different ſexes, without ſenſuality; but *love* never. A woman always looks upon a man, as a man; and a man will look upon a woman, as a woman.

Time, which ſtrengthens *friendſhip*, weakens *love*. *Love* ſeizes us ſuddenly, and our diſpoſition favours the ſurpriſe. One look, one glance from the fair, fixes us, and determines us. *Friendſhip*, on the contrary, is a long time in forming, and is of ſlow growth. *Love*, whilſt it laſts, ſubſiſts of itſelf, and ſometimes by thoſe very means which ſhould ſeem rather

rather to extinguiſh it, caprices, diſdain, cruelty, abſence, jealouſy. *Friendſhip*, on the other hand, ſtands in need of all helps. Attention, confidence, and complaiſance; if not ſupplied with theſe it expires.

Love that grows ſlowly and gradually, is too like *friendſhip*, ever to be a violent paſſion.

Nothing more reſembles a ſtrong *friendſhip*, than thoſe acquaintances which we cultivate for the intereſt of our *love*.

As nice as we are in *love*, we pardon more faults in *love*, than in *friendſhip*.

Love is ſelfiſh; *friendſhip* the reverſe. In the latter, we ſee only the faults which may be prejudicial to our *friend*; but in thoſe we *love*, we diſcern no faults, but thoſe by which we ourſelves ſuffer.

Let thoſe who contend then, that the *friendſhip* we bear the female world is inſeparable from *love*, conſider what I have ſaid above and compare them together; and they will ſoon ſee that they are altogether diſtinct in operation, purſuit and quality. *Friendſhip* operates with calm reaſon, deliberate judgment, and nice circumſpection; *Love*, is thoughtleſs, unadviſed, and ſudden.—*Friendſhip* ſeeks the gratification of others; *Love*, the gratification of itſelf: what is conſidered as the ornament of one, moſt certainly is a blemiſh in the other. *Love* muſt be confined to a ſingle object, and derives its luſtre proportionably from its conſtancy and attachment to it; whereas *friendſhip* diſdains boundary, and to contract it, is to violate it. What character ſo valuable as a univerſal *friend?* What more to be avoided than a univerſal *lover?* —No affections, therefore, can be more diſtinct.

See *Affection*, *Love*, Vol. I.

To *Appeaſe*, To *Calm*.

Of theſe two words, *to appeaſe*, implies rather to pacify; *to calm*, implies to quiet.

We *appeaſe* anger, wrath, fury and violence; we *calm* agitation, inquietude, emotion and care.

We *appeaſe* the cries of an infant, and *calm* the anxiety of a friend.

By removing a public grievance, we may *appeaſe* the clamours of the people, and by firmneſs in diſtreſſing circumſtances, we may *calm* their fears.

After we have *appeaſed* the anger of a jealous man, we have nothing to do but to *calm* his ſuſpicions.

We may *calm* the ſcruples of conſcience, but who can *appeaſe* its remorſe?

We *appeaſe* an angry parent; we *calm* the fears of a repentant child. Soft words will often *calm*, but it frequently requires ſatisfaction to *appeaſe*.

When we ſpeak of a troubled ſea, cuſtom will ſupport us in the uſe of the word *calm*; though a tempeſtuous ocean, implies violent agitation. This is an exception to the general rule. We may ſay, a *calm* ſea, or that the ſea is *calm*; but we cannot uſe *appeaſe* in this ſenſe, without inelegance.

Nothing, *No Thing*.

I may be charged as being too nice and particular, when I can take notice of the above terms; but I aver, that he who would write with preciſion and elegance, cannot be too nice in his choice of words.

When we uſe the word *nothing*, we are indeterminate in what we ſay; for in the phraſe good-for-*nothing*, we do not mean to infer, that it cannot be turned to any uſe whatever, but that it is of little

value; but when we ſay *no thing*; we fix our ideas, and mean to be more expreſſive; as for example.

The reſiduum in a glaſs retort, is a caput mortuum, from which *no thing* can be expected.

Madneſs, Phrenzy.

In a medical ſenſe, theſe words bear a different ſignification. *Phrenzy* is attended with fever; *madneſs* is not; of courſe, the former is a temporary diſeaſe; the latter an habitual one.

A ſettled and conſtitutional *madneſs* is frequently incurable; but a *phrenzy* of the brain will ſubmit to medicines.

Tax, Rate, Aſſeſſment.

Theſe are all impoſts on the people; but *tax* implies a government-impoſt, and is levied for the ſupport of the ſtate; whereas *rate* and *aſſeſſment* are parochial ones, laid on for the uſe of the pariſh.

Subjects are *taxed*, to defray the expences of a war, public buildings, and the like. The inhabitants of a pariſh are *rated* or *aſſeſſed*, to repair the church, mend the highways, and maintain the poor, &c.

Of the two latter words, *rate* is more applicable to the particular ſums, enjoined to be paid by act of parliament, and there ſpecified, as the highway-*rate*; *aſſeſſment* to thoſe proportionable ſums, made out by aſſeſſors, according to the wants of the pariſh, at the time of ſuch *aſſeſſment*.

To *Depoſe, Dethrone.*

Theſe words refer to the degradation of a monarch in depriving him of royalty. Under the diſtinction

pointed out between *depoſe* and deprive, I have already given the ſignification of the firſt word, it remains only to give the meaning of *dethrone*, and ſhew where it differs from *depoſe*.

Both *depoſe* and *dethrone*, imply depriving a king of his crown; but *depoſing* him, indicates doing it without any ceremonial; *dethroning* him, with a degree of ſolemnity.

Where a monarch is compelled to make a formal ſurrender of his crown, as was the caſe of John of England, he may be ſaid to be *dethroned*; but in the caſe of Charles I. who was beheaded, without any ſuch formal ſurrender, he may with greater propriety be ſaid to have been *depoſed*.

See *To Depoſe, to Deprive.*

Studied, Affected.

Theſe adjectives convey an idea of ſomething artificial and not natural, in the air and manner of people.

A *ſtudied* manner, is deſigned to add conſequence, and draw reſpect; an *affected* manner, to appear different to what we are.

Studied manner, is ſhewn by a man's ſtiffneſs, his reſerve, his inceſſant air of circumſpection; he has neither flexibility, eaſe, nor elegance. An *affected* manner is ſeen, in the pains and labour a man takes to appear what he is not. He has nothing eaſy or natural about him, frequently forgets himſelf, and is at one inſtant different from what he is at another.

The general manner of a courtier is *ſtudied;* that of a prude, *affected.* I ſcarce know which is moſt ridiculous, the *ſtudied* language of a pedant, or the *affected* airs of the coquette.

To *Prepare, Make Ready, Diſpoſe.*

To *make ready*, is to provide matters for the end propoſed, at the time we want them; but to *prepare*, is to *make ready* beforehand.

We *make ready* to do, what we are going to do; we *prepare* to be in ſtate to do, what we mean to do.

We *make ready* work, to employ our workmen; we *prepare* materials for the ſame work.

Make ready, implies an idea of induſtry, and contrivance; *prepare*, an idea of foreſight and diligence.

We *make ready* for a ceremony, a feaſt, &c. we *prepare* for a great or ſmall undertaking.

It is ſufficient to *make ready*, where no great preparation is required; but we muſt *prepare*, where it requires a good deal of work and proviſion.

We *prepare* for war; we *make ready* for a negotiation.

We cannot uſe the term *make ready*, but with reſpect to the action of the body; whereas *prepare* is as applicable to the mind as the body.

If we would not break that which only ſhould be bent, we ſhould *prepare* the mind for great changes.

Where is the man ſufficiently wiſe, as to be *prepared* for every event?

Nature has *prepared* us from our birth, to ſuffer with patience.

To *Arrogate, Aſſume.*

Theſe words both imply a taking upon one's-ſelf more than we ought, or becomes us; but *arrogate* indicates vanity; *aſſume* denotes pride and inſolence.

We *arrogate* merit; we *aſſume* conſequence, titles, prerogatives, and pre-eminences.

He who *arrogates* to himſelf more commendation than he is juſtly entitled to, not only deſerves the cenſure, but the ridicule of the world.

The Romans inſolently *aſſumed* a right of dictating laws to the people, among whom they were placed merely as mediators; and the tribunes of Rome, becauſe they obtained one prerogative, *aſſumed* a variety of others.

Aromatics, Perfumes.

Odoriferous is the quality of both *aromatics* and *perfumes;* but *aromatics* are ſpicy *perfumes.*

Perfume, therefore, is the genus; *aromatic*, a ſpecies of that genus. Thus, all *aromatics* are *perfumes*; but all *perfumes* are not *aromatics.*

Aromatics belong to the vegetable kingdom; whereas, *perfumes* are drawn from other things. Ginger, aloes, ſaſſafras, cinnamon, mace, citron, baum, ſage, flowers, reſin, ſtorax, incenſe, myrrh, &c. are both *aromatics* and *perfumes*; muſk, civet, &c. are *perfumes*, but not *aromatics.*

The Arabians have long carried on an extenſive trade in *aromatics* with the Eaſtern nations, but we never hear of their dealing in camphire, cloves, and nutmegs; if they do, they are called by ſome other name.

The Eaſtern people have even made *perfumes* a principal article of conſumption and magnificence. They uſe them contiuually to refreſh their ſpirits, keep off inſects, and render baths and unctions ſalutary to health, and alſo to do honour to the Deity, by inducing worſhippers to attend his ſervice, through the agreeableneſs of the worſhip.

Aromatics are not *perfumes*, except when uſed to yield an agreeable odour; but are employed for culinary and medicinal purpoſes, as well as for *perfumes*; whereas *perfumes* are uſed only for ſcents.

Aromatics

Aromatics are agreeable both to the ſmell and to the taſte. Taſte is out of the queſtion with *perfumes*, their characteriſtic is to gratify the ſmell only. Perfumers ſell *perfumes*; druggiſts and grocers, *aromatics*.

Arms, Eſcutcheons.

Theſe are ſymbolical ſigns, painted or engraved, to diſtinguiſh perſons, families, communities, people, &c. but *arms* imply the general ſcience; whereas, *eſcutcheons* are the armorial enſigns of particular families, &c.

Heraldry is the ſcience of *arms*; *eſcutcheons* are made uſe of at funerals, as pageants in the proceſſion.

The uſe of *arms* derives its origin from a cuſtom common among the people in early ages. As ſavages of the preſent time paint their bodies with different colours, to diſtinguiſh one tribe from another; ſo did our Britiſh anceſtors paint certain figures on their bodies, cloaths, and armour, to diſtinguiſh one family from another.

The hatchment, uſually placed on the front of a houſe, on the death of its owner, contains always the *eſcutcheon*, or armorial enſigns of the family.

Ancient *eſcutcheons* are ſpeaking *arms*. They record and hand down to poſterity, the exploits and alliances of our anceſtors.

Artiſan, Artificer.

Both one and the other of theſe, are men who labour and work by hand. But the *artiſan* is employed in ſome mechanical art; the *artificer* in ſome particular kind of work; the firſt is a tradeſman, the other a labourer. The *artiſan* profeſſes; the *artificer*

tificer executes; of courſe, *artificer* is a more extenſive word than *artiſan*.

We uſe the word *artificer*, when ſpeaking of workmen of various denominations. Thus we ſay, to erect a great building, a number of *artificers* are employed, of which many are ingenious *artiſans*, as maſons, joiners, painters.

In a manufactory or ſhop, the maſter is generally an *artiſan*; his ſervants are *artificers*. The *artificers* work for the *artiſan*, the *artiſan* for the public.

Artiſan, Artiſt.

Artiſan implies the profeſſion of low and common tradeſmen, as the ſhoemakers, the carpenters, the blackſmiths, &c. But *artiſt* alludes to higher and more liberal profeſſions, as that of painter, ſculptor, architect, engraver, &c.

The *artiſts* of this country are an honour to it, and one age ſeems to riſe upon another in excellence.

Of all members of ſociety, *artiſans* are the moſt uſeful; they ſupply the wants of the people, add to the comforts of life, and, in ſo doing, increaſe the revenue of the ſtate.

Aſylum, Refuge.

Theſe are places of ſhelter and ſecurity; but the *refuge* is an *aſylum*, to which we fly when purſued, to avoid danger.

When we fear danger, we ſeek an *aſylum*; but when aſſailed by that danger, we ſeek a *refuge*; ſo in want, we require an *aſylum*; in neceſſity, a *refuge*.

A port is at all times an *aſylum*: in tempeſtuous weather, it is a *refuge*.

Adam

Adam, chaſed from the *aſylum* of innocence, knew not where to find a *refuge* from the purſuit of the exterminating angel; "Where," ſays he, ſhall I fly from thy face?"

Cicero called the Roman ſenate an *aſylum* for kings, for people, and for nations; but theſe nations, theſe people, theſe kings, were preſently in want of a *refuge*, from the tyranny of Rome.

The favourite of Arcadius, who was the firſt to aboliſh the right of *aſylum*, was the foremoſt to ſeek a *refuge* againſt an adverſe fortune.

Let us prepare an *aſylum* in our own heart, and a *refuge* in the arms of Providence.

Death is an *aſylum* to old age, a *refuge* to deſpair.

But the word *aſylum*, is particularly uſed to denote a ſacred *aſylum*, to which, in ſome Roman Catholic countries, a criminal can fly and be ſecure from the hand of juſtice. *Refuge* implies no ſuch idea.

To *Attribute*, *Impute*.

Theſe two words expreſs the action of laying a thing to the charge of ſome perſon: to *attribute* it to him, is to place it to his account, by the mere ſimple aſſertion, that he was the direct author of it. To *impute* it, is to place it to his account by induction, conjecture, or ſuppoſition. It is things themſelves that we generally *attribute*; and the merit of thoſe things which we *impute*.

Theologians, in the Roman Catholic faith, *attribute* the oracles of Paganiſm to the devil; and teach, that the church may *impute* to us the ſuperabundant merits of the ſaints.

We *attribute* a calumny to him whom we believe to be author of it; we *impute* an event to him whom we conceive, from a variety of circumſtances, more or leſs remote, to have been the direct or accidental

cauſe of it. We *attribute* a fault to him, who, according to what we know, either committed, or immediately cauſed it to be committed; we *impute* a bad action to him, who, according to our conjectures, or ſuppoſition, was the firſt cauſe or inſtigator of it; of courſe then, we uſe the word *attribute* in a caſe where the perſon we ſpeak of was the immediate author of the thing; and *impute*, where the perſon brought the matter about by his advice or inſtigation.

Thus, we *attribute* the ruin of empires to conquerors, becauſe they complete it; but we ought to *impute* it to a bad government, that being the firſt cauſe. We can never overthrow an empire, till it is firſt ſhaken.

There is a degree of uncertainty in *attributing*; we do it from appearances; it requires ſome proofs to *impute*, and we do it from circumſtances; *impute*, therefore, implies more direct charge than *attribute*.

We *attribute* what is real, or that which we believe ſo; we *impute* often what is imaginary. We *attribute* a ſpeech in the ſenſe it was ſpoken; we turn the ſenſe of the words, and *impute* that which was never in the ſpeaker's thoughts.

Malice is always diſpoſed to *attribute* to us crimes, which ſhe can any way charge us with. Wickedneſs, when it cannot calumniate our actions, will *impute* to us bad views, thoughts, and intentions. One loves to find us and declare us culpable; the other takes pains to apply the charge, and make us appear ſo, and judges accordingly.

The wolf in the fable, unable to *attribute* any crime to the lamb, *imputes* an imaginary one to his father, that he might devour him, with a ſhadow of juſtice.

It reſults from theſe obſervations, that to *attribute*, is taken indifferently either in good or bad part; to *impute*, is generally taken in bad part. We *attribute* virtues

virtues as well as vices; but we *impute* rather vices than virtues.

To *attribute*, is applied equally in a phyſical as a moral ſenſe. An effect, we *attribute* to ſome cauſe, as we do an action to ſome perſon. The flux and reflux of the ſea are *attributed* to the combined action of the ſun and moon. But to *impute*, is ſeldom uſed but in a moral ſenſe. The *imputed* righteouſneſs of Chriſt, is a favourite doctrine of enthuſiaſts.

Exaction, Extortion.

Conſidered in a law-ſenſe, theſe words imply a wrong done by an officer, one in pretended authority, by taking a reward or fee, for that which the law allows not; and the diſtinction between the two is this.

Extortion, is where an officer takes more than his due, when ſomething is due to him; *exaction* is, when he wreſts a fee or reward, where none is due.

By ſtatute, he, who *exacts* from a man, is liable to be fined and impriſoned, and to render to the party twice as much as the money he ſo takes. He who *extorts*, may be fined and impriſoned.

Extortion has been deemed more odious than robbery, becauſe it carries an appearance of truth, and is often accompanied with perjury, in officers, &c. by breaking their oaths of office.

In a larger ſenſe, *extortion* is taken for any oppreſſion, by power, or pretence of right.

Therefore, For this reaſon, So.

The phraſe, *for this reaſon*, is uſed with moſt propriety, when the reaſon, motive, principle, or cauſe which determines a thing, is given in the ſame

paſſage; as for example, " God is good; it is *for this reaſon* that he afflicts us, in order to draw us to himſelf. Such a father is too indulgent, *for this reaſon*, his ſon is ungovernable. I believe ſuch and ſuch a thing to be proper and uſeful, *for this reaſon*, I do it. You love me, ſays a child to its parent, *for this reaſon*, you correct me. In all theſe examples, the phraſe *for this reaſon* indicates, that the firſt propoſition is the reaſon of the other.

Therefore is beſt uſed, where, between two propoſitions, there is a perfect equality or correſpondence, and it is requiſite to connect them, as in the following. You have eaten too much, *therefore* digeſt your food ill. Theſe two propoſitions are equal in conſequence, for they may be reverſed, and the word *therefore*, will ſtand equally well between them. You digeſt your food ill, *therefore* you have eaten too much. Your thought is noble, it is *therefore*, a mark of genius.—It is a thought of genius, *therefore*, it is noble. Miſs B. is beautiful, *therefore* ſhe is admired.—Miſs B. is admired, *therefore* ſhe is beautiful. This word expreſſes then in a very energetic manner, the exact relation in which one propoſition ſtands to another, as the cauſe and its effect, the principle and its conſequence, the event and its reſult, &c.

Much leſs preciſe in its idea is the word *ſo*, of courſe, leſs energetic in expreſſion, denoting only in things, a conformity, reſemblance, analogy, agreement, or compariſon, as in the following examples. The owl ſeeks obſcurity, *ſo* does the wicked. The dove ſoftens in its craw, the grain with which it feeds its young; *ſo* does a tender mother prepare and ſoften inſtruction, that her children may reliſh it. Sometimes the relation is more pointed; for example: As there are degrees of virtue, *ſo* are there of vice. It often points out an exact conformity between things, as facts with their recitals, thoughts with

with the wills of perſons, as for inſtance. *So* is the thing which I have related. *So* goes the world.

You believe that diſtreſſed virtue is ſtill more happy than triumphant vice; *ſo* do I, &c.

It is the ſame, when this word eſtabliſhes a dependance between two propoſitions, as a ſinner (the pious thief on the croſs) was converted at the hour of his death, *ſo* we need not deſpair; it was, however, but one ſinner, *ſo* we need not preſume. Here is a motive, a reaſon drawn from an example. We have ſome buſineſs to tranſact in the ſame place, *ſo* let us go together. Here is an agreement. Thus does the word *ſo* denote a conformity, analogy, or agreement between the objects of the two propoſitions it connects.

It is not ſufficient to ſay, that a term is ſometimes an adverb, ſometimes a conjunction; that ſometimes it ſignifies one thing, ſometimes another. It ſhould always be properly applied, and thoſe who would ſpeak either with preciſion or elegance, will be nice in the choice of words.

Axiom, Maxim, Sentence, Apothegm, Aphoriſm.

Theſe are all unconnected, energetic ſentences, but by no means carry one and the ſame ſenſe.

Axiom, is a Greek word, and ſignifies literally, majeſty or authority. Logicians have uſed it, in a different ſenſe, to expreſs a principle, a general truth, or a propoſition full and perfect, expreſſing a truth or falſehood; a propoſition worthy to be received of itſelf, without any additional authority. *Maxim*, from *maximus* greateſt, is a ſublime propoſition, worthy of being engraved upon the mind. *Sentence*, implies generally a moral thought, as the proverbs of Solomon. *Apothegm*, is a propoſition generally uſed to enforce the ſenſe of a word, a *bon mot*, a repartee, or a remarkable ſaying. *Aphoriſm*

is

is defined by Galen, to be an idea, an expreſſion that contains every quality of a thing in a few words.

An *axiom* then is a propoſition, a capital truth, ſo principal and evident in itſelf, that it keeps, by its own force, with an irrefragable authority, the mind well diſpoſed. It is the torch of ſcience. A *maxim* is a propoſition, conveying an important inſtruction, to guide men in the career of life; of courſe, it is a great rule of conduct. A *ſentence* is a propoſition, conveying, in few words, a moral ſentiment, the thought in which is ſtriking, independent of the language. An *apothegm* is a remarkable ſaying, which energetically written or delivered, makes a lively impreſſion on us. It is a brilliancy of the mind. An *aphoriſm*, is a doctrinal precept conveyed in a few words.

An *axiom* ſtands forth of itſelf, to him who is ſearching for truth, and convinces him. A *maxim* is the reſult of obſervation, the conſtant effect drawn from any principle. A *ſentence* ſeems formed by an aſſemblage of truths, collected to eſtabliſh one certain truth. An *apothegm*, is, as it were, inſpired by the occaſion, and by a colliſion with it, as iron with flint, gives forth fire. An *aphoriſm*, grows under the methodical pen of a very judicious writer, who, after having well conſidered, and happily digeſted his thoughts, gives them in form.

According to the above diſtinctions, the following are *axioms*. "Two bodies cannot occupy the ſame ſpace, at one and the ſame time. Two things equal to a third, are equal among themſelves. The power of the prince, is merely the power of the law."

The following are *maxims*: "Always look forward to the end. Know thyſelf. If you would *grow* merits, ſay the Perſians, you muſt *ſow* rewards. Of many evils, ſays Ariſtotle, chuſe the leaſt. Adviſe with *many* on what you *ought* to do, but with

with *few*, or rather with *one*, on what you are going to do. Repeal a law, ſaid Locke, if ſociety is happier *without* it, than *with* it. Government ſhould proportion its *expences* to its *revenue*, and not its *revenue* to its *expences*."

The following propoſitions are conſidered as *ſentences*: "Misfortunes are the great teachers of mankind; or, as the Greek adage ſays, that which *wounds* us, *inſtructs* us. Juſtice, ſays Pythagoras, is the ſalt of life, that is, preſerves it from corruption. If the king, ſays the Perſian proverb, would gather an apple in the garden of a ſubject, his courtiers will ſhake the tree. He who does not bluſh, ſays Chou-king, at an involuntary fault, commits another fault. The head of him turns round, who raiſes himſelf too high. Knoweſt thou, ſays Seneca, what that man wants who poſſeſſes every thing? Some one to tell him the truth. To adviſe a deſpot, ſays a Chineſe proverb, is to waſh our hands in one's own blood. In proportion to the corruption of *manners*, ſaid Tacitus, is the corruption of *laws*."

The following traits are recorded as *apothegms*, the conſul Carbon, threatening the life of old Caſtricius, the inflexible defender of his country's intereſt, ſaid to him, "he has many *weapons*; and I, replied the intrepid old man, have many *years*." The Roman Senate, enraged at the revolt of the Pridernates, aſked their chief what puniſhment they deſerved? "That, replied the captive, which men deſerve, who think themſelves worthy of liberty; and, continued the conſul Portius, If they are pardoned, how long will they preſerve the peace? For ever, retorts he, If that peace be favourable; if not, a very little time." Leonidas being aſked, "Why brave men preferred honour to life? anſwered, becauſe they hold their life from *fortune*; their honour from *virtue*." Cleomenes uſed to ſay, "that *he* was a *good* king who did ſervice to his friend

friend, and diſſervice to his enemies; but that he was a *better*, who made his enemies his friends, by doing *them* ſervice."

The following propoſitions are *aphoriſms*. "Maladies, according to Hippocrates, are cured by nature, and not by remedies; it being the virtue of remedies to aſſiſt nature. "Power," ſay the Logicians, "leads to action, underſtanding to truth, and the will to good." "Three things, ſaid Ariſtides, conſtitutes a good ſoldier. To will, reſpect, and obey." The following definitions may be conſidered as *aphoriſms*, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe: "The wicked man, ſaid Hobbes, is a robuſt child." "Good men, ſaid Philo, the Jew, are the champions of virtue."

Babler, Prater.

Theſe are both great and inceſſant talkers; but the firſt fatigues you with words, and, like a child, talks a great deal and ſays nothing. The other, in ſaying a great deal, ſpeaks without any regard to diffidence or good manners, like a forward boy. The *babbler* muſt talk. The *prater* muſt converſe. The firſt will tell you all he knows; the latter, not only what he knows, but what he knows not.

Never tell your ſecrets to a *babbler*, he is indiſcreet and inconſiderate. Have no ſociety with a *prater*, he is indiſcreet and impertinent.

It is the women that are generally *babblers*; the men, that are *praters*.

The characteriſtics of a *babbler*, are levity, futility, and childiſhneſs. Thoſe of a *prater*, pretenſion, importance, and obſtinacy.

A *babbler* has ſometimes a livelineſs about him, which pleaſes and entertains for a time; he is an agreeable chatterer; but the *prater* not only fatigues, by his labouring to prove all he ſays, and diſplay

diſplay his flow of words; he alſo wears you out with his inſupportable noiſe. We ſay a pretty *babbler*, and a tireſome *prater*.

The *babbler* tires you, though he has nothing to ſay; the *prater* does the ſame, though he has a great deal to ſay. We can, ſometimes, make a *babbler* hold his tongue; but a *prater*, never.

Salluſt ſays of a *babbler*, "A good deal of babble, but little ſenſe," and of a *prater*, "That he has much tongue, but nothing elſe."

To *Stutter*, *Stammer*.

Both theſe words expreſs a defect in ſpeaking, but a defect of different kinds.

He who *ſtutters*, is at a loſs for articulation. He who *ſtammers*, at a loſs for words.

Defects in the organization of the tongue, will make a man *ſtutter*; but it is want of recollection that makes him *ſtammer*. Thus we ſee, that *ſtammerers* will ſpeak diſtinctly, if they ſpeak ſlow and deliberate; and a great *ſtammerer* in converſation, will read without any defect.

Stutterers find it very difficult to pronounce the letter *r*. *Stammerers* will heſitate in the middle of a word, loſing the recollection of it, after having pronounced the firſt ſyllable; and their heſitation ariſes from labouring to recover that word. Drunkenneſs will make a man *ſtammer*, but not *ſtutter*; ſo will timidity, hurry or ignorance; each of theſe being enemies to recollection.

To *Boggle*, *Heſitate*.

Boggle is rather a coarſe word, though made uſe of by Locke, Dryden, and ſome other of our beſt writers; but it alludes to a proverb of the Latins

hæſitare

hæſitare in luto, "to flounder in a bog, or *boggle* in a ſlough." To *boggle* then, according to the preſent acceptation, is to make vain efforts to get out of a ſituation, not being able to reſolve or get on; of courſe, when we have obſtacles to overcome, we *boggle*. When objects require conſideration, we *heſitate*.

I might run farther into the difference between theſe words, but as I would never make uſe of the word *boggle*, where I could poſſibly avoid it, enough has been ſaid upon the ſubject.

Kindneſs, Favour, Service, Good office.

A *kindneſs*, is a liberal act on the part of him who confers it, notwithſtanding he, to whom it is ſhewn, may deſire it; the characteriſtic of a *kindneſs*, being to render the condition of the perſon, we favour, better, from a natural inclination to contribute to the happineſs of our fellow-creatures. A *favour*, is a good done to one who has no claim to it, or a forgiving one who deſerves puniſhment. A *ſervice*, is an aſſiſtance given to a perſon to be of ſervice to him; the characteriſtic then of *ſervice*, is to be uſeful to the perſon we render it, either for his own ſake, or the ſake of ſome other. A *good office*, is a ſervice done to another, through our credit, our mediation, or our means. The characteriſtic of a *good office*, being to forward another's intereſt with affection and zeal, as far as we can; from a ſenſe of duty we owe him.

It is a *kindneſs*, to deliver the unfortunate from oppreſſion; it is a *favour*, to admit a man into a ſociety to which he has no claim, merely to gratify his vanity. It is a piece of *ſervice* to a man, to open his eyes to a ſnare laid for him, and of which he is unacquainted; and it is a *good office*, to help him forward in life through our intereſt.

We

We do *kindneſſes* from affection and humanity; *favours*, from partiality; *ſervices*, from zeal, and *good offices*, from friendſhip.

A *kindneſs* is a gift; a *favour* is a generoſity or condeſcenſion; *ſervice* is a voluntary tribute; and a *good office*, is an act of officious friendſhip.

A *kindneſs*, then, is a humane and generous action, that has a good and happy effect; and by this double act becomes one of the firſt ſocial virtues. A *favour* has not always the merit, or the importance of a *kindneſs*, for it is often little more than a civility. A *ſervice* carries with it an idea of dependance, and thus ſtands in oppoſition to *favour*. *Good office*, is literally a uſeful act, but combining with it that of officiouſneſs, becomes obliging, attentive and gracious.

He who does a man a *kindneſs*, finds the reward in his own heart. To a generous friend, *favours* confered, communicate greater pleaſure than *favours* received. He who expects *ſervices* from mankind, muſt be as ready to do them. An occaſional *good office* to a man, will often do him more eſſential *ſervice* than a ſum of money.

Inconſtant, Falſe, Fickle, Faithleſs.

Theſe terms are all calculated to expreſs the infidelity of one ſex to the other; but, though often confounded, they have all diſtinct meanings.

An *inconſtant* woman, or man, is one no longer in love; *falſe*, implies one already in love with another; *fickle*, he or ſhe who neither know whom they love, or whether they love or not; and *faithleſs*, one known to be ſo by the party aggrieved.

Inconſtant love implies love of ſhort duration, and apt to change. *Fickle* love is ſlight, and never violent. *Falſeneſs* denotes a change. *Faithleſs* is never

never uſed but where love has been reciprocal, of courſe, it implies treachery.

Men of the world are too apt to be *inconſtant* in their affections; their love is ſeldom otherwiſe than ſlight and *fickle*; they wander as do bees, from flower to flower, are *falſe*, often, where they profeſs the ſtrongeſt attachment, and glory in being *faithleſs*.

Starved, Famiſhed.

Starved implies killed by the deprivation of any thing neceſſary to life; *famiſhed*, killed by want of food ſolely; of courſe, *ſtarved* is a more general term than *famiſhed*.

We ſay, *famiſhed* with hunger or thirſt; *ſtarved* with cold, or *ſtarved* with want of food.

Many a perſon has been *famiſhed*, in paſſing the deſarts, for want of water; and many a traveller has been *ſtarved* to death with cold, in the regions of the North.

Sigh, Sob.

A *ſigh* is a violent and audible emiſſion of the breath, which has been long retained, and is cauſed by inſpiring ſtrongly, to relieve the labouring heart. A *ſob* is a convulſive *ſigh*, occaſioned by ſorrow.

Grown perſons *ſigh*; children *ſob*.

To be ſenſible of the diſtreſs of one we love, and hear them *ſigh*, awakens our feeling; but when they *ſob*, it pierces us to the heart.

Sighs are the language of ſorrow, and *ſobs* the convulſive throes of heart-felt diſtreſs.

Alley, Path.

The ſenſe in which I mean to conſider theſe words, is implying a way in a garden; for in no other ſenſe have they been uſed as ſynonimous.

They both mean a paſſage from one place to another, but *path* denotes a narrower one than an *alley*. We ſay narrow *paths*, and broad *alleys*.

In an *alley*, there is, or ſhould be, always room enough for two perſons to walk a breaſt; whereas in *paths*, there is ſeldom room for more than one. They are merely foot-*paths*.

Alleys are generally ſtrait and uniform, and *paths* are winding and intricate; we often hear of a crooked *path*, but ſeldom, if ever, of a crooked *alley*. In a figurative ſenſe, we often ſay the intricate and crooked *paths* of ſin.

An *alley* broader at the entrance, and narrower at the further end, gives an idea of length.

An *alley* is generally the work of art and deſign; a *path* the work of chance, being formed only by frequent treading.

No garden can be ſaid to be in order, unleſs the *alleys* are trimmed and kept clean, and the *paths* cleared away and open.

Anceſtor, Predeceſſor.

Theſe are our progenitors, in an aſcending degree of lineal deſcent, but the law makes a diſtinction between them.

Anceſtor applies to a natural perſon; ſuch a one and his *anceſtor*; *predeceſſor* to a body politic, or corporation, as a biſhop, or a parſon, and his *predeceſſor*.

A man of becoming pride, will never do any thing to diſgrace his *anceſtors*.

Whatever

Whatever our *predeceſſors*, time out of mind, have eſtabliſhed as a law or cuſtom, ſhould be attended to, and be a law to us.

Shore, Coaſt, Beach, Banks.

Theſe words refering to the ſea only, may be thus diſtinguiſhed.

The *ſhore* is that extremity of the land that touches the water. The *coaſt* is that part of the land which riſes above the water, commands it, and deſcends to it. The *beach* is that land between high-water and low-water mark. *Banks* are moſtly applied to rivers, but when ſpeaking of the ſea, they imply a high *ſhore*.

We ſay a high, flat or rocky-*ſhore*; the *coaſt* of Africa, the *coaſt* of France; the ſea-*beach*; the *banks* of the Thames, the *banks* of the Seine.

Shores are generally barren; *banks* frequently verdant and flowery. *Coaſts* are often mountainous; *beaches* generally flat, and with a gentle declivity to the water's edge.

The *ſhore* is, as it were, a *bank*, that confines the water, as a frame does a picture that it encircles; a *coaſt* is a large and long barrier, which arreſts the water, rejects it and throws it back, and is the defence of the land; the *beach* is the ſtrand which the water leaves at its ebb, and on which we can often travel for miles.

That kingdom is a powerful one, whoſe *coaſts* have a number of ſea-ports, where induſtry and care, maſters of the ſea, keep the waters to their ancient *beaches*, and not ſuffer them either to bear or encroach upon their *ſhores*; whoſe rivers are acceſſible and open to the introduction of foreign wealth, and whoſe lands are cultivated even to the *banks* of thoſe rivers, and to the *ſhores* of the ſea.

Plot,

Plot, Conſpiracy.

Theſe words imply clandeſtine and ſecret aſſociations of perſons, combined to perpetrate ſome unlawful act; but they differ from each other, in reſpect to the perſons engaged, the object in view, and the means propoſed.

A *plot* may be concerted between two perſons only, though more are ſometimes concerned; but it requires more than two to form a *conſpiracy*.

Brutus and Caſſius *plotted* againſt the life of Cæſar; but a whole army of citizens, of all ranks, joined the *conſpiracy* of Cataline againſt the Republic.

Plots are often formed againſt private perſons; but *conſpiracies* are acts of treaſon againſt the ſtate. It is malignity and wickedneſs that inſpire *plots*; wrongheaded, diſcontented, bad citizens, that form *conſpiracies*.

The object of a *plot* is to injure, its views are always criminal; they are often laid to aſſaſſinate or take away the life of an individual. The object of a *conſpiracy* is to bring about a change of meaſures, whether it be good or bad, and oftener in public affairs than in private; it is generally an attack againſt the ſtate.

The concerted plan of traitors, to open the gates of a city to an enemy; that of villains, to charge a faithful domeſtic with a robbery, from a ſpirit of hatred; that of informers, to accuſe an individual, in order to curry favour with government; that of the ambitious, to calumniate or decry a miniſter, in order to ſucceed him; that of favourites, to aſſaſſinate another, in hopes of procuring his place and fortune; that of Thares, to cut the throat of Ahaſuerus, in order to diſpoſe of his throne. All theſe plans concerted between two or more, we call *plots*.

A meditated ſcheme or plan, of all orders of the ſtate,

ſtate, to put an elective crown on the head of the greateſt citizen; or of any particular ſet of men, to change the government, we call a *conſpiracy*. It was a *conſpiracy* of the lower order of people, againſt the nobles, that brought about the revolution in Sweden; and it was the *conſpiracy* of Cromwell and his party, that changed the monarchical government of this kingdom into a commonwealth.

Theſe words differ alſo in their means purſued. A *plot* is carried on by dark and ſecret means; a *conſpiracy* by profound and dreadful plans. A *plot* chiefly requires intrepidity; a *conſpiracy*, prudence. A *plot* has a blow to ſtrike; a *conſpiracy*, ſucceſs to be planned. A *plot* requires artifice, cool blood, and ſudden execution; a *conſpiracy* demands council, unanimity, foreſight, nice circumſpection, wiſe meaſures, keen penetration, and ſound judgment.

The *conſpiracy* formed againſt the religion and government of this nation, had very nearly been attended with ſucceſs, in the reign of James I. for had the horrid *plot*, laid for blowing up the parliament, taken place, all would have been anarchy and confuſion, and the *conſpirators* would have been able to have carried things as they pleaſed.

Weakneſs, Imbecility, Feebleneſs.

The firſt is a general term, and may be applied to things animate and inanimate; the laſt two, are limited to the human race, and of theſe *imbecility* is more properly applied to the mind, *feebleneſs* to the body.

We ſay, a *weak* building; a *weak* fortune; a *weak* ſucceſſion; a *weak* animal: but the *imbecility* of the mind, and the *feebleneſs* of the human frame.

The *weakneſs* of a building, may ariſe from its being built with ſlight materials. *Imbecility* of intellects

lects may ariſe from a defect in the organization of the brain; but *feebleneſs* is generally the effect of ſickneſs or old age.

Lake, Pool, Pond.

When a large piece of water is formed by a river, or ſprings, which continually renew it, it is called a *lake*; whereas *pools* and *ponds* are conſtructed chiefly by ſhowers and land-drains, and their waters ſtagnated.

A *pool* implies deeper water than a *pond*, and is formed by nature; whereas *ponds* are generally artificial.

That which in a garden or field is called a *pond*, if conſiſting of many acres, and in an open country, would be called a *pool*; and if of ſtill greater extent, it would aſſume the name of *lake*.

Great ſpace then is eſſential to characteriſe a *lake*, not ſo a *pool* or *pond*. We ſay, the clear *lake*; a ſtinking *pool*, and a muddy *pond*.

Some *lakes*, are naturally of vaſt extent, and cover a great tract of country, as the *lake* of Harlaem, the *lake* of Geneva, &c. *Pools* are generally formed in depreſſions of the land, and thus become reſervoirs of water. *Ponds* are dug in every field, throughout a farm, for the convenience of cattle drinking.

Viſion, Dream.

Having pointed out the characteriſtic diſtinction between the words *viſion* and *apparition*, I will now do the ſame, between theſe before us.

Viſion then, is the repreſentation of ſome momentous thing to man, whilſt he is awake. *Dreams* are the effects of his imagination, whilſt aſleep.

One of the uſual ways which God made uſe of, in the infancy of the world, to communicate his mind to man, was by *viſion*. In ſuch a viſion did he appear to Moſes on the mountain (Exod. xxiv.) and in ſuch a *viſion* did he wreſtle with the Patriarch Jacob. The burning buſh of Moſes, that did not conſume, (Exod. iv. 3.) was a *viſion*, and ſo was the fire from the rock that conſumed the fleſh and the cakes, and appeared to Gideon (Judges vi. 20).

Dreams, though they are in general little elſe than the wanderings of the imagination, in the hoursof ſleep, have now and then been portentous, and ſent as warnings. Pharaoh's *dream* was prophetic, as interpreted by Joſeph; and ſo was Nebuchadnezzar's *dream*, explained by Daniel.

Good, Great.

Theſe words are not uſed as ſynonymous, but in one ſenſe, where they imply quantity, as when we call a *great* way, a *good* way; a *great* deal, a *good* deal, and a *great* many, a *good* many; it is proper, however, to ſhew the diſtinction between them.

Good, then, ſignifies ſomewhat leſs than *great*, and rather indicates a full proportion; whereas *great*, implies more than a full proportion. Thus, *good* meaſure is full meaſure; but *great* meaſure is full and running over. A *good*-ſized man, is one well proportioned as to ſize; but, a *great* ſized man, denotes one of gigantic ſtature.

It requires a *good* many articles to furniſh an apartment well, but a *great* many would croud it.

See *Much, a great deal.*

Heir-apparent, Preſumptive-heir.

Theſe expreſſions, like many others equally diſtinct, have been uſed in the Engliſh language, to denote

denote one and the ſame thing, but they are widely different.

An *heir-preſumptive* is one, between whom and the ſucceſſion, another perſon ſtands, and on whom that ſucceſſion may never perhaps devolve.

An *heir-apparent*, on the other hand, is one who has no competitor, to whom the ſucceſſion muſt come in the courſe of nature.

The eldeſt nephew of a married man, who has no children, is the *preſumptive-heir* to his title and eſtates, but not the *heir apparent*; as in caſe the uncle ſhould have a ſon, the nephew would not inherit.

The elder ſon of a man is his *heir-apparent*, as nothing can interrupt his ſucceſſion to his father's honours and fortune, but dying before him: if he outlives his father, he muſt ſucceed him.

A *preſumptive-heir*, if he is an ambitious man, might attempt to ſecure to himſelf the ſucceſſion of that, by improper means, which might never become his, by right; it may be neceſſary, therefore, to guard againſt the deſigns of a *preſumptive-heir*; but an *heir-apparent* having no temptation, to aim at ſecuring it by indirect or violent meaſures, is liable to no ſuch ſuſpicion.

To *Calculate*, *Reckon*, *Count*.

To *calculate*, is, properly ſpeaking, to make uſe of any means to procure a reſult; to *reckon*, is to apply certain means to the ſame end; to *count*, is merely to number or add.

Thus, to *calculate*, is to obtain a knowledge or demonſtration of a thing, by arithmetic, mathematics, &c. We *calculate* ſome things by figures, and others by lines. To *reckon*, is to aſſemble, combine, and add given numbers, ſo as to find the total or product. We *reckon* by figures only. To *count*, is

to number by memory, adding one given quantity to another. We *count* the clock. We *count* ten, twenty, and ſo on.

If *calculate* is applied to arithmetic, it is a more general term than either *reckon* or *count*. In the ſtudy of figures, a child firſt learns to *count* by its fingers, one, two, three, &c. it requires a further knowledge to be able to *reckon*, to find that one and two makes three; one and three, four, and ſo on; and much greater underſtanding to *calculate* by diviſion, multiplication, and ſubtraction.

Although the Romans *counted* by ſtones, it does not follow that they were not able to *reckon* any other way; for they made a variety of very ingenious *calculations* reſpecting ſociety.

Calculation is a ſcience, and purſues various means to produce a reſult. Aſtronomy *calculates* the return of comets. Geometry *calculates* diſtances, &c. We ſay aſtronomical and algebraical *calculations*.

Accounts, which is a ſubſtantive of the verb to *count*, relate to the affairs of intereſt, commerce, and finance; ſuch as receipts and debits. We ſay merchant's *accounts*, ſtate-*accounts*, &c.

Reckoning alludes to *calculations* and *accounts*. A chronologiſt *reckons* time, from one period to another, and often fixes his epoch by aſtronomy. Careful gentlemen of large property, if prudent, *reckon* often with their ſtewards.

Theſe terms, in their ſubſtantives, are uſed in a different ſenſe.

Reckoning, is implied in the ſenſe, as a ſettlement, or caſting-up of *accounts*. A ſhort *reckoning*, ſays the proverb, makes long friends. He who *reckons* without his hoſt, ſeldom *reckons* right.

Account rather implies a general ſtatement of ſundry articles. We ſay a long *account*, or a ſhort *account*; a fair and clear *account*; a general or political *account*.

Calculation always implies more than a ſtatement; it is rather the reſult of an enquiry. Thus we ſay, a laboured or ingenious *calculation*; an exact or a juſt *calculation*.

The tradeſman who makes good *calculations*, with reſpect to the profits of his buſineſs, ſtates his *accounts* fairly, and *reckons* right, is not liable to ſuſtain much loſs.

Elegance, Grace.

When theſe words allude to the human figure, *elegance* is confined to the form, *grace* to the motions. Though a perſon cannot be truly *elegant*, that is not *graceful*. We ſay an *elegant* figure, a *graceful* walk.

Nature gives *elegance*; education, *grace*. Let a girl be ever ſo *elegantly* made, without care is taken to preſerve this *elegance*, by education, the inſtruction of the dancing-maſter, and an aſſociation with perſons of refined manners, ſhe will grow up awkward and uncouth; but teach her to carry herſelf well, give her a *graceful* ſtep, and bring her into faſhionable company, and ſhe will be an *elegant* woman.

See *Graces*.

Hiſtory, Annals.

Hiſtory, in the Greek, ſignifying the knowledge of things preſent, is properly a recital of things which the author has ſeen; whereas *annals* relate to the tranſactions of others, and ſuch as the writer never was an eye-witneſs of.

Under this idea, Tacitus, the great Analiſt, calls that part of his works, which treats of times prior to his exiſtence, *annals*; but when he comes to treat of his own times, he changes his title, and calls his

work *hiſtory*. In this ſenſe of the words, then, Robertſon is an *Analiſt*, and Burnet an *Hiſtorian*.

But this diſtinction is too nice. According to Sempronius Aſellios, and the modern acceptation of the word, *annals* are a bare relation of what paſſes each year; whereas *hiſtory* relates not only to tranſactions themſelves, but gives the cauſes, ſprings and motives of them. The *Annaliſt* merely ſtates his facts, but the *Hiſtorian* reaſons and deſcants on them.

Cicero ſays that *Hiſtory*, in its original, was the compoſition of *Annals*.

The *Annales maximi*, or great *annals*, of Rome, conſiſted of eighty books; but were moſt of them deſtroyed, when that city was burnt by the Gauls.

Robertſon's *hiſtory* of Charles V. is reckoned the moſt finiſhed of all his works.

Cato, Pictor, Antipater, and Grotius, were *Annaliſts*. Bacon, Clarendon, and Rapin, were *Hiſtorians*.

See *Hiſtory*.

Ancient, Antique.

Ancient differs from *antique*, as the genus from its ſpecies.

Ancient denotes a thing which exiſted in times long ago: ſo does *antique*; but *antique* refers to ſuch pieces of *ancient* architecture, ſculpture, paintings, &c. as were made by the *ancient* Greeks and Romans, when theſe arts were in the greateſt perfection.

We ſay the *ancient* inhabitants of Britain; *ancient* times, *ancient* manners, &c. but an *antique* coin, an *antique* building; or a building after the *antique* taſte, &c.

Antique is ſometimes contradiſtinguiſhed from *ancient*, as denoting a leſs degree of *antiquity*. Thus, *ancient* architecture is ſo much more valuable than

antique

antique architecture, being more venerable from age.

The *ancient* bas-relievos of the Greeks, are in much higher eſtimation than the *antique* buſts of the Romans, as they ſhew an earlier knowledge in the art of ſculpture.

Arched, Vaulted.

Both theſe words refer to architecture, and imply a concave ſtructure raiſed on a ſemicircular mould; but *vaulted* conveys an idea of greater ſpace than *arched*, and much more lofty.

An *arch*, according to Sir Henry Wotton, is a contracted *vault*, and a *vault* a dilated *arch*. Doorways are *arched*; cielings are *vaulted*.

Any thing however diminutive, if regularly carved and ſemicircular, may be ſaid to be *arched*; as an *arched* eye-brow; but *vaulted* cannot be uſed but where there is an idea of expanſe, as the *vaulted* dome, the *vaulted* canopy of Heaven.

Acclivity, Declivity.

Of theſe two words, though they have a diſtinct meaning from each other, *declivity* is generally uſed to expreſs both. Whether we riſe a hill or deſcend it, if it is ſteep, we are apt to ſay the *declivity* is great. In coming down the hill, we may ſo expreſs ourſelves, and with propriety; but not ſo in going up, for though the deſcent of a hill is its *declivity*, the aſcent of the ſame hill is its *acclivity*.

If we go up a hill with bended knees, and blindfold, we ſhall not be ſo ſenſible of its *acclivity*.

In running down a hill, the ſharper its *declivity* is, the greater velocity we acquire in the motion.

Affidavit, Oath.

Lawyers have made a very proper diſtinction between theſe words. They both imply ſolemn and judicial ſwearing; but *affidavit* is an *oath*, written down and ſworn to; whereas an *oath* is merely taken before a perſon authoriſed to adminiſter it, without any writing; of courſe, an *affidavit* is an *oath*, but an *oath* is not an *affidavit*.

Affidavits are admitted and read in courts, on motions made by counſel; but on the trial, they are not allowed: the parties muſt perſonally prove the matter upon *oath*.

Unnatural, Not natural.

Theſe terms both expreſs a deviation from nature, but in different ſenſes; the firſt implies hard-hearted, the ſecond artificial.

When we paſs an opinion, on an imitation of nature, we either ſay it is *natural* or *not natural*. If art is too viſible in its formation, and it appears ſtudied, we pronounce it *not natural*. When we ſpeak of an unfeeling mother, we call her *unnatural*.

As the beauties of nature far exceed thoſe of art; if we attempt to imitate her in all her wild and fancied irregularities; ſhould our object in the diſpoſal *not* be *natural*, they loſe their effect, and, inſtead of beauties become deformities.

Ingratitude, undutifulneſs to parents, was conſidered by the Romans as ſo very *unnatural*, and of courſe, ſo unlikely to take place, that they made no law to puniſh it.

The term *not natural*, we ſometimes uſe in a figurative ſenſe, to denote an impediment or abſurdity in concluſions. It is *not natural*, we ſay, to ſuppoſe a man

a man can make a good husband, who is not a good son.

Non-naturals, is also a technical term in medicine, and implies a different thing.

Collation, Institution.

Both these words imply giving a minister possession of a benefice; but the first is performed by the bishop, at his own instance or motion; the latter, at the instance or presentation of another.

Thus, when a man has obtained a living from a bishop, we say, such a person *collated* him, or gave him *collation*; when any other person presents, we say the bishop *instituted* him, or gave him *institution*.

By *collation*, the church is not full; that is, the person *collated*, may be removed, unless the bishop had a right to *collate*; the bishop's *collation* being no more, in this respect, than a temporary provision for the celebration of divine service, till the patron presents; but *institution* gives full possession.

Collation, Presentation.

Here too there is a necessary distinction to be made. The former is the act of the bishop, the latter of a patron; presenting a clergyman to the bishop to be instituted.

Where a bishop is the patron of a living himself, and he gives to a clergyman, we say, he gives the *collation*; but where a living is given by any other patron, it is called a *presentation*.

The advowsons of livings, being like estates in the possession of laymen, *presentations* to such livings, are sometimes publicly sold; but *collations* never. A bishop, having the *collation* of a living, cannot

preſent himſelf; but a clergyman having a *preſentation*, can.

Motion, Movement.

Motion is natural; *movement*, mechanical. *Motion* is a continued and ſucceſſive change of place, and uſed in oppoſition to a thing at reſt, and is more general than *movement*, which is confined to a certain combination, of mechanical principles.

We ſay, the *motion* of the heavenly bodies; the diurnal *motion* of the earth; and, when an army is on its march, we ſay it is in *motion*; but the inſide of a clock or watch, we call its *movement*; ſo do we certain paſſages in muſic.

The doctrine and laws of *motion* make the ſubject of mechanics.

The projectile powers of a water-engine depend upon the principles of its *movement*.

The excellence of a ſonata depends upon the harmony and variety of its *movements*.

Harbour, Haven, Port.

Harbour is the genus; *haven* and *port* the different ſpecies of that genus. Thus, though *haven* and *port* are both *harbours*, it does not follow, that a *harbour* is either a *haven* or a *port*.

Some roads at ſea are good *harbours* for ſhips. Any place where there is good anchorage, may be called a *harbour*; but *haven* or *port* imply a ſafer ſhelter from weather and enemies.

Harbours are of two kinds, natural and artificial. Natural *harbours* are called *havens*, artificial ones *ports*, or *ſea-ports*.

Havens are thoſe *harbours* which Providence ſeems to have formed, for the communication of commerce,

merce, where the natural figure of the land is ſuch, as contributes to the ſafety of ſhipping therein.

Ports are formed with piers, moles, and ſecured by boom-chains.

The properties of a good *harbour*, are ſufficient depth of water for large ſhips, good offing and anchoring ground, an eaſy and ready acceſs to a *port* or *haven*.

Breſt is the fineſt natural *haven* in the world; and Dunkirk, before the demolition of the Jettees, was the ſtrongeſt *port*.

Cuſtom, Preſcription, Uſage.

The ſenſe in which I mean to conſider theſe words, is that of a right and title in law, acquired by uſe and time.

Cuſtom is always applied to a certain place, and properly a local *uſage*, not annexed to any particular perſon; ſuch as a *cuſtom* in the manor of Dale, that lands ſhall deſcend to the youngeſt ſon; whereas *preſcription* is merely a perſonal *uſage*, as that A. B. and his anceſtors, or thoſe whoſe eſtate he holds, have, time immemorial, poſſeſſed and uſed ſuch an advantage or privilege; for example, going through certain grounds, &c. Thus, *preſcription* belongeth only to one, or a few; whereas *cuſtom* is common to all. *Uſage* is applied to either places, or perſons, as to the inhabitants of a town to have a way, &c.

Cuſtom and *preſcription* refer to the right; *uſage*, to the poſſeſſion.

By *cuſtom*, and *preſcription*, the inhabitants of a pariſh may dig gravel in certain places.

No man can claim a rent, the uſe of a common, or other inheritance, by *uſage*, though he may, by *preſcription*.

To be *Security*, *Reſponſible*, To *Guarantee*.

In matters of right and juſtice, he, who is *ſecurity* engages to make payments good: he, who *guarantees*, engages to ſee that ſtipulations and contracts are performed; he, who is *reſponſible*, engages to repair injuries, and indemnify from loſs.

The members of any ſociety ſtand *ſecurity* for each other. Adminiſtration *guarantees* the acts of the king. Parents are naturally *reſponſible* for their children.

Security, relates to pecuniary matters; *guarantee*, to poſſeſſions; *reſponſible*, to damages. The firſt engages to pay; the ſecond, to protect; the third, to repair injuries: the firſt pledges fortune and perſon; the ſecond, power and authority; the laſt, care and abilities.

He who is *ſecurity* for the debts of another, is very likely to pay more than what he himſelf owes; for, Be bail and pay for it, is a maxim of the Grecians.

Kings, in order to make peace, frequently *guarantee* the treaties of their allies.

By the law of England, maſters are *reſponſible* for the acts of their ſervants.

But, independent of matters of right, in a more extenſive ſenſe of the word, *ſecurity* refers to perſons; *guarantee* to acts, and *reſponſible*, to events.

A man, accuſtomed to deceive, is often in want of *ſecurity*. An extraordinary act, or contract, to be performed, requires frequently a *guarantee*, in whom greater confidence can be placed; but a man muſt ſhew much more powerful motives than common friendſhip, to be *reſponſible* for future events, which are caſual and uncertain.

A man of probity is ſometimes *ſecurity* for the fidelity and punctuality of another. Men frequently *guarantee* the acts of their agents; and perſons

ſons acquainted with the influence of cauſes, and the means that determine them, will often be *reſponſible* for the ſucceſs of an undertaking.

Wood, Timber.

Wood is a general term; *timber*, a particular one, being rather a ſpecies of *wood*.

By *timber* is underſtood, large tall trees, cut down for the uſe of being ſawn into planks, boards, and ſtuff, for the uſe of building; whereas *wood* is deſtined chiefly for the fire.

By *wood*, as a general term, is implied the ſubſtance of trees, whether large or ſmall. We ſay under-*wood*, bruſh-*wood*, faggot-*wood*, billet-*wood*; and we ſay alſo, that ſome kinds of trees yield very fine *wood*.

If there is too much *timber* in a foreſt, the under-*wood* will not thrive.

Timber is ſold by the load, which is fifty cubic feet; *wood* by the ſtack, which is generally twelve feet long, three feet high, and three broad.

Wood, in another ſenſe, is ſometimes uſed to expreſs an extent of ground covered with trees. Thus we ſay, a fine, thick *wood*; a beautiful, hanging *wood*. *Timber* is never uſed in this ſenſe; on the other hand, *timber* is uſed ſometimes to expreſs the main beams of a building, which are called the *timbers*; *wood* never is.

Into, In to.

The firſt is uſed in a direct ſenſe; the ſecond, in a figurative one.

We pour wine *into* a glaſs; we come *in to* the meaſures of another; or *in to* his way of thinking. Of courſe, *into* implies an entering or taking poſ-

ſeſſion

ſeſſion of; whereas the words *in to*, imply rather a junction.

He who goes *into* the grounds of another, to hunt without leave, is liable to be ſued for a treſpaſs.

When the Pretender landed in Scotland, and marched *into* England, as the people in his way did not come *in to* him, he was obliged to return.

Secretary of an Embaſſy, Ambaſſador's Secretary.

Theſe terms are often confounded; to prevent it in future, I will point out the diſtinction.

The *ſecretary of an embaſſy*, is a perſon attending an ambaſſador, for writing diſpatches relative to any particular embaſſy, on which ſuch ambaſſador is ſent, and is a ſervant of the crown.

An *ambaſſador's ſecretary*, is one employed by an ambaſſador, to write thoſe diſpatches, he is enjoined to tranſmit to his court, throughout the whole continuance of his office; and is a domeſtic and menial ſervant of the ambaſſador.

Of courſe, the *ſecretary to an embaſſy*, is a man of more weight and conſequence than an *ambaſſador's ſecretary*; and, in the abſence of ſuch ſpecial ambaſſador, is often left *charge des affaires*; which the other is not.

Painter, Limner.

The ſenſe in which I mean to conſider the word *painter*, is, that of picture-painting; and it differs from *limner*, as the firſt paints in oil; the other, in water-colours.

Sir Joſhua Reynolds was one of the beſt portrait *painters* of his age; and Cotes ſtands unrivalled as a *limner* in miniature.

There

There is ſuch a rage at preſent for pictures, that daubings by *limners* are coveted, by thoſe who cannot afford to pay *painters* a good price, for landſkips in oil.

Certainly, with Certainty.

The phraſe *with certainty* denotes, by a ſimple aſſertion, that we have the moſt powerful motives to aſſure us, or the ſtrongeſt reaſons to believe, or ſpeak of a thing as *certain* in itſelf, or of which we are *certain.*

The adverb *certainly* is an affirmation, that declares our conviction, or perſuaſion of a thing; and the authority, we would give our aſſertions by our own teſtimony; rather than the reaſons which lead us to it, or on which we ground our belief.

By what fatality does it happen, ſay ſome men, that, when the age grows more and more enlightened, the morals of mankind ſhould grow more and more corrupt?—If we ſuppoſe they do, we muſt judge from appearances, and not *with certainty.* I am *certainly* far from thinking, that ſcience brings in corruption with its knowledge. The more the ſun ſhines, the brighter is the day. We may ſay *with certainty*, that "the light is gone, and the darkneſs comprehendeth it not," that ſuch light has not *certainly* ſufficient power to correct every degree of evil, without the interference of laws; but a progreſs in knowledge, ſhews the neceſſity of ſuch laws, and it is by the puniſhment of vice, that bad morals fall more under our notice; not that they are more general than in times leſs enlightened: and *certainly* men judge wrong, and miſlead mankind, when they make ſuch aſſertions with any degree of *certainty.* (See *adverbs*, and *adverbial phraſes.*)

To

To *Stagger, Totter.*

The act of *ſtaggering* implies a defect in the head; that of *tottering*, a defect in the limbs. The firſt ariſes from giddineſs, not being able to preſerve an equilibrium; the laſt, from feebleneſs and want of ſtrength.

A drunken man *ſtaggers*; an old man *totters*.

A man may turn ſo often as to make his head ſwim, and cauſe him to *ſtagger*. Children, before they have ſtrength enough to walk firm, will *totter*.

Vertigo will make a man *ſtagger*, and long illneſs will make him *totter*.

In an allegorical ſenſe alſo they have the ſame diſtinction. An unexpected and diſagreeable occurrence will ſometimes *ſtagger* a man, and diſorder his intellects. His head will run round, and he ſhall ſcarce know what he is about. When, from the feebleneſs of government, a ſtate ſhall begin to *totter*; there are not wanting diſaffected ſubjects that take pains to haſten its overthrow.

To *Drop, Fall, Tumble.*

To *drop*, ſeems to imply a certain ſpecies of *falling* from a loſs of ſupport; gentle, eaſy, and perpendicular; and to *fall*, implies loſs of equilibrium, or overthrow. To *tumble*, inſinuates great violence and noiſe.

Water *drops*, the dew *drops*, a curtain *drops*; a ladder, or a pillar may *fall*; and a horſe may *tumble* down.

So, in an allegorical ſenſe; in epileptic fits, a man *drops* ſuddenly.

The *fall* of ſome men, from a ſtate of elevation, are no leſs remarkable inſtances of divine diſpleaſure,

ſure, than the ſudden exaltation of others are of its favour.

As great as men may ſometimes fancy themſelves, and as much beyond the reach of fate; there have been times, when, in commotions of the ſtate, tyrants have met their deſerts, and have been *tumbled* from their thrones.

Heaven, Paradiſe.

Both theſe words are uſed in a religious ſenſe, to denote the place where the righteous ſhall enjoy the preſence of God in a future life. Exaltation to the higheſt, and ſublimity, is all we underſtand by *Heaven*; whereas by *paradiſe*, we would convey an idea of a ſpiritual *paradiſe*, in alluſion to that terreſtrial one, or that bleſſed ſtate of innocence in which our firſt parents were placed, prior to the commencement of ſin.

Heaven is the peculiar reſidence of glory; *paradiſe*, that of the bleſſed.

Heaven is the tabernacle; the temple, the throne of the Divinity; there the ſaints ſee God, face to face, contemplate him, adore him, glorify him. *Paradiſe* is the inheritance, the city of the bleſſed. It is God that conſtitutes *heaven*; celeſtial happineſs, that forms a *paradiſe*. *Paradiſe* is in *heaven*.

Mahomet, on the model of Odin, and other human inſtituters of religion, has created a *paradiſe*; but the idea of *heaven* belongs only to God. The very Indians, when they announce an intimate union with God, ſeem to have an idea of *heaven*; but their hopes reach no farther than to a ſenſual *paradiſe*.

Cloiſter, Convent, Monaſtery.

Theſe words are better underſtood in thoſe countries where ſuch inſtitutions exiſt, than in England; it is, however, neceſſary to underſtand them here.

Cloiſter is a general term, of which *convent* and *monaſtery* are rather the ſpecies, and implies a religious houſe ſhut up from ſociety. *Convent* is ſuch a religious houſe for nuns, and *monaſtery* for monks or friars.

But the idea of a *cloiſter* is, that of an encloſure; the true idea of a *convent*, that of a community, and the true idea of a *monaſtery*, that of ſolitude. Thus, he who would abſolutely divoree himſelf from the world, ſhuts himſelf up in a *cloiſter*; he who would renounce a commerce with the world, places himſelf in a *convent*, and he who would fly the world, retires to a *monaſtery*.

A *cloiſter* raiſes, between the world and us, a wall of ſeparation, to ſecure us from its attacks, and defend us from our own wickedneſs. A *convent* reunites us to a ſociety, the reverſe of that of the world; to free us by the force of example, and exerciſes of piety, from a taſte for life, and the influence of the world; and a *monaſtery* buries us in a deſart, to make us dead to the world, and alive to God.

In a *cloiſter*, we ſacrifice our liberty to carry the yoke of diſcipline; in a *convent*, we renounce ancient cuſtoms, and contract the habits of a regular ſociety; in a *monaſtery*, we are in a land of exile, and live only for futurity.

But in the common acceptation of theſe words, as I have obſerved, a *cloiſter* is a general term, and implies any monaſtic, ſecluded ſtate. *Monaſteries* are only thoſe houſes of ancient monks, as the Benedictines, and others of ſome antiquity; whereas

convents

convents imply the more modern houſes of monks and friars.

Convents and *monaſteries*, in this country, we have none, but *cloiſters* many; theſe are the remaining quadrangles of certain ancient abbies, or *monaſteries*, ſurrounded with colonades, and ſo called, as the *cloiſters* of Weſtminſter-abbey; the *cloiſters* of Chriſt's hoſpital, London, &c.

To *Cloſe*, *Shut*.

The proper idea of *cloſe*, is to join or unite things, or their parts, in ſuch a manner, as there ſhall be no interſtice between them, and not again to be divided; the proper idea of *ſhut*, is to ſtop up a paſſage or way, to be opened occaſionally.

We *cloſe* a joint; we *ſhut* a window or door, voluntarily.

We *ſhut* our eyes, in order to go to ſleep; but death *cloſes* them for ever.

To *Encloſe*, *Shut up*.

Both theſe words imply confinement; but one open, the other cloſe.

Fowlers *encloſe* birds in nets; goalers *ſhut up* criminals in priſon.

Encloſe conveys an idea of ſurrounding or hemming in; *ſhutting up*, that of ſtopping up a way or a paſſage. We *encloſe* a yard, a field, or one cellar in another. We *ſhut up* an entry or a window.

To *encloſe*, is again more properly applied to extenſive open and uncovered places, as pieces of land or water; *ſhut up*, to ſuch as are more circumſcribed and covered, as buildings, cloſets, boxes.

Fields and meadows are *encloſed* with hedges, and parks with pales; but barns, outhouſes, and ſhops, are

are *ſhut up* with doors and windows; trunks, cheſts, &c. with covers.

Complaiſance, Deference, Condeſcention.

Neceſſity, politeneſs, convenience, ſervices, the pleaſures of ſociety, familiarity and intimacy, oblige us to *complaiſance*; we make a kind of ſacrifice to it of our wills, our inclinations, our conveniences, our enjoyments, our private views. Age, rank, dignity, and perſonal merit, demand a *deference*, and to theſe we ſubmit our advice, our opinions, our judgments, our pretenſions, our deſigns. The weakneſs, the wants, the predilections, the defects of others, require *condeſcenſion*, and we find it neceſſary, at times, to relax from our ſeverity, our rigidneſs, our authority, our ſuperiority, our liberty, and our will.

A huſband ſhould be *complaiſant* to his wife. A wife ſhould ſhew *deference* to her huſband, and both one and the other be *condeſcending* to their children. We ſhould be *complaiſant* to each other, ſhew a *deference* to our ſuperiors, and be *condeſcending* to our inferiors.

Complaiſance ſhews a deſire to pleaſe; *deference* marks reſpect, and *condeſcention*, indulgence.

Complaiſance is a debt due to ſociety and to good manners. *Deference* is a homage, due to men of merit; and *condeſcention*, a kind of generoſity, owing to our dependants. The firſt is active and attentive; the ſecond modeſt and noble; the laſt, affable and gracious.

But take it for granted, that men will abuſe your *complaiſance*, if you neglect opportunities to ſhew an honeſt freedom; will encroach on your *deference*, if you omit, at times, to ſhew a noble firmneſs; and treſpaſs on your *condeſcention*, if you do not ſometimes ſhew a juſt inflexibility.

As

As much as theſe good qualities are admired, there is a ſervile *complaiſance*, that betrays meanneſs; a blind *deference* that betrays folly; and a ſoft *condeſcention*, that betrays weakneſs.

Guard then againſt the *complaiſance* of flatterers, that proſtitute their ſervices; the *deference* of toad-eaters, who ſtrew your way with flowers, to lead you to a precipice; and againſt the *condeſcention* of thoſe men in power, who purchaſe at this price, all their credit and their fortune.

To *Infringe, Tranſgreſs, Violate.*

All theſe words imply an acting contrary to law, but the proper idea of *infringe*, is to break; of *tranſgreſs*, to go beyond the bounds of; and of *violate*, to uſe violence, or commit an outrage.

We *infringe*, in breaking that which binds; we *tranſgreſs*, in exceeding preſcribed limits; and *violate*, in loſing all regard to reſpectable things.

We *infringe* thoſe laws to which we owe ſubmiſſion; we *tranſgreſs* thoſe that limit us; and *violate* thoſe we are bound to reſpect. Thus,

If we break thoſe public or private laws, which we have ſworn, or engaged ourſelves to obey, we may be ſaid to *infringe* them; theſe are the treaties of ſovereigns, the agreements of individuals, the reciprocal engagements between prince and people, and the vows we make to God. A prince, who gives ſuccour to the enemy of an ally, *infringes* his treaty of alliance. A ſubject may *infringe* the laws of the nation; a king, the privileges of his ſubjects; a monk, the rules of his order; or an individual, the obligations he enters into.

If we exceed the bounds of moral or religious order, the natural laws of honeſty, or the ordinances of God, we may be ſaid to *tranſgreſs* them.

The

The whole poſterity of Adam is puniſhed, for his having *tranſgreſſed* the commandment of God. The Gentile, who, having not a law, is a law unto himſelf, is culpable if he *tranſgreſſes*, even the law of his conſcience. Moſes threatened temporal puniſhments to thoſe who *tranſgreſſed* his precepts. Injuſtice *tranſgreſſes* the capital law of ſociety; and an ambaſſador, who does not implicitly obey the inſtructions he receives, is ſaid to *tranſgreſs* the order of his maſter.

If we audaciouſly attack the eſſential order of nature, of good manners, of ſociety, or of religion, we may be ſaid to *violate* it: thus, brutality *violates* modeſty. Treachery *violates* the ſecrets of friendſhip. Tyranny *violates* human nature. Impiety *violates* things ſacred, and infidelity *violates* the conjugal bed.

A man who will preſume to *infringe* his engagements, *tranſgreſs* the bounds of good order, and *violate* all that is ſacred and right, deſerves to be hunted from ſociety, and execrated by all honeſt men.

Contrition, Repentance. Remorſe.

Contrition, is that voluntary and profound grief which a heart feels, at having committed ſin, under an idea that it is an offence to God. *Repentance* is that bitter regret which a timid ſoul experiences at having committed a fault, and which it is anxious to repair. *Remorſe* is that afflicting, revenging reproach, with which conſcience ſtings the mind on the commiſſion of any great crime, or any criminal tranſgreſſion of thoſe laws imprinted on the human heart.

Thus, *contrition* refers to ſin, is ſeated in the heart, and its motives are the moſt ſublime which religion inſpires. *Repentance* refers to every ſpecies of evil, or

or action regarded as evil; ariſes in the mind, and is ſuggeſted by reflection and experience. *Remorſe* refers to crimes, takes place in the conſcience, is born with us, and ſprings from the crime itſelf.

Contrition puts us in a good path; *repentance* brings us back to a good path, and *remorſe* points out that good path with a kind of deſpair.

If I may uſe the alluſion, *repentance* is the plank that offers us life after ſhipwreck; *remorſe* is the tempeſt that ſtill purſues us, and *contrition* is the happy effect that brings us into port.

Contrition is the moſt affecting act, and the moſt heroic of the human heart; it changes, it deſtroys the old man, and raiſes up in us the new, and is an effect of God's grace. *Repentance* is a confeſſion, forced from our faults, our weakneſs, and our ignorance. It muſt be lively, or it has no merit. *Remorſe* is one of the greateſt misfortunes, and the moſt terrible trials of life. It is either death or a cure. The happineſs, or wretchedneſs, of remaining life depends upon it.

Woe to that ſinner, whoſe deſperate condition frightens away *contrition*! He is ſoon familiarized with his unhappy ſituation. Woe to that man who cannot *repent* of errors! He runs the riſk of *repentance* for crimes. Woe to that wretch, whoſe heart is ſo ſteeled as not to feel the ſtings of *remorſe!* His reaſon is loſt with his conſcience.

To be able to take Heaven by force, in the allegorical ſenſe of the goſpel, is the greateſt good on earth, it is this which works the *contrition* of the ſinner, or his return to virtue, according to the proverb of the prodigal ſon, and the ſheep that was loſt.

The beſt manner of puniſhing man, according to Tacitus, is to bring him back to his duty, and give him time to *repent*; it being ſuch return that facilitates *repentance*.

The moſt terrible curſe, ſays Seneca, we can beſtow upon man is, that he may become an enemy to himſelf. This is the effect of *remorſe*.

Repentance often ariſes from human motives; *contrition*, from thoſe only that are ſupernatural. Such is the power of faith!—We ſometimes *repent* of having done a good act; but are never ſtung with *remorſe* on that account. Such is the nature of good!

Read in the goſpel, the hiſtories of the Publican, the Samaritan, and Mary Magdalen, and you will have a juſt idea of *contrition*. Read in Strabo, the deſcription of the furies, and you will have a proper conception of *remorſe*. Read in Lucian, the ſtory of that Lady, who, cloathed in mourning, diſſolved in grief and ſhame, turned her head from the ſide of truth, and you will have a ſtriking picture of *repentance*.

Remorſe goads the guilty to *repentance*, and *repentance* brings the Chriſtian to *contrition*.

Regret, Remorſe.

Remorſe being, as we have juſt ſeen, the ſting of conſcience, it is neceſſary only to ſay, that *regret* is vexation at ſomething paſt.

Regret ſours reflection, but *remorſe* ſmites the heart.

We frequently *regret* having done a good action, being diſappointed in our expectation, and it being returned with ingratitude; but are never ſtung with *remorſe* for ſo doing, it being the part of a chriſtian to do good for evil.

Compunction, Remorſe.

Of theſe two words, the latter riſes upon the firſt; *compunction* being the miſguiding of the mind; *remorſe* the pain of guilt.

He who feels *compunction*, at firſt, on going to commit a ſin, and refrains from that ſin, need never fear the ſtings of *remorſe*.

Thus, *compunction* is the friend of man; *remorſe* his puniſher.

Decay, Decline, Decreaſe.

Decay is *falling* from a ſtate of perfection; *decline* is *paſſing* from ſuch a ſtate; and *decreaſe* is *leſſening*.

We ſay, the *decay* of an edifice; the *decay* of fortune; the *decay* of literature; the *decay* of empires, of things ſubject to change, and are expoſed to ruin and liable to fall. We ſay, the *decline* of day, of life, of health, things that have but a certain duration, and which verge to their end and paſs away. We ſay, the *decreaſe* of the moon, the *decreaſe* of a diſorder of things, ſubject to periods of increaſe and *decreaſe*, which are limited to a revolution, and diſappear.

By *decay*, things loſe their perfection, their greatneſs, their conſiſtence. By *decline*, things loſe their ſtrength, their vigour, their luſtre. By *decreaſe*, things loſe their appearance, their influence, and their energy.

Decay brings on fall and ruin; *decline* brings on expiration and end; *decreaſe* brings on courſe and revolution.

Decay is more or leſs rapid, in proportion to elevation; *decline*, more or leſs ſenſible, according to declivity; *decreaſe*, more or leſs advanced, according to progreſs.

If we would not accelerate the *decay* of an empire, by an irreſiſtible ſwiftneſs; we ſhould ſtop it in its commencement.

A man may retard the *decline* of life, by tempe-

rance, in ſpite of ſickneſs, and the weight of years.

In order to re-eſtabliſh health; when we find a diſorder *decreaſe*, we ſhould throw in ſuch ſuccours as will prevent a relapſe, and then there is every likelihood of its terminating.

We often ſearch for the cauſe of *decay* in literature; it ariſes from many cauſes; from the *decay* of ſtates, a *decay* of manners; from ſuch looſe, effeminate, and corrupted morals, as bring the ſtar of learning to its *decreaſe*, before it has acquired all its luſtre, and its flowers to their *decline*, ere nature has thrown them into bloom.

Becomingneſs, Decorum, Decency.

Theſe words are frequently uſed by good writers to expreſs the ſame thing; namely, conſiſtence of character; but they ſtrike me, according to the modern acceptation of the words, as conveying very different ideas.

Becomingneſs implies propriety, in oppoſition to unſeemlineſs; *decorum*, good order, in contradiſtinction to licentiouſneſs; and *decency*, good manners, in oppoſition to *indecency*; and, as ſuch, I would recommend the uſe of them. The word *decent*, as an adjective, may be uſed with propriety to expreſs the ſame meaning with *decorum*; that word having no adjective; but we are now ſpeaking of *decency*, the ſubſtantive.

A woman is dreſſed with *decency*, when dreſſed modeſtly; and with *becomingneſs*, when ſuitable to her ſituation in life; and acts with *decorum*, when ſhe conducts herſelf orderly.

Decency is, in general, one and the ſame throughout. There are not two kinds of indecency, nor two kinds of modeſty. *Becomingneſs* varies according to the ſex, the age, and condition of perſons.

What

What becomes a man, a young man, or a military man, ill ſuits a woman, an old man, or a magiſtrate. *Decorum* varies according to circumſtances; what would be *decorum* at a funeral, would be very unſeemly at a wedding, and *vice verſâ*. There is a propriety of conduct to be obſerved on all occaſions, and this propriety is *decorum*.

Nature teaches us *decency*; the world, *becomingneſs*; and prudence, *decorum*.

The natural modeſty of the female ſex inſpires *decency* upon all occaſions; we preſerve a *becomingneſs*, in order to be reſpected in life; and obſerve a *decorum* in all companies, not to give offence.

Decency is the higheſt object of refined manners, but not always the moſt reſpected. *Becomingneſs* is the loweſt object of the ſame, and yet moſt followed. *Decorum* is, properly ſpeaking, a ſhort rule of conduct; but a rule very often broke through.

To *Diſcover*, *Find*.

The literal ſenſe of *diſcover*, is to bring to light things that are covered or hidden; whereas, to *find*, implies to meet with a thing of which we were ignorant where it was.

Thus we *diſcover* what is hidden, or ſecret; we *find* what immediately fell not under our notice. That which we *diſcover*, was not viſible or apparent; that which we *find*, was merely out of our reach or ſight. We *find* a thing ſimply miſlaid, when we come to the place where it is; but we do not *diſcover* it; for it was manifeſt and readily to be ſeen.

The earth has in its boſom mines and ſprings; we *diſcover* them by digging. It has in its ſurface, plants and animals; we *find* them by ſearching. We *diſcover* a thief that is concealed, and *find* one that is run away. Columbus and Cooke, *diſcovered* new

countries, buried to the reſt of the univerſe; they *found* in theſe countries, a new vegetable kingdom, and a new animal one; but the ſame ſpecies of men.

In thoſe Eaſtern countries which have been lately *diſcovered*, manifeſt traces of the Chriſtian religion have been *found*.

On the firſt reading of an excellent work, we generally *find* great beauties; but on a ſecond reading, we *diſcover* new ones.

In *diſcovering*, we *find*; but we *find*, without *diſcovering*.

The curious ruins of Herculaneum have been *diſcovered*, and we have there *found* valuable monuments of the arts, and ancient hiſtory of Italy.

Aerial navigation, (the glory of which is due to Mr. Mongolfier) is one of the moſt aſtoniſhing wonders in the operation of the force of genius, and promiſes great *diſcoveries*; but it remains ſtill to *find* means to direct it, and render theſe air-balloons uſeful.

In the ſame ſenſe of the words, we *diſcover* a phenomenon in natural hiſtory, and *find* the ſolution of a problem. Geometry *diſcovers* the properties of different figures. Chemiſtry *diſcovers* the different properties of bodies. Theſe properties lay hidden in the bodies themſelves. But geometry *finds*, by reaſoning and calculation, the ſolution of a problem; and chemiſtry *finds*, by new combinations, new remedies; demonſtration and remedy being the fruit of their labour.

Dr. Price ſeems to have *diſcovered* a great ſecret of nature, when he *found* that of making gold; happily a proceſs dearer than gold itſelf.

In ſhort, to *diſcover* a thing, that thing muſt exiſt and be concealed. To *find*, it is not neceſſary the thing ſhould be concealed, ſo as it is out of our reach and ſight, and we know not where it is.

To *Forbid*, *Prohibit*.

Both theſe words import, in general, an injunction not to do a thing, in conſequence of an order, or a poſitive law, but they differ from each other in this, that *prohibit* is ſcarce ever uſed but in things *forbidden*, by policy and human laws.

Marriage, though regulated by divine laws, in certain degrees of kindred; indeed, is *prohibited*; but this *prohibition* is an eccleſiaſtical diſcipline, and thus comes under the denomination of their laws.

In common uſe then, to *forbid* is a general term, applied to all ſorts of objects; whereas, to *prohibit*, is applied only to objects of adminiſtration, police, and diſcipline.

We are *forbidden* by the laws of God, even to indulge a thought of committing evil; he who luſts after his neighbour's wife, is ſaid to have committed adultery with her in his heart.

Wool being the ſtaple commodity of this country, the exportation of it is *prohibited* under ſevere penalties.

The power that ordains, can *forbid*; and the power that authoriſes, can *prohibit*.

As nothing is *forbidden*, that is good and juſt in itſelf; ſo nothing is commanded that is iniquitous and unjuſt. As a ſtate never authoriſes licentiouſneſs, ſo it never *prohibits* the exerciſe of a lawful right.

Depravity, *Corruption*.

Both denote a change from good to bad; but the firſt implies a great alteration in forms, ſenſible characters, and the natural and regular proportion of things; the ſecond, a great alteration in principles, and the elementary parts of things. *Depravity* diſ-

figures, deforms, and alters the nature of; *corruption* ſpoils, decompoſes, and diſſolves. Cicero ſays, (2 de finib.) that *depravity* is applicable only to the mind and heart. But we ſay, a *depraved* taſte, and *depraved* humours. *Depravity* of taſte refuſes common nutritive food, and longs for that which is hurtful to the conſtitution. *Corruption* naturally produces a conſiderable change in the ſubſtance of things, and tends to their putrefaction and deſtruction.

The moral ſenſe of theſe words follow the natural, or phyſical one.

Depravity imports defect in regularity, rectitude, and order; *corruption*, a defect in purity and good manners.

Thus by *depravity*, we expreſs formally, a direct oppoſition to order, regularity, and a model given; by *corruption*, we expreſs vitiation, and ſpoiling of things, and a fermentation tending to diſſolution. *Depravity* gives things a tendency quite contrary to that which it had; *corruption* labours to deſtroy the eſſential qualities it had. *Depravity* is the effect of a vice; which, by its baleful influence, diſorders, diſturbs, perverts, and deſtroys the neceſſary conformity of things; *corruption* is the effect of a vice, which, by its impure venom, defiles, infects, ſpoils, and diſſolves the vivifying principles of things. That which is *depraved*, loſes its original manner of exiſting and acting; that which is *corrupted*, loſes its virtue and its ſubſtance.

A judgment not ſound or right, is *depraved*; a judgment not pure, is *corrupted*; the influence of irregular paſſions and diſordered inclinations, produce *depravity* of manners; the confuſion, and inteſtine motion of errors and paſſions, produce *corruption*. That which is *depraved*, requires to be reformed; that which is *corrupted*, to be purified. *Depravity* expreſſes, rather apparent and exceſſive

exceſſive diſorder; *corruption*, internal and diſſolute vices.

Manners, ſays Cicero, are *corrupted* and *depraved*, by the love of riches. Port-Royal ſays, that God has given up infidels to the wandering of a *depraved* and *corrupted* mind. Theſe words, one after the other, are by no means a pleonaſm, or repetition, becauſe they repreſent two different images; one indicates the ſtate of a thing very much changed in its ſubſtance; the other, the ſtate of a thing very much oppoſed to regularity.

"Good God! ſays Maſillon the preacher, what a dreadful account will the rich and the powerful have one day to give; ſince, beſides their own ſins, they will have to account before Thee, for public diſorder, *depravity* of morals, and the *corruption* of the age; the very ſins of the people will become their own!" Public diſorders bring on naturally *depravity* of morals; and ſins, or vicious actions, naturally give birth to *corruption*.

Depravity is more or leſs open, manifeſt and revolting; *corruption*, more or leſs hidden, ſecret, and mortal. *Corruption* is attended with a degree of ſhame; *depravity* is ſhameleſs. The hypocrite does not ſeem ſo much *depraved*, as *corrupted*; for he gives vice the appearance and form of virtue.

The reſult of theſe obſervations is, that *depravity* is beſt applied to thoſe objects, to which common uſage has added the epithets, as qualifications, of *right*, *regular*, *fine*, *perfect*, *orderly*, *well-eſtabliſhed*, &c. and *corruption* to thoſe, to which are added the epithets of *ſound*, *pure*, *innocent*, *good*, and the like.

Thus we ſhould rather ſay, *depravity* of mind, and *corruption* of heart; becauſe we ſhould ſay, in reverſing them, a *right* mind, and a *pure* heart.

On the ſubject of arts and the *belles lettres*, we ſay, the *depravity* and *corruption* of taſte; becauſe taſte has its rules, liable to be diſordered, which are, or are not

conformable to natural order; which are regular or irregular; and we at the ſame time admit taſte to be good, pure, and the like; of courſe, both words are applicable on this ſubject.

Deſart, Uninhabited.

Deſart implies a place neglected, waſte and uncultivated; *uninhabited*, a place without inhabitants.

A ſavage and ſhepherd people, Nomades, are often found in *deſarts*, though thinly ſcattered. Unuſed to agriculture, they aſſociate in wandering tribes, and live by hunting, and keeping flocks. But, in *uninhabited* countries, we find only a dreary wild, without the leaſt veſtige of ſociety, or footſtep of man.

We fly into *deſarts*, to avoid ſociety; we fly into *uninhabited* places, to eſcape perſecutions.

Were we to contemplate the immenſe *deſarts*, or *deſart* places of the North, of Aſia-Minor, of Africa, of America, of the Southern World, and of Europe itſelf; we ſhould be apt to ſay, that the earth was but juſt begun to be peopled and cultivated. Follow Cooke, Forſter, and their comrades, in their voyages to the Southern Pole; and, in approaching it, inſtead of the hoped-for continent, you will ſee (if I may be allowed the expreſſion) the floating wreck only of a broken land, almoſt all *uninhabited* and uninhabitable.

Pallas diſcovered, in *deſart* Tartary, empires that were loſt and buried, and of whoſe very name we were ignorant. Selkirk, the model of Cruſoe, thrown on the *uninhabited* iſle of Fernandos, formed an intimate and ſweet ſociety with various kinds of ſavage animals. Such are the reſources of man.

Unoccupied,

Unoccupied, Unemployed.

The proper ſenſe of theſe words is clearly determined by their manifeſt relation to thoſe of occupation and work. Man, *unoccupied*, has no occupation; man, *unemployed*, has no work.

Occupation is the engagement of the mind; *employ*, the labour of the body. Man *unoccupied*, is at leiſure; *unemployed*, is idle.

We are often *unoccupied*, though not *unemployed*. Active and induſtrious man, when *unoccupied*, or without occupation, never remains *unemployed*; he fills up his leiſure time with exerciſe of ſome kind.

There are a great many perſons whoſe life is wholly *unoccupied*, and yet conſtantly *employed*. They work; but what do they do? Thoſe who know not how to *occupy* their time, deſtroy it.

Take notice of a man *unoccupied*, he has a certain air, reſtleſs, and ill at eaſe; he ſeems to want ſomething. Take notice of a man *unemployed*, he has an air of languor, and liſtleſſneſs; he ſeems to wait for ſomething to animate him.

We ſay ſometimes of a ſtudious man, that his mind is *unoccupied*; and, of a working man, that his hands are *unemployed*.

Ennui, as the French term it, is the pain of a man *unoccupied*; lazineſs and puniſhment, of a man *unemployed*.

Deſtiny, Deſtination.

Theſe words are never uſed one for the other, by good writers, but are often confounded by bad; it is, therefore, neceſſary only to define them.

By *deſtiny*, is underſtood, the power that determines our fate; by *deſtination*, the fate or end, for which any thing is appointed.

Deſtiny, the greateſt of the fabulous deities, ordained that death, ſhould be the *deſtination* of all men.

Laws are the *deſtiny* of empires, under the inevitable ſanction of nature; for nature, the incorruptible miniſter of Providence, puniſhes or rewards their oppoſition, or conformity to theſe laws, by the irreſiſtible influence of the phyſical laws of order.

It is the *deſtination* of kingly office, to watch for thoſe who ſleep; to act for thoſe who repoſe, and labour for thoſe who enjoy themſelves.

See *Lot*, *Deſtiny*.

Belief, *Faith*.

Faith riſes upon *belief*; inaſmuch as, according to the proverb, "Seeing is *believing*;" but, according to the ſcripture, "*Faith* is the evidence of things not ſeen."

Belief is a pure, ſimple opinion; *faith* is a firm, conſtant, uniform, and implicit *belief*, founded on the moſt ſolid grounds. We *believe*, or give credit to a fact, which is related to us upon ſlight authority; but we place no *faith* in a thing, unleſs ſupported by the moſt unqueſtionable authority. The goſpel has our *faith*; but many points of hiſtory have merely our *belief*.

Belief is rather uſed in the ordinary courſe of things: *Faith*, in more ſolemn matters, as in religion; becauſe religion is what we *believe* moſt firmly. Thus, we call our confidence in men and things, *belief*. We *believe* in their veracity. But, revelation is the *faith* of Chriſtians.

Carnivorous animal, Beaſt of prey.

Theſe phraſes are deſcriptive of ſuch animals as feed upon fleſh, but at the ſame time diſtinct from each other. The firſt eats fleſh occaſionally, and is uſed in contradiſtinction to gramenivorous, or ſuch animals as feed upon herbs and graſs; the laſt implies an animal that feeds wholly on fleſh, and preys upon others.

The lion, the tyger, and the wolf, are properly *beaſts of prey*. Man, a dog, and a cat, are *carnivorous animals*.

Beaſts of prey have a natural ſavageneſs, a ſanguinary inſtinct, are armed with ſharp claws, and cutting teeth, inſtruments of murder; *carnivorous animals* have arms leſs terrible; a fierceneſs leſs arduous, partaking of the ferocity of the former, and the gentleneſs of thoſe that live on the fruits of the earth.

To *Confuſe, Confound.*

We *confuſe*, by putting in diſorder; we *confound*, by throwing into obſcurity.

Affairs are *confuſed*, by miſconception and diſcord; they are *confounded* when unintelligible and inexpreſſible. That is *confuſed*, which is not in order; that is *confounded*, which is not clear. In things *confuſed*, there are difficulties and oppoſitions to remove; in things *confounded*, there are matters to be cleared up. The *confuſion* of things conſiſts in the relation they have to each other. When *confounded*, they are preſented to our mind as in a fog.

In a book without method, all is *confuſed*; by an enigmatic ſtyle, the ſenſe is *confounded*.

When the head is *confuſed*, every thing ſeems *confounded*. Hence ariſe ſo many obſcurities.

He who has neither method or order in his mind, muſt be *confuſed*. He who labours to explain what he does not properly conceive, is *confounded*, himſelf.

To *Halt*, *Limp*.

A man ſtiff in the hip-joint, and with one leg ſhorter than another, *halts*. If he favours one foot more than another, he *limps*. Thus, *halting* implies a greater degree of lameneſs than *limping*; for treading on a ſharp ſtone, ſhall occaſion *limping*, while the pain laſts.

The *halt* are often obliged to uſe crutches. Some men will *limp*, from habit.

Antlers, *Horns*.

Theſe words are ſometimes confounded in Zoology; when they are deſigned to expreſs thoſe hard pointed bodies that grow on the head of ſome gramenivorous quadrupeds, and ſerve them for ornament or weapons. In pharmacy, the *antle* of a ſtag, or hart, is called *horn*; *hartſhorn*.

Antlers and *horns* differ in their ſubſtance, their form and their non-eſſentials. The ſubſtance of *horn*, is analogus to that of the nails; the ſubſtance of *antlers*, to that of the branch of a tree.

From the *antlers* of certain animals, chemiſtry extracts a ſalt and medicine for many remedies. From the *horns* of different quadrupeds, ingenuity has made a variety of uſeful articles.

The *horn* is a ſimple ſhoot, ſtraight or curved, and of a uniform hard ſubſtance, hollow within; the *antler* is a branching body, cloathed with a kind of bark, when it firſt grows; ſolid throughout, and ſeems to be a vegetable production.

The

The *horn* is permanent, and never falls but by accident; the *antler* is ſhed regularly every ſeaſon, and renewed.

The ſtag, the elk, the fallow-deer, rein-deer, &c. have *antlers*; the ox, the goat, the buffalo, the ram, have *horns*.

Kindneſs, Favour, Service, Good-Office, Civility.

A *Kindneſs* is a free act on the part of the beſtower, though the perſon, on whom it is beſtowed, may be worthy of it. The end of *kindneſs* is, to render the condition of him whom we befriend, the better; and ariſes from humanity, and a wiſh to contribute to the happineſs of our fellow-creatures.

A *favour*, is a good granted to one who has no claim to it; its end is merely gratuitous, but is to the perſon on whom confined a real or apparent advantage.

A *ſervice*, is an aſſiſtance by which we help a perſon to obtain ſome good; its end or deſign is, to be uſeful to the perſon we ſerve.

A *good-office*, is the employ of our credit, our mediation, our power, or other means to be of benefit to the party we eſpouſe. Its deſign is to add to his well-being, to ſhew him, in a friendly manner, the intereſt we have in his welfare, and how much we wiſh to be of uſe to him.

A *civility*, is merely one of thoſe polite and obliging acts, which opportunity enables us to ſhew one another occaſionally, in the commerce of civil life. Its end is to pleaſe and give ſatisfaction, and ſhew ourſelves ready to communicate pleaſure.

It is a *kindneſs*, to deliver the wretched from oppreſſion; it is a *favour*, to admit a man into company, above his ſituation in life. It is a *ſervice*, to open a man's eyes to his danger. We do a man a

good

good office, by interceding for him with another; and we do him a *civility*, by communicating ſome good news.

Humanity and generoſity lead to *kindneſſes*. Attention diſtributes *favours*. Zeal renders *ſervices*. Benevolence inſpires *good offices*; and complaiſance ſhews *civility*.

Kindneſs is a ſacrifice, or gift, from him that has, to him that has not. *Favour* is a piece of generoſity, or condeſcention, from one to another; where the receiver communicates as much pleaſure to the granter, in receiving, as the granter to the receiver, in beſtowing. *Service* is a tribute, or voluntary work, which zeal impoſes, where friendly aſſiſtance is wanted. A *good office* is a benefit conferred by a perſon in office, to one, whoſe merit, or worth, entitles him to it. A *civility*, is an act of politeneſs, or an obliging anticipation, in matters of ſocial intercourſe.

We beſtow a *kindneſs*; we grant a *favour*; we do a *ſervice*; we perform a *good office*; we ſhew a *civility*.

Much, A great deal.

Of theſe expreſſions, the laſt riſes conſiderably on the firſt. *Much* implies, merely and ſimply, a large indefinite quantity; a *great deal*, adds to this expreſſion, an energetic affirmation, and a degree of ſurpriſe, and implies a ſtill greater quantity.

We ſay, *much* ſtore, *much* wrath, *much* noiſe, &c. but a *great deal* of earth, a *great deal* of corn, a *great deal* of wood, and a *great deal* of rubbiſh, &c.

If we ſay, a man eats *much*, it does not create that ſurpriſe; as when we ſay, he eats a *great deal*.

He who does *much* good, is praiſe-worthy; but he

he who does a *great deal* of good, deſerves to be immortalized: ſo he who does *much harm*, ought to be guarded againſt; but he who does a *great deal* of harm, ſhould be cut off from ſociety.

See *Good, Great.*

Simple, Weak, Fooliſh, Silly.

All theſe words have one common idea, that of weakneſs of intellects, as in infancy, or puerility; but they have, in my opinion, very diſtinctive differences.

A *ſimple* perſon admires every thing, and betrays a ſurpriſe at every little incident. A *weak* perſon acts not of himſelf, but is led by every one. A *fooliſh* perſon, on the contrary, is often obſtinate, as a child, and as great a novice. A *ſilly* perſon, knows leſs than a *fooliſh* one, knows only how to triſle and amuſe himſelf with baubles.

The *ſimple* man, is he who ſtops with ſurpriſe, or curioſity, at every thing he ſees, as if he had never ſeen any thing before. The *weak* man, is he, who, by an exceſs of ſimplicity, does nothing of himſelf, but acts as every one would have him. The *fooliſh* man is he, who, for want of experience and knowledge, knows neither what to think, what to ſay, or what to do. The *ſilly* man, is he, who, from puerility, is always a child, and knows not how to put himſelf in place, or any thing about him.

We may diſtinguiſh one that is *ſimple*, by his almoſt ſtupid manner of conſidering objects, and his eagerneſs to ſee what he never ſaw before; he is little-minded. We may diſcover one that is *weak*, by his readineſs, by his extreme docility, which render him almoſt abſolutely paſſive. He is a poor creature. We may know a *fooliſh* man, by his *ſimple* air and diſcourſe; by his committing himſelf in his actions; and by his free, unguarded behaviour,

before

before every ſtranger; he is almoſt an idiot. We may diſtinguiſh a *ſilly* man, by the ſtrong contraſt between his countenance, his taſte, his diſcourſe, and his occupations, which all ſavour of infancy; and that becomingneſs and propriety, which ſhould mark his years. He is a great boy.

The *ſimple* are taken in, and ſeduced by appearances; the *weak* are duped, and led by raſcals; the *fooliſh* are ſurpriſed, and wonder at novelties. The *ſilly* are attracted, and won over by trifles.

The lower claſs of people, condemned to live a very uniform life, in a very narrow circle, are generally *ſimple*. A prince, (as benign, as ready,) ſitting on a throne, as an idol on an altar, pronouncing by the mouth of his favourites, as does an idol by its prieſts, is a very *weak* man, and much to be dreaded. The honeſt countryman, tranſported with all his ruſtic and loyal ſimplicity, into the midſt of faſhionable manners, and all the tricks of a city, will be *fooliſh*, in a new degree. A perſon, who continually takes up frivolous objects ſeriouſly, and treats ſerious things lightly, muſt ſeem very *ſilly* in the eyes of every one.

A *ſimple* man ſavours of idiotiſm; every thing catches his eye; he laughs, and is himſelf again. The *weak* man is to be pitied; he is an orphan that demands our protection. The *fooliſh* man is our ſport, if he is not utterly a fool; wait till he has acquired uſe and experience, and he may grow cunning. The *ſilly* man is ridiculous; makes his friends bluſh for him, but never bluſhes for himſelf.

To *Augur*, *Preſage*.

The original meaning of *augur* was to foretel, from the ſinging, the flight, and other actions of birds; the Pamphyleans, the Phrygians, and other Eaſtern people, were particularly addicted to this kind

kind of divination. Hence, *augur* has been applied to all ſorts of conjectures, reſpecting the future.

Preſage, in its original, expreſſes ſagacity, penetration, and diſcernment; and, hence, has been applied to announce things before they have happened.

Augury is ſimply the idea we form of the future, from certain *data*; of courſe, it is theſe *data*, or things themſelves, that *augur*. *Preſage* is not only the ſign that predicts what is to happen, but, the conjecture, or prognoſtic, we draw from that ſign. *Augury* is in the imagination, and not in the object; *preſage* is both in the object, and in the imagination. Thus, the word *preſage* has two different acceptations; *augury*, but one.

People, in early ages, conſidered the extraordinary *Phenomena* of the heavens, as *preſages*, ſigns, or forerunners of great political revolutions; and often, in effect, theſe *phenomena* have been dreadful, by the ſad *auguries*, which the fears of the people drew from them.

Imagination, ſuperſtition, *preſentiment*, prejudice, formed *auguries*. Sagacity, ſcience, experience, reaſoning, drew *preſages*.

Soothſayers and witches, by incantations, *augur*; phyſicians, by ſymptoms; and meteorologiſts, by *phenomena*, *preſage*.

By our *auguries*, we may judge of our fears, of our hopes, of our paſſions, of our temper, of our character. By our *preſages*, we may judge of our underſtanding, of our knowledge, of our views, of our application, of our abilities. For, according to the temper and diſpoſition of minds, the ſame objects have given birth to different *auguries*; and, according to the judgment and clear perception of minds, the ſame event has ſuggeſted different *preſages*.

Calchas

Calchas founded, upon the number of birds that he ſaw fly, his *augury* of the ſiege of Troy. Savanarole founded on the intereſts, and the actual diſpoſitions of powers, his *preſages* of the approaching fate of Italy.

The negro, from the firſt object he meets, on going out of his habitation in the morning, *augurs* the good or ill fortune of the day. The philoſopher, from the event he ſees, and ſearches into, *preſages* an event, that will ariſe or reſult from it.

People who have ſeen great calamities follow extraordinary *phenomena*, *augur*, on the return of theſe *phenomena*, the ſame calamities. Politicians, who have obſerved in hiſtory, that a concurrence of certain cauſes have, conſtantly, produced certain revolutions; *preſage* a ſimilar revolution, from an aſpect of the ſame concurrence.

Taken in another light, *preſage* announces an event, of whatever nature it may be; *augur*, an event happy or unhappy; the firſt, relates to the fact; the laſt, to the ſucceſs. Thus we ſay, a certain or uncertain *preſage*; a good or bad *augury*. In general, we conſider rather in *preſage*, the nature, the influence, the reality of its relations to the event, as the reaſons that point it out; in *augury*, we attend only to its being lucky or unlucky; to the good or evil that hangs to it; or to the favourable, or unfavourable iſſue that it promiſes.

To *Humble*, *Abaſe*, *Diſhonour*, *Degrade*.

To *humble*, is to lower the merit, or dignity of a perſon, in the eyes of the world, with mortification. Porſenna, the protector of Tarquin, *humbled* his pride before the ſenate of Rome, in aſking to treat with him by an Ambaſſador.

To *abaſe*, is to *humble* ſtill more; "He that *humbleth* himſelf," ſays our bleſſed Saviour, "ſhall be exalted;

exalted; and he that exalteth himſelf ſhall be *abaſed.*"

To *diſhonour*, is to leſſen our own character, or treat thoſe with indignity, who are entitled to our reſpect. He, who does a diſgraceful act, *diſhonoureth* himſelf: "he, who *diſhonoureth* his parents, ſhall be cut off."

To *degrade*, is to take from a man his office, his title, his degree. Clergymen, for immoral acts, are liable to be *degraded* from their office. Officers are ſometimes *degraded*, and put into the ranks. In an early reign, a Duke of Bedford was *degraded* by parliament, and his title taken from him, merely, becauſe he had not ſufficient eſtate to ſupport it.

It is right to *humble* ourſelves, before thoſe who have raiſed us; be aſſured, ſuch an act will not *abaſe* us, but do us credit. Vices *diſhonour* mankind, and put them on a level with brutes. The firſt puniſhment of an ennobled criminal, is to *degrade* him.

Money, Caſh.

By *money* is underſtood any thing that paſſes current, for the purpoſe of commerce. By *caſh*, is underſtood, coin. Bank-notes are *money*; guineas and ſhillings are current *caſh*. Thus, all *caſh* is *money*, but all *money* is not *caſh*.

The only *money* the Chineſe have, are ſquare bits of metal, with a hole through the center, by which they are ſtrung upon a ſtring.

The moſt portable *money* are the ſtate-notes of a country. A man poſſeſſed of theſe, can put himſelf into *caſh* preſently.

To *Vex, Teaſe.*

Vex implies ſlight trouble, or uneaſineſs. *Teaſe*, a continuation of that trouble.

Diſagreeable

Diſagreeable circumſtances ſhall *vex* us; but it requires many, and in quick ſucceſſion, to *teaſe* us.

To *vex*, always puts out of humour; but a perſon may be ſometimes *teaſed* into good humour. *Vex* a child, and leave it, it will dwell on the *vexation* till it cries; but *teaſe* it immediately after, by tickling it, or rouſing it, and it will ſoon return to its original temper.

By *vexing* a perſon, we may ſour the beſt of tempers for the moment; but, by a continual *teaſing*, we may totally change it from good to bad.

Of *Faſhion*, of *Quality*, of *Diſtinction*.

As ſynonymous as theſe expreſſions may be, in the mouths of thoſe who uſe them, they imply particular characters, in their right ſignification, when we are obliged, on certain occaſions, to expreſs ourſelves properly.

By men of *faſhion*, is underſtood, ſuch men as live in the *faſhionable* world, and keep the beſt company. By men of *quality*, is underſtood, men of rank and title. By men of *diſtinction*, is underſtood, men of honourable ſuperiority, whether by wealth, by office, or pre-eminence in ſcience.

The firſt claſs of gentry, though, perhaps, not perſons of *quality*, are undoubtedly, perſons of *faſhion*. The nobles of the realm, and their children, whilſt the head of the family be living, are all perſons of *quality*, whether they are titled or not. Sheriffs, mayors, generals, admirals, governors, deans, graduate doctors, and very wealthy people, are all men of *diſtinction*; though, perhaps, not all men of *faſhion*, or *quality*.

Men of *faſhion* are admired; men of *quality* reſpected; and men of *diſtinction* revered.

A man diſtinguiſhed for his learning, and ſupe-

rior knowledge, who is a man of *diſtinction*, is, *cæteris paribus*, a much more reſpectable character, though he does not mix with the faſhionable world; than a man of *faſhion*, who has nothing to recommend him but his polite manners, and good connexions; or a man of *quality*, who owes his rank, perhaps, to the favour of his prince, without any deſerts of his own.

To *Foretell*, *Prophecy*, *Prognoſticate*, *Predict*, *Forebode*.

To *foretell* is a general term, and implies a capacity, by various means, to announce the arrival of a thing long before it happens; the other four are, as it were, different ſpecies of *foretelling*. To *prophecy*, is to *foretell* by inſpiration. To *prognoſticate*, is to *foretell* by ſymptoms; to *predict*, by the influence of heavenly bodies; and to *forebode*, is to *foretell* diſagreeable events only.

Learned men are enabled to *foretell*, by obſervation, and other means, events, before they occur. Prophets, by inſpiration, *propheſy* what is hid in the womb of time. Phyſicians *prognoſticate* the event of diſeaſes, by certain ſymptoms, or prognoſtics. Aſtrologers *predict* good or bad fortune, by means of the planets; and augurs *forebode* diſaſters to come, by the flight of birds, and the entrails of animals.

Prophecy, is the effect of a ſupernatural gift; *prognoſtication*, of real medical knowledge and obſervation; but *prediction*, and *foreboding*, are the effects of imagination. *Prophecies*, and *prognoſtications*, are to be depended on; *predictions* and *forebodings* are to be laughed at.

Iſaiah, and the Prophets of old, *foretold* in their *prophecies*, the birth of our Saviour, as circumſtantially as they would have written it, had they lived in his time. Medical men, by obſervations, are

are able to *prognoſticate* the criſis of diſorders with great certainty. Almanack-makers pretend to *predict* rain, or froſt, twelve months before it is to happen, with as much confidence, as they *foretell* the change of the moon; and perſons of a fanciful and melancholy caſt, will preſume to *forebode* miſchief; which is the viſion of their own diſordered conceptions, and merely in the lap of chance.

Fluid, Liquid.

Theſe words, philoſophically conſidered, have been indiſcriminately uſed. Every *liquid* is a *fluid*; but every *fluid* is not a *liquid*.

A *liquid*, under the ordinary preſſure of the air, has a ſurface parallel to the horizon, as water and quickſilver; but this is by no means the caſe with every *fluid*; as for example, air itſelf, ſmoke, vapour, ſteam.

All metals in fuſion are *liquids*. Quickſilver, for particular uſes, is often changed from its *liquid* ſtate, to a fixed one.

Sound is propagated by the *fluidity* of the air; for, having received the ſtroke of the voice, it ſo undulates, as to communicate that ſtroke to the adjoining air; thus, in ſucceſſion, it is carried to the ear, and theſe ſtriking the tympanum, or drum, occaſions that ſenſation which we call ſound.

Tranſparent, Clear.

The laſt word ſeems to riſe in brightneſs upon the firſt. I conceive, that a ſubſtance may be ſufficiently *tranſparent*, to ſee objects through; but not ſo *clear*, as if we had no medium to ſee through.

All water, in its nature, is *tranſparent*; but the water of a rivulet, pure and limpid; which ſuffers us

us to ſee the ſand or gravel, upon which it rolls, is, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word, *clear*.

Theſe terms are further diſtinguiſhed, by an eſſential difference eſtabliſhed by uſe. *Tranſparent* is applied chiefly to ſuch bodies, as paſs the rays by viſible pores; whereas, *clear* is more applied to ſuch as paſs them by pores, that are inviſible. Thus, we call oiled paper or ſilk, and veils made of thin ſubſtances, as tiffany, gauze, &c. *tranſparent*; but we ſay *clear* as chryſtal, *clear* as glaſs.

The *clearneſs* of a body, according to Sir Iſaac Newton, reſults not from the rectitude, or quantity of its pores, but from an equal denſity in all its parts; whereas, *tranſparency* is rather an effect of the ſame cauſe, or a defect of adherence, or connexion of the parts of a body, among themſelves.

To *Diſtinguiſh*, *Diſcern*.

When we have ſufficient light to ſee an object, we *diſtinguiſh* it by its appearance. We *diſcern* it, by its excluſive ſigns; and when we are able to *diſtinguiſh* it from every other object, with which it is confounded.

In the night, at ſea, if we look towards the ſhore, at ſome little diſtance, we ſhall not be able to *diſtinguiſh* a rock from a cloud, or a man from an animal; the characters of the object not being ſufficiently viſible. With the ſame appearances, and in the ſame point of view, we are ſometimes not able to *diſcern* one object from another, gilt metal from gold, or a copy from an original; the characters of objects being frequently equivocal. So far theſe words reſpect viſion

It requires diſquiſition, underſtanding, and a proper application, to *diſtinguiſh*; ſagacity, and criticiſm, to *diſcern*.

By

By the power of reaſon, young men will *diſtinguiſh* good from evil. By penetration and judgment, wiſe men will *diſcern* evil, though veiled in the appearance of good.

When truth and falſehood appear in their proper colours, and characters, they are readily *diſtinguiſhed*; but, if truth and falſehood preſent themſelves under the ſame appearances, we muſt diſcover their concealed differences, in order to *diſcern* them.

To become acquainted with objects, we need only *diſtinguiſh* them; but, to make choice of them, it is requiſite to *diſcern* them.

We *diſtinguiſh* the ſingularities of objects at firſt ſight; but we *diſcern* the reality of their appearances, with trouble.

We *diſtinguiſh* the natural ſenſe of a propoſition; we *diſcern* the true ſenſe of an oracle.

It is not difficult to *diſtinguiſh* a fool among a number of men, whether he ſpeaks or is ſilent. It is not difficult to *diſcern* the flatterer from the friend, if we do not flatter ourſelves.

There is no man of underſtanding, that cannot *diſtinguiſh* the language of the heart, from the language of the mind. I can ſcarcely *diſcern*, ſays Tacitus, whether it is more diſtreſſing to be accuſed by one's friend; than to be obliged to accuſe oneſelf.

According to Malbranche, we may diſtinguiſh by a man's air, the opinion he entertains of himſelf. As we can *diſcern* the hand of the workman, in viewing his workſhop, ſo may we *diſcern* the motive of a man's actions, whoſe character we are acquainted with.

To *Divorce*, *Repudiate*.

Theſe are both uſed to imply a diſſolution of marriage. But, *divorce* is properly a legal ſeparation of the

the man and wife; *repudiation*, a rejection of the wife by her husband.

Divorce puts the two persons on an equality; and implies that separation, decreed by the law, for a transgression of the married vow. *Repudiation* puts a great inequality between the two, and arises from the authority of the one, and the dependance of the other.

Persons *divorced* may marry again; but a woman *repudiated* has not that liberty: she is only in a state of separation from her husband; but, *repudiation* differs from separation, inasmuch, as the last implies the concurrence of both parties; whereas the former signifies a husband's turning away his wife against her inclination.

A man cannot *repudiate* his wife in this country, without allowing her a maintenance; but, if he can prove her guilty of adultery, he may obtain a *divorce*, and get rid of her for ever.

Gift, Present.

Both these are gratuitous, but a *gift* is rather the genus; *present*, the species: the *present* being a *gift*, which we present, and is so called from our presenting it personally.

We make a *gift*; we offer a *present*. We accept a *gift*; we receive a *present*.

It has been long a custom, on the commencement of the new year, to make *presents* to our friends; it seems inspired by nature, to tighten the bands of internal society. The custom in France, of making *gifts* to the church, when a man dies, has been held so sacred, that no will is valid without such a *gift*.

Gifts, in general, imply something more considerable than *presents*; and the distinctive quality of the former, is to be absolutely gratuitous: we consider a *gift*, as the effect of generosity, liberality,

or ſingular predilection. Thus we ſay, the *gifts* of Heaven, of nature, and of fortune. *Preſents* are a kind of offerings, of homage, of tribute; a pledge of our ſentiments, and we conſider them as the effect of friendſhip, politeneſs, and particular attachment. We ſay a genteel *preſent*, a friendly *preſent*.

We beſtow *gifts* to do good; we make *preſents*, to conciliate eſteem.

According to an Arabian maxim, there are two ſorts of things not to be expected from two kinds of men: a *preſent* from a poor man, and a *gift*, from a covetous one.

Since a *gift* then has for its object, the particular advantage of the perſon we give it to; our *gifts* are generally things uſeful; and, as *preſents* are rather made with a view of pleaſing the perſon we offer them to; our *preſents* are generally things that are agreeable. Thus we ſhould rather ſay, the *gifts* of Ceres, and the *preſents* of Flora.

But theſe acceſſary, or ſecondary relations, in language are, and always ought to be, ſubordinate to the primitive idea of the term uſed; and it is by this original idea, that we ſhould judge of the propriety of the application.

To *Prune*, *Cut*.

To remove the ſuperfluous branches of a tree, is the general meaning of theſe words, and the province of the gardener; but, to *prune*, implies uſefulneſs; to *cut*, agreeableneſs.

To *cut*, is properly to lop, ſo as to pleaſe the eye; to *prune*, is to cut a tree, ſo as to encreaſe its bearing.

Hedges are *cut* or clipt; wall-trees are *pruned*.

Praiſe, Elogy.

I have already ſpoken of the word *praiſe*, where it ſignifies approbation; I ſhall now conſider it in a different ſenſe; and ſhew, that, notwithſtanding it has been often uſed to convey the ſame idea with *elogy*, it carries a very different meaning.

Elogy is derived from the Greek, and implies literally, a diſcourſe upon ſome ſubject; but, with us it implies a diſcourſe, or recital, in commendation of any particular perſon, and for any particular act; that is to ſay, a written or ſtudied panegyrick.

Praiſe expreſſes literally the action of beſtowing honour and glory, without the leaſt reſtriction.

Elogy is the honourable teſtimony we bear to merit, and the approbation we give it. *Praiſe* is the honour we beſtow on it, and the homage and tribute we pay it.

Open *elogy* eſtabliſhes that, which *praiſe* ſuppoſes and boaſts.

Elogy is our profeſſed eſteem, and admiration of an object. *Praiſe*, is rather the expreſſion, or cry of our favourable opinion. *Elogy* ſtamps a value on merit; *Praiſe* is its reward. *Elogy* is the foundation of *praiſe*; *praiſe* is the crown of *elogy*.

If theſe ideas explain and juſtify the different uſe of the terms before, can we doubt of their propriety?

We ſay, that a noble act is an *elogy* of him who performs it; or that a recital of his actions is a ſufficient *elogy*, and why? Becauſe our deeds ſpeak for us, proclaim our merit, and eſtabliſh our deſerts. But we do not ſay, that a good action is a man's *praiſe*, or that his actions ſufficiently *praiſe* him, and why? Becauſe our actions do not celebrate us, or pay homage to ourſelves.

A man ſounds his own *elogy*, by a ſimple recital and juſtification of his conduct; he *praiſes* himſelf,

by vain boaſting, and oſtentation. We may, without arrogance, defend and eſtabliſh our pretenſions; but, a man is always thought little of, who trumpets forth his own *praiſe*.

We *write* the *elogy* of a perſon, but *ſpeak* his *praiſe*. Thus, his hiſtory, (if to his credit) his apology, a diſplay of his merit, is an *elogy*: but we cannot *praiſe* him, but by honouring him; *praiſe* being properly the expreſſions of our ſentiments in his favour. Heroes are the ſubject of our *elogy*, and the objects of our *praiſe*. We make poems in their *praiſe*, and theſe poems are their *elogies*. It is *praiſes* that embelliſh, and inflate *elogies*; whereas ſuch *elogies* are founded on the baſis of truth and equity.

Though *elogies* are more public than *praiſe*; delicate *praiſe* is often more flattering than a pompous *elogy*. Though *elogy* is more ſtimulative, *praiſe* is more gratifying.

Elogy will better ſtand the teſt of criticiſm, than *praiſe*; the firſt being founded on reaſon, from partiality; the latter being the reſult of favour, or opinion. We write *elogies* on thoſe we approve; we *praiſe* thoſe whom we love. *Elogy* is placed in the mouth of thoſe intelligent perſons who know us; *praiſe*, in the mouth of the people in general, in the mouth of infants.

When academicians propoſe the *elogy* of an illuſtrious perſon, they require not *praiſes* to be ſet forth, but the actions, the virtues, the titles, and the real merits of the man.

In a literary ſenſe, ſatire is the contraſt of *elogy*; cenſure, that of *praiſe*. The *elogy* of Claudius, pronounced by Nero, was conſidered only by the people, in ſpite of Seneca, as a ſatire. The *praiſes* given to Nero, by Narciſſus, ought to have been conſidered as the greateſt cenſure of his conduct.

To *praiſe* God is not to ſound his *elogy*; but to bleſs him, and to glorify him. It is in this ſenſe only

only, that we ſing forth his *praiſes*, in hymns and pſalms, and ſpiritual melody.

Embryo, Fœtus.

Embryo ſignifies in Greek, what *fœtus* does in Latin; that which is formed, or produced, in the womb of its mother; but medical men make the following diſtinction. By *embryo*, they would underſtand, fruit of the womb; before nature has impreſſed it with any ſenſible features, that is the animal in its unfiniſhed ſtate. By *fœtus*, they would imply the child, or animal in the womb, after it is perfectly formed.

Anatomiſts tell us, that the *embryo* in the human body, takes on the character of a *fœtus*, about the forty-ſecond day after conception.

Fœtus is applicable only to animals; but we uſe *embryo*, to expreſs fruits and plants, when they appear only confuſed, in the buds of trees, and the germs of ſeeds.

Embryo is alſo uſed in a figurative ſenſe, to imply the ſtate of a plan forming in the mind, and not ripe for production. Thus we call ſuch unformed plans, *embryo*'s of the mind; and we ſay, our deſign is only in *embryo*.

To *Iſſue, Flow.*

To *iſſue*, is to proceed or ſpring from a ſource, to derive from its origin, diffuſing itſelf abroad. To *flow*, is to run from a place, by a paſſage, in ſmall currents, and in a continued ſtream.

The blood *flows* from a wound; odours *iſſue* from bodies. The good actions of a prince *flow* to the people through his miniſters.

The word *iſſue*, is more applicable to very ſubtile bodies, ſuch as are exhaled, either by inſenſible tranſpiration, or ſome ſuch ſimilar way. To *flow*, is more applicable to things, which run and ſpread themſelves through ſome opening, in a manner more or leſs ſenſible.

An infinity of corpuſcles *iſſue*, or fly off, from bodies imperceptibly, and thus decreaſe its original ſubſtance. It is thus bodies waſte, and grow leſs by time; and it is thus that water evaporates.

It is by the moiſture, which *flows* through the veins of the earth, that chryſtals and minerals of all kinds are formed.

Light *iſſues* from, or is an emanation of, the ſun. Sweat *flows* from the body.

The particles of matter, that *iſſue* from a body, ſpread themſelves abroad on all ſides, and form a kind of atmoſphere about it, as perfumes, and diſagreeable ſmells and heat.

Fluids, which *flow* from a ſource, purſuing a certain declivity, will fall while ſuch declivity continues, and then riſe again to their former level. It is this which occaſions fountains, and ſprings, upon certain hills.

In a figurative ſenſe Theologians, ſpeaking of God, ſay, that the Son *iſſues* from the Father; and the Holy Ghoſt, from the Father and the Son; and that grace *flows* upon us inceſſantly, from the inexhauſtible treaſures of Divine mercy.

Emulation, Rivalry.

Emulation implies concurrence; *rivalry*, conteſt.

When two perſons run the ſame carriere, it is *emulation*; when their intereſts oppoſe each other, it is *rivalry*. Two of equal *emulation* act together; two *rivals* act one againſt the other.

Emulation,

Emulation is an ambition that excites us to uſe the moſt generous efforts to ſurpaſs, equal, and follow thoſe cloſe up, who have done ſome great or noble act. *Rivalry*, is a jealouſy, that excites every effort, generous or not, to ſurpaſs others purſuing the ſame object. Two high-mettled courſers, ſtriving to outſtrip each other in ſwiftneſs, is an emblem of *emulation*; two animals of the chace, diſputing their prey, is an emblem of *rivalry*.

Emulation excites; *rivalry* irritates. *Emulation* is a flame that warms; *rivalry*, a fire that divides. *Emulation* merits ſucceſs; *rivalry* obtains it. *Emulation* labours to ſurpaſs his competitor; *rivalry*, to ſupplant him. *Rivalry* ſnatches the palm, which *emulation* obtains.

Chriſippus, the philoſopher, ſaid, "If you run the ſame race with another, try to get before him; but uſe no unfair means ſo to do." This leſſon clearly ſhews the triple idea of concurrence, *emulation*, and *rivalry*.

Laudable *emulation*, ſays Cicero, is the imitation of virtue. *Rivalry* is the jealouſy of preference.

It was *rivalry* between Pompey and Cæſar; each wanted to be chief in Rome; but it was *emulation* between Cicero and Hortenſius. They wiſhed to divide the palm of eloquence.

A good government, excites *emulation* among the citizens, by a general encouragement. A tyrannical government, labours to divide the people, by infuſing *rivalry* among them.

As an exception to the general rule of things, the ſultan of the Eaſtern Turks, Malek-Shah, maſter of the empire of the beſotted caliphs, obliged, by the revolt of his brother, to take the field; oppoſed his brother's criminal *rivalry*, by the moſt virtuous *emulation*. He aſked his Grand Vizir, what prayer he would offer up to Heaven? That we may obtain a victory over your brother, replied the miniſter. And I ſhall pray, returned the ſultan, that he may

be the victor, if I am not as equally fit to reign as he is.

Thoſe two ſoldiers of Cæſar, *rivals* in glory, is another elucidation of the diſtinction between theſe words. Ambitious in the extreme, they both entertained ſentiments of *rivalry*; but, in the field of battle, with a noble *emulation*, they challenged each other in heroic exploits, againſt the common enemy; and, by a ſtill greater, and more, *emulation*. Each ſaved the others life, and forced Cæſar to crown them together.

But, following the ſame acceptation of the words; *Emulation* is ſometimes taken in bad part, and *rivalry*, in good.

There is *emulation* between robbers and rebels; but, this ariſes merely from an eagerneſs to diſtinguiſh themſelves, and to acquire a kind of honour, that is always attached to ſuperiority.

In the End, At Laſt, Finally.

In language, cuſtom is generally the law-giver; but I muſt appeal againſt cuſtom in the uſe of theſe expreſſions; and ſhew, that to ſpeak with elegance and preciſion, we ſhould be as nice in the choice of theſe, as of ſome others.

In the end, ſeems to convey a ſenſe little more than, in ſhort, right or wrong, and is uſed at the concluſion of a ſubject, as an arbitrary and neceſſary cloſing of the whole; thus, notwithſtanding all that is advanced to the contrary, *in the end*, it muſt be, &c. *In the end*, I muſt keep my promiſe. *In the end*, the law ought to command. *In the end*, the maſk will drop, and the man remain. *In the end*, all men will periſh. This mode of ſpeech, marks the proper reſult of things, without regard to reaſoning.

At

At laſt, is beſt applied to denote the period in which the conſequence of events, ſooner or later, will take place in ſpite of conditions, contrary accidents, or ſuch other circumſtances.

You expect a gueſt, he comes *at laſt*, though in the middle of the feaſt. You have ſent every where for a phyſician, *at laſt* you have found one. You have been a long time at law, but you have gained your cauſe *at laſt*.

Finally, is beſt uſed, to imply the laſt and definitive concluſion; as, our accounts are *finally* cloſed; your reaſons are *finally* deduced; the affair is *finally* determined. This adverb indicates a matter entirely finiſhed.

To *Surround*, *Encompaſs*, *Encircle*, *Encloſe*.

The diſtinctive ideas, of the laſt two words, are well marked.

To *encloſe* implies, to ſhut up a place, or thing, ſo as to hide it, ſecure it, and preſerve it. A park is *encloſed* with walls, that people may not treſpaſs on it, nor the game eſcape. Gardens are *encloſed*, to prevent incurſions, and make them a retreat. Barns are *encloſed*, for the preſervation of corn; and ſtatues are often *encloſed*, to preſerve them from the weather. One letter is *encloſed* in another.

To *encircle*, is beſt applied, where a place is *encloſed* in all its circumference, as with a girdle, or a band, ſo that no part lies open; but its limits are fixed, and all acceſs to it ſhut out. A town is *encircled* with walls, and a foreſt with ditches. We *encircle* the head with a diadem, and the finger with a ring. *Encircling* then a thing, differs from *encloſing* it, inaſmuch as the firſt does not conceal it wholly from the eye, which the latter is ſuppoſed to do.

The meaning of the other two words, is leſs preciſe; cuſtom has not eſtabliſhed their diſtinctive ideas; but I would preſume to make the following choice between them, and truſt, they will be beſt applied, as I ſhall point out.

I would then, in deſcribing a thing, bordered by a border that touches it, ſay it was *encompaſſed*. Thus, a bracelet *encompaſſes* the arm; the frame *encompaſſes* the picture. A caſtle is *encompaſſed* by a ditch; an iſland is *encompaſſed* by the ſea. In all theſe caſes, I ſhould prefer the word *encompaſs*, to that of *ſurround*; but, when ſpeaking of things, where the object is at ſome diſtance from that which *encircles* it, I would uſe the word *ſurround*. Thus, I would ſay, the heavens ſurround the earth. The ſatellites *ſurround* a planet. Strong places *ſurround* a ſtate. Clouds *ſurround* a particular object. Various people *ſurround* a nation. Water *ſurrounds* a country. The Chineſe, when hunting, *ſurround* their game. In all theſe caſes, the body *ſurrounded*, is either far diſtant, or detached from the *ſurrounding* objects.

This being premiſed, we may uſe theſe words in one and the ſame ſentence, without the cenſure of tautology. A city is *encompaſſed* with ramparts, and *ſurrounded* with fine fields. The ocean *encompaſſes* and *ſurrounds* the earth. It *encompaſſes* it, becauſe it borders it in all parts; and it *ſurrounds* it, becauſe, in ſo doing, it occupies, like the earth, half the globe.

Theſe words may be figuratively uſed, in the ſame way. To *encompaſs* is to ſhut up in a narrow circle, and indicates more intimate relations than the word *ſurround*. The ſinner is *encompaſſed* with all the horrors of death; while rays of happineſs *ſurround* the good man, and mitigate theſe horrors. Man is *ſurrounded* with misfortunes; but a poor man is *encompaſſed* with them. The hero *encompaſſed* with a modeſt

modeſt retinue, without being confounded in the croud, marches *ſurrounded* with glory.

Epithet, Adjective.

An *epithet* is an *adjective*, ſays Johnſon, denoting any quantity of a noun, or ſubject, good or bad. Thus, a *good* man, or *bad* man. Good and bad are *adjectives*, or *epithets*, expreſſing the qualities of the man. Here they are uſed in one and the ſame ſenſe: but I would have a choice in theſe words, and would have them diſtinguiſhed as follows; which, indeed, is not a new diſtinction of mine, but one authoriſed by cuſtom, and elegance of diction.

Epithet then belongs properly to poetry and eloquence; which admit, nay require, an abundance of words. *Adjective* belongs properly to grammar, and to logic, which require not the uſe of words that are not abſolutely neceſſary, but the uſe of all ſuch words as are neceſſary. *Epithets* and *adjectives*, are added then to ſubſtantives, to modify the principal idea, by ſecondary ones. The idea of an *adjective* is neceſſary, ſerving to determine and complete the ſenſe of a propoſition; that of an *epithet*, often uſeful; as it ſerves to pleaſe the ear, and ſtrengthen the expreſſion. Take from a phraſe its *adjective*, and it is incomplete, or rather it is another propoſition; take from it its *epithet*, and, though the propoſition may remain complete, it may be disfigured, or weakened. Such is the general rule to diſtinguiſh an *epithet* from an *adjective*. I will give an example or two.

A *deſponding* mind, in ſome meaſure, ſaddens the moſt pleaſing objects. *Pallid* death mows down all, without diſtinction; both the rich and the poor. In the firſt phraſe, take away the *adjective* deſponding, and you deſtroy the ſenſe. In the ſecond, take

away the *epithet* pallid, and the ſenſe will remain, but the image is diſfigured.

An orator, ſays Fenelon, like a poet, ought, when the ſubject-matter requires it, to employ embelliſhed figures, ſtriking images, and bold tropes; and Du Marſais obſerves on this, that ſuch embelliſhments of language, are nothing without *adjectives*, that determine the neceſſary and diſtinctive qualities of theſe tropes, theſe images, and figures. Haller ſays, in deſcribing the ruſtic amuſements of the inhabitants of the Alps, a *heavy* ſtone, ſlung by a *vigorous* arm, at a *fixed* mark, cuts the *divided* air. Now theſe four *epithets* may be omitted, without eſſentially changing the figure; but their acceſſary ideas ſerve to render the principal one more ſtriking.

Sulzer has well diſtinguiſhed an *epithet*, properly ſpeaking, from the ſimple *adjective*, in ſaying, there is another kind of *epithets*, (which may be termed grammatical,) from being ſuch as may be called in grammar, *adjectives*. Theſe add no beauty, but are neceſſary to explain the paſſage, as a *ſpoilt* child; a *deſponding* mind. Without theſe, the principal idea would not have that determination indiſpenſible to give the preciſe meaning.

To *Rove, Wander.*

To *rove*, is to go here and there, without purſuing any certain road. To *wander*, is to *rove* about a country, without any object in view, without ſettling any where, without deſign, without reaſon, without diſcretion.

Rovers fix no where, for any length of time, often changing their place. *Wanderers* are vagabonds, without fixing the ſhorteſt time for their moving.

He who *roves*, rambles without knowing his way; he who *wanders*, ſtrays without knowing where.

When

When we *rove*, it is ſometimes in one place, ſometimes in another; when we *wander*, it is every where, and no where. It is the bewildered man that *roves*; the idle man that *wanders*.

Ulyſſes having loſt his way, through the reſentment of Neptune, *roved* from ſea to ſea; but, he purſued his deſign in returning to Ithacus. Dido, in deſpair, for the departure of Æneas, *wandered*, as Virgil expreſſes himſelf, into every city as a fury, without knowing where ſhe went, or what ſhe did.

Inconſtance leads to *roving*; levity to *wandering*. We *rove* in ſearch of ſomething; but *wander* to fly from one's ſelf. So in the figurative ſenſe, an unſteady mind *roves* from object to object, from thought to thought. A puerile imagination *wanders* far, and extravagantly wide from reveries to chimeras.

Travelling in purſuit of knowledge, from clime to clime, with the poſt-haſte expedition of modern times, is *roving* to as little purpoſe, as do the *wandering* tribes of ſavages, who have nothing in view, but the cravings of nature.

We frequently *rove* from book to book, in ſearch of truth; and *wander* through volumes of pages, as if it was to be found out of the pale of nature.

Wander, then, in my opinion, may be well applied to intellectual objects, much better than *rove*; as the *wanderings* of the imagination.

To *Excite*, *Incite*, *Urge*, *Animate*, *Encourage*, *Spur*, *Carry on*.

Moſt of theſe words are uſed only as ſynonymous, in the figurative ſenſe; and that, becauſe the common idea is merely attended to, without any regard to their diſtinctive propriety. I am perſuaded

ſuaded I need only define them, to ſhew the abſurdity of ſuch a promiſcuous choice.

To *excite*, is to awaken, to rouſe, to put into motion. To *incite*, is to ſtir up, to inſinuate one's ſelf ſufficiently with a perſon, and ſolicit him ſtrongly to a purpoſe. To *urge*, is to impel, to force the inclination and lend a helping hand, to be an abettor. To *animate*, is to inſpire with new activity, to communicate fervor, to give warmth, and *excite* a paſſion or a lively ſentiment, in the ſoul of him, we would have act with eagerneſs and perſeverance. To *encourage*, is to aid the weakneſs, *animate* the courage, elevate the heart, inſpire the audacity, and give new energy, to a perſon; that nothing may divert him from the object, and check him in the purſuit. To *ſpur*, is to touch a man, and prick him where he is moſt vulnerable, to goad him on; importune him in language he cannot reſiſt, and *excite* him by motions, he cannot withſtand. To *carry on*, is to carry a man forward by every means in our power, to remove his fears, and his ſcruples; to inſpirit with hopes of reward, and perſuade him, that he is acting a great and a noble part.

Thus, we *excite* him who thinks little of a thing, who wants reſolution, who acts with languor, who faulters and ſtops ſhort. We *incite* him who is not diſpoſed, who is ſcarcely intereſted, who is not attached, who has not the buſineſs at heart, and who has neither motive nor inclination ſufficient, to purſue the object in view. We *urge* him who heſitates, who is diſinclined, but yet is not averſe; he who wants vigour, firmneſs, and conſtancy. We *animate* him, who wants ſoul, who is cold and indifferent, who has a degree of apathy, who wants will, warmth, and eagerneſs. We *encourage* him who is ſlack and timid, he who diſtruſts himſelf, who raiſes difficulties, and whom a little bad ſucceſs will intimidate. We *ſpur* him, who cannot overcome his indolence, his inactivity, who recoils at the propoſal,

poſal, and who, through lazineſs either lies down, or ſtarts at the difficulty. We *carry on* him, who, with a too eaſy character, is under influence who can make no reſiſtance, and who is only to be moved as a paſſive being.

The novelty of an object *excites* us to ſeek it. Luſt, *incites* us to commit what we ſhould otherwiſe deteſt. Admiration *urges* us to conſider an object in every light. Fear, ſometimes, *animates* us, and gives us wings. Succeſs *encourages* us. Intereſt *ſpurs* moſt men; and ſelf-love often *carries* us *on*, beyond the bounds of truth and juſtice.

Exile, Baniſhment.

Exile is pronounced by an order of authority; *baniſhment*, by the ſentence of a court of juſtice. *Exile* is the effect of diſpleaſure; a diſgrace incurred without diſhonour. *Baniſhment*, the puniſhment for a crime; and, of courſe, infamous. *Exile*, ſends a man from his houſe, from his country. *Baniſhment* chaſes him ignominiouſly. The Tarquins were *baniſhed* from Rome, by a public decree, or ſentence. Ovid was *exiled*, by an order from Auguſtus.

Expedient, Reſource.

Expedient implies a ſhift, or means contrived in an exigence; *reſource*, new unexpected means that offer, of themſelves; the laſt, is ſuch as preſent themſelves; the firſt, the contrivance of the perſon wanting them.

When Dr. Pallas travelled through Siberia, and found a neceſſity of croſſing a ſtream, where there was neither ford nor bridge, he had recourſe to the following *expedient*. Having cut down ſome long

long ſtout poles, he laid them acroſs the ſtream, parallel to each other, where the oppoſite banks were nearly on a level, and the poles ſo near together, that the wheels of his waggons might come on the outſide of each pole, and the axle-tree, which, in that country, turn with the wheels, might roll on the poles. The horſes then took the water between them; and thus the carriages were conveyed ſafely over; and, in windy weather, when he could not erect his tents at night; he had no *reſource*, but to creep into a cave, and make his party ſtand guard over him, by turns.

Conſidering theſe words in another ſenſe; *expedient* is the means uſed to extricate one's-ſelf from an embarraſſment; *reſource*, thoſe called in aid to relieve from ſome great misfortune. *Expedient* ſuppoſes an obſtacle to overcome; *reſource*, a loſs to repair; *expedient* facilitates ſucceſs; *reſource* remedies an evil.

In the current affairs of life, we are often in want of *expedients*; and of *reſources* in calamities. It requires a knowledge of life, induſtry, dexterity, and cleverneſs, to furniſh *expedients*; but, a wiſe head, fortitude, genius, credit, and good fortune, to provide *reſources*.

Chicanery is fertile in *expedients*; power, fruitful in *reſources*. A courtier, in his intrigues, is in frequent want of *expedients*; a commander, in the revolutions of war, is often obliged to fly to *reſources*.

In the embarraſſments of finance, the means that are employed for the moment, are merely *expedients*; thoſe which extend their benign influence on the future, are *reſources*.

In credit, a merchant has *reſources*; without credit, uſury is a momentaneous, and the only *expedient*.

Thoſe who have frequently recourſe to *expedients*, are ſuch as build moſt on *reſources*.

Self-love

Self-love has always ſome *expedient*, to ſpare the confuſion of a vain attempt. A good conſcience, is the beſt *reſource*, under calamities.

To *Eradicate*, *Extirpate*.

The firſt of theſe words implies merely to root out; the ſecond, to *eradicate*, root and branch; that is the root in all its branches.

Extirpate, of courſe, indicates always the action of tearing up a body by force, from the place where it has hold; whereas, *eradicate* is generally uſed to imply the mere action of taking it up by the roots, whether all the roots are removed or not.

In the figurative ſenſe, it ſignifies the total deſtruction of pernicious things; whether they are abuſes, evils, cuſtoms, errors, hereſies, or what not. We *eradicate* that which has taken deep root; ſuch as inveterate habits. We *eradicate*, in deſtroying that which produces and nouriſhes them. We *extirpate* that which has taken more hold, and gained more ſtrength. We *extirpate*, by deſtroying, without leaving the leaſt trace.

You would *extirpate* abuſes, by violence, when abuſes grow from the very conſtitution of your government! Tear up then, the tree that bears the fruit; take away the cauſe of the diſorder, and the abuſes will be *eradicated*.

Fabrick, *Manufacture*.

Fabrick, literally means any ingenious, finiſhed form, given to rough matter, ſo as to be of uſe to man; whereas, *manufacture* denotes things faſhioned and made up for uſe; whether they are complete and finiſhed in the kind or not. Thus, before broad cloth is *fabricated*, the wool muſt be *manufactured*.

So,

So that *fabrick* is rather the reſult, or the produce of *manufacture*. *Fabrick* being *manufacture* in ſmall, and *manufacture*, *fabrick* at large.

Fabrick is rather the compages of particular things, as broad-cloth formed of wool, cambrick of flax, and brocades, of ſilk. We obſerve, it is either a fine, or well-wrought *fabrick*; whereas, by *manufacture*, we allude to the various kinds of cloth, linen, or ſilk, ſo wrought and brought to market.

When we ſpeak, in general, of the eſtabliſhment, the encouragement given, the inſpection, the commerce, the progreſs, the proſperity, or decay, of certain works, we call them *manufactures*; but, when we ſpeak of certain parts of ſuch *manufactures*, and advert to workmanſhip alone, we then call it *fabrick*.

The *fabrick*, of the muſlin *manufactures* in China, is far ſuperior in quality and duration, to thoſe made in Mancheſter, and will always fetch a better price.

Favourable, Propitious.

That which inclines to us, is well diſpoſed, and ready to aſſiſt us, is *favourable* to us. That which is at hand, to protect and aſſiſt us, which flies to our ſuccour; that which determines the event in our favour; that which has power ſo to do, and does it, is *propitious* to us. A greater and more important influence, one that is more powerful, more immediate, more efficacious, more ſalutary, diſtinguiſhes that which is *propitious*, from that which is only *favourable*.

Perſons, which bring or enſure good ſucceſs, are *propitious*; ſecond and auxiliary cauſes, thoſe circumſtances, that tend to our good, are *favourable*. We requeſt a patron to be *favourable* to us, and pray

pray to God to be *propitious*. Cato was *favourable* to Pompey; the Gods were *propitious* to Cæsar. Opportunity is *favourable*; destiny, *propitious*.

In all cases, persons and things are either *favourable* to us or not. In tribulation, in danger, in greater cases, God, Heaven, fortune, pain, are either *propitious*, or against us.

A good friend is a *favourable* genius. A good prince, is a *propitious* star. To be *favourable*, it is sufficient to interest yourself in my success, and second my wishes; but to be *propitious*, you must save me from misfortune, or procure me some great good.

We equally call times, seasons, and opportunities *favourable*, or *propitious*. A *favourable* or *propitious* season, is a time proper for any thing. It is right to take the advantage of a *favourable* or *propitious* time, or opportunity. The word *propitious*, may be used on such occasions, but it always conveys a greater idea, and is a much stronger expression than *favourable*.

Fruitful, Fertile, Prolific.

The first two of these words are too often used as synonymous, by good writers; the latter only, by the ignorant; but, as I write for information, it may not be unnecessary to speak of the three. I shall not attempt a distinction between *prolific* and the other two; but content myself with observing, that *prolific* can be applied only to animals that generate; to fruitfulness, in bringing forth young; but, with respect to the first two, I shall be more particular.

If *fruitful* and *fertile* are ever synonymous, it is when applied to the culture of land. Possibly we may then say with propriety, *fruitful* or *fertile* land. The maxim, that no two words are synonymous, means

means only, that the ſame words cannot be uſed on *all* occaſions. A female of any ſpecies may be ſaid to be *prolific*, or *fruitful*, but ſhe cannot be ſaid to be *fertile*. Nature is not *fertile*, but *fruitful*. Eggs, grain, ſeed, kernels, are *fruitful*, when they have the power of producing. A tree, a year, may be called *fertile*, when they produce abundantly.

The lands in Peru are ſo *fertile*, that they produce five hundred fold; ſo *fruitful* is nature in that climate!

Salt does not render the earth *fruitful*, but the contrary; it concurs, however, to render it *fertile*, in dividing and moderating the principles of inordinate nature. Pruning of trees does not render them *fruitful*, but makes them *fertile*.

We may ſay, that *fruitfulneſs* ſeems to ariſe from nature; *fertility*, from art. The properties of *fruitfulneſs*, doubtleſs, belong only to nature; but art may extract them, combine, and apply them. Though there are lands naturally *fertile*, it does not follow, that good cultivation may not add to their *fertility*. Hence then, *fertility* appears to be the effect of *fruitfulneſs*.

In figurative ſpeech theſe words alſo preſerve their difference.

Tyrannic laws are *fruitful* in crimes; they create them, commit them, and inſpire them. A weak government is *fertile* in abuſes. If it gives birth to no evil, it tolerates it.

Mazarin, *fertile* in expedients, held the reins of government in France, in ſpite of cabals, barricadoes, lampoons, and every obſtacle. Hannibal, *fruitful* in reſources, cleared his way, alone, if I may ſo ſay, againſt the ſea, the Spaniards, the Pyrenees, the Gauls, the Alps; from Italy, even to the gates of Rome.

In a word, all things that produce their like, or cauſes, which produce effects of the ſame kind, and in the ſame order, may be called *fruitful*; but, when they

they act and produce with variety, and diverſity, they are ſaid to be *fertile*. Thus, a woman is *fruitful*, but a garden is *fertile*.

Felicitation, Congratulation.

Compliments of *felicitation*, are mere words, of courſe. Thoſe of *congratulation*, partake of the ſentiment of the heart. The firſt proceeds from politeneſs; the ſecond, from friendſhip.

Flattery, Adulation.

Adulation is a groſs kind of *flattery*; the latter is pleaſing; the former, diſguſting.

Delicate, indirect *flattery*, is a compliment paid by polite people, to each other, in all faſhionable ſocieties, and is well received; but the mercenary *adulation* of the ſycophant, is preſently ſeen through, by the ſenſible part of mankind, and is held in abhorrence.

Flattery is offered at the ſhrine, of almoſt every one; but *adulation* is a homage, paid only to the great.

There are few men but what like to be *flattered*. It is an agreeable incenſe, that puts them in good humour. *Adulation*, by attributing to the great thoſe qualities they are ſtrangers to, makes them loſe ſight even of thoſe which nature has beſtowed upon them.

Flexibility, Pliancy.

Flexibility, is an eaſineſs of character, which will not withſtand any great reſiſtance, but accommodates itſelf ſoon to the diſpoſition of others.

Pliancy,

Pliancy, is a verſatility of character, that we may command at any time, and requires only a dexterity, or addreſs, to bring it to our purpoſe.

A *flexible* man meets your wiſhes, changes his form, and continues firm to thoſe wiſhes. He bends, if I may uſe the compariſon, like a piece of lead, and that continues its poſition. A *pliant* man, complies as you would have him, takes on all ſorts of forms, bends like a cane, keeping its poſition no longer than while you can hold him. The former is a reſpectable character; the latter, a trifling one.

Flexibility is rather paſſive, you may bend it; *Pliancy* is rather active, you have no occaſion to bend it, it will bend of itſelf. Complaiſance is *flexible*; flattery is *pliant*.

Flexibility is a favourable and neceſſary quality: *Pliancy*, is an equivocal and ſuſpected one. It is too often full of fineſſe, artifice, and deceit. Stubbornneſs, is the reverſe of *flexibility*; obſtinacy, of *pliancy*.

A man, though *flexible*, will be, at the ſame time, firm; but a *pliant* man, is not ſteady for a minute. A *flexible* man will ſtoop, to avoid injury. A *pliant* man will crawl, in order to raiſe himſelf. Take a man at certain moments, and you will find him *flexible*; flatter his foibles, and you will find him *pliant*.

Clemency is the *flexibility* of a heart, which, ſtruck with the ſenſe of human weakneſs, thinks it acts juſtly, in judging rather the man than his action. Politeneſs is a *pliancy* of mind and manners, which conforms with a natural eaſe, to faſhion and ceremonies.

Weakneſs, Imbecility.

The ſenſe in which I mean to conſider theſe words, is that ſtate of the animal mind, or body, that is oppoſed to ſtrength.

Weakneſs,

Weakneſs then, is the conſequence of infancy; *imbecility*, that of ſickneſs, or old age.

Weakneſs announces merely want of ſtrength; *imbecility*, loſs or decay.

Fortunate, Lucky, Succeſsful.

Succeſs ariſes from well-concerted plans, prudently and induſtriouſly followed up. *Fortunate* and *lucky*, denote *ſucceſs*, by chance.

Prudent and intelligent men, are generally *ſucceſsful* in trade; they look forward in all they undertake, and truſt little to chance.

Though *fortunate* and *lucky*, are both the children of chance; the firſt is more noble than the ſecond. *Fortunate* ſignifies bleſt with great advantages, through the ſignal favours of fortune; *lucky* implies the enjoyment of a good, from ſome caſual and unforeſeen event.

You throw doublets on the dice or not; if you do, and win by that throw, you are *lucky*. Where you have a thouſand chances againſt you, for example, in the lottery; if you gain a great prize, you are *fortunate*.

The ſingle man, who eſcaped the earthquake at Callao, by throwing himſelf into a boat, that preſented itſelf; when all the city, and its inhabitants, periſhed, was a very *fortunate* man. But the ſeaman who makes ten voyages without being in a ſtorm, is merely a *lucky* man.

According to the Greek proverb, all the world is allied to the *fortunate* man; proſperity ſparkles and attracts: when ſcarce any one knows a man barely *lucky*; for *luck* is tranquil, and ſeldom noticed.

Funeral rites, Obſequies.

Theſe terms denote interment of the dead, with more or leſs ceremony.

By

By *funeral rites*, I apprehend is underſtood, the carrying a corpſe into church; the form of prayer from the ritual, read upon the occaſion, and its interment afterwards. By *obſequies*, I conceive is meant, the funeral pomp and proceſſion of the attendants. In the exerciſe of the firſt, we depoſit the remains of our friend, in the boſom of nature and religion; by the ſecond, we accompany them to the grave, with religious honours, and thus pay our laſt tribute of duty to the deceaſed.

According to this ſenſe of the terms, then, decency and conformity lead to *funeral rites*; lamentation and mourning, to *obſequies*.

Rage, Fury.

Though theſe words are often confounded by good writers, they certainly have a diſtinctive meaning. We ſay poetic *rage*, divine *rage*, martial *rage*, heroic *rage*, and not poetic *fury*, martial *fury*, and ſo on. On the contrary, we ſay in the *fury* of the battle, in the *fury* of the people, &c. and not the *rage* of battle, the *rage* of the people; of courſe, *rage* muſt imply more a violent agitation within; and *fury*, a violent agitation without.

Rage, then, poſſeſſes us; *fury* tranſports us. We can contain our *rage*, ſo as it ſhall only ſparkle; but *fury* is a whirlwind, which carries us away. All violent paſſion is *rage*; but *fury*, is violent *rage*. We may endeavour to pacify an *enraged* man, but can only fly from a *furious* one. *Fury* being maddened *rage*.

A woman carried away by *rage*, is a very *fury*.

Rage, as it it expreſſes only internal agitation, paſſion, or diſordered mind and reaſon, or at leaſt an immediate heat of blood; is applicable only to men and animals. But *fury* may be applied to inanimate things, which are ungovernable, and commit ravage and devaſtation. Thus we may ſay properly,

perly, the *fury* of the winds, the *fury* of the flames, and the *fury* of the waves; but figuratively ſpeaking, we may ſay the *rage*, or *raging* of the winds, &c. In a word, in all caſes, *fury* is *rage* carried to exceſs, and one may be diſtinguiſhed from the other, by the degree of outrage.

As a further proof of this diſtinction in the words, it may be remarked, that *rage* is ſuſceptible of moderation, and is often taken in good part, as pride, anger, &c. which *fury* is not; as we ſay, a holy anger, a noble pride; ſo we ſay, a noble *rage* gives birth to great things; a divine *rage*, that inſpires genius and liberty; a holy *rage*, that animated the prophets; nay, we attribute *rage* to God, and pray that he will not condemn us in his wrath.

Future, To come.

Theſe terms are more characteriſed by the diverſity of ſtyle, than the difference of ſignification. *Future*, is often dogmatically uſed. Grammar has the *future* tenſe. The philoſophy of the ſchools treats of *future* contingencies; and even poetry tells of *future* ages; but *to come*, is oftener found in morality, and common converſation. The reflection on time paſt, or anxiety for the time *to come*, ſeems only to rob us of the enjoyment of the preſent time. We are apt to comfort an unfortunate traveller, through life, with the proſpect of happier days *to come*.

Future relates to the exiſtence of things; *to come*, to revolutions and events. We may ſpeak with certainty of *future* things, and predict thoſe of a certain order, by the light of nature; but we can only conjecture of what's *to come*.

Thus, vague and obſcure ſigns are but vain preſages of things *to come*; but natural and neceſſary

ſigns, are certain preſages of a *future* revolution in the order of nature. We may ſpeak ſafely of *future* generations, and *future* ages, for they will be, as they are at preſent; but when we talk of changes *to come*, good *to come*, and happineſs *to come*, theſe are uncertainties. Aſtronomy predicts *future* eclipſes and conjunctions, that muſt happen. Divination predicts wars, deaths, and ſucceſs *to come*, which may, or may not happen.

Let us prefer then, the word *future*, when it affirms what will come to paſs, or what ought to come to paſs; but the term *to come*, when we conjecture and talk of things doubtful and uncertain.

Heathens, Infidels, Pagans, Idolaters.

It is of importance to diſtinguiſh between theſe words, wrong underſtood; and, of courſe, too often miſapplied; comprehending three orders of men, very different, religiouſly conſidered.

Before Chriſtianity, the Jews compriſed all perſons that were not of their religion, under the name of *infidels*; as did the Romans all ſtrangers, under the name (gentiles, or *heathens*) of barbarians; but, after the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, thoſe, who did not believe in the revealed religion, were called *heathens*; thoſe who were attached to the ancient mythology, or the worſhip of falſe gods, *pagans*; and thoſe who worſhiped images, *idolaters*. Confucius and Socrates, who rejected the plurality of gods, were *heathens*, but not *pagans*. The worſhippers of Jupiter, of Fo, of Brama, of Lama, and other gods; were *pagans*; whilſt the diſciples of Mahomet, and the worſhippers of the one God, were called *heathens*. *Idolaters* were thoſe who proſtrated themſelves to idols, that is images, and repreſentations of things.

But

But, in the common uſe of the words, now, that of *heathen*, is ſcarce applied to any, but thoſe ancient nations, conſidered in oppoſition to Judaiſm, or growing Chriſtianity; whereas that of *pagan*, is applied generally to all people, who, at all times, worſhipped falſe deities; ſo that when we ſay a *heathen* philoſopher, a *pagan* ſage, we mean only that ſuch philoſopher, ſuch ſage, lived in the midſt of *paganiſm*, under the law of *pagans*; not that they, in fact, believed the doctrines of their times.

Pagans have been called *idolaters*; but the Jews, and St. Paul, acknowledged that the gentiles, or *heathens*, were diſtinct from *idolatry*; that is, that they were only worſhippers of falſe gods; whereas *idolatry*, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is the adoration of idols, that is to ſay, images and ſtatues.

In this ſenſe, thoſe nations that offered up worſhip to the ſtars, and the great agents of nature, were *pagans*, without being *idolaters*. The Perſians, who adored fire, were *pagans*; but could they be called *idolaters*, whoſe religion forbad every idol?

This diſtinction, between *paganiſm* and *idolatry*, appears to me not only proper, but uſeful and neceſſary.

Greatneſs of Soul, Generoſity, Magnanimity.

Greatneſs of ſoul conſiſts in ſentiments above the common run. *Magnanimity* is, properly ſpeaking, the conſtituent quality of a great ſoul; but, when conſidered as a particular virtue, implies not only *greatneſs of ſoul*, but *greatneſs of ſoul* in perfection and fulneſs. *Generoſity* is that quality which diſtinguiſhes the breed, if I may ſo call it, of a man, his nobility of blood; the gentleman.

Greatneſs of ſoul is a kind of inſtinct, which leads us naturally to do noble acts. *Generoſity* diſcovers itſelf, in the uſe we make of our talents, in relin-

quiſhing our privileges, and ſacrificing our intereſts in favour of others; and, under this idea, is often uſed to expreſs the ſame thing as liberality. *Magnanimity* does great acts, as the common people do ordinary ones, without the leaſt idea of any ſacrifice.

Greatneſs of ſoul aſpires, perhaps, to glory. *Generoſity* covets not glory, without being uſeful, or accompliſhing its aim. *Magnanimity* lets glory come, ſuffers it to paſs, and ſacrifices it. In great actions, ſaid the *magnanimous* Condé, "we are to think only of doing good, and let the praiſe follow the virtue."

Greatneſs of ſoul forgives injuries. *Generoſity* returns good for evil. *Magnanimity*, in forgetting the injury, will even forget the offender.

We admire *greatneſs of ſoul*. We admire and love *generoſity*; and are in raptures with *magnanimity*.

Ageſilas, the little king of Lacedemon, enraged at hearing the king of Perſia called a great king, cried out, "Wherein is he greater than me, whilſt I have a ſword by my ſide?" The exclamation of a *great ſoul*, which values kings only according to their worth. "Strike, but hear," was a noble emotion of a *generous* citizen, who braved an inſurrection to ſerve his country. "I love myſelf well, ſaid Fenelon, but I love my family more. Nay, I love the ſtate better than my family, and mankind in general, more than the ſtate;" a principle full of *magnanimity*.

Murder, Aſſaſſination.

All homicide, with malice prepenſe, is *murder*; of courſe, *aſſaſſination* is *murder*; but there is the following diſtinction to be made between them, when *murder* is not conſidered as a generical term.

Murder,

Murder, then, conſiſts in a deſign to kill a perſon, and in the meaſures taken to carry that deſign into execution, at a convenient opportunity. *Aſſaſſination* is the action of certain perſons, who engage themſelves to kill a perſon fixed on, in order to gratify the vengeance of another.

To *Haſten*, *Diſpatch*, *Accelerate*.

To *haſten* implies to expedite; to *diſpatch*, is to finiſh out of hand; to *accelerate*, is to quicken.

The firſt two are uſed in common life; the laſt, generally, in a philoſophic ſenſe.

We *haſten*, when preſſed for time; *diſpatch* buſineſs, when we wiſh to get rid of the embarraſſment. We ſhorten the pendulum of a clock, and thus *accelerate* its motion, in order to make it go faſter.

Hiſtory, *Chronicle*, *Annals*, *Memoirs*, *Records*, *Anecdotes*, *Life*.

Criticiſm will reproach me, for throwing together into one head, words ſeldom, if ever, confounded: ſhould it diſpleaſe my reader, I ſhall be ſorry. But Bacon has furniſhed me with the idea, and with many of the materials. It is true, however, that Bacon did not write on ſynonymous words.

Hiſtory gives a full narration of the riſe and progreſs of a thing, accompanied with facts, and memorable events; ſo as to make men acquainted with the ſubject-matter, as if the whole had happened in their time. There are univerſal *hiſtories*, general *hiſtories* of countries, and particular *hiſtories* of individuals.

A *chronicle* is the *hiſtory* of time, or a chronological *hiſtory*, divided according to the order of time;

chronology, or the date of events, that is, a ſtatement of facts or events, unconnected with each other, being its principal object. The moſt ancient *chronicle* we have, is that of the Arundelian marbles of Paris. Gazettes are a kind of *chronicles*.

Annals are *chronicles*, or chronological *hiſtories*, divided by years; as journals are, properly ſpeaking, by days. Public *annals*, and, in general, ancient *chronicles*, the firſt monuments of *hiſtory*, carry with them the impreſſion of the ſimple and rude manners of early times.

A learned Roman, quoted by Aulus Gellius, ſays, that *hiſtory* differs from *annals*, in this; that the *hiſtorian* ſpeaks of the time preſent, and relates what he ſaw; whereas, the *annaliſt* ſpeaks of the time paſt, and relates what he never ſaw: but Aulus Gellius ſays, *hiſtory* is to *annals*, what the genus is to the ſpecies. Cicero adds, that *annals* are confined to facts, without embelliſhments; whereas, *hiſtory* reaſons on theſe facts, and explains the cauſes, motives, reſources, &c. (See *Hiſtory*.)

Memoirs are, as Bacon ſays, the materials of *hiſtory*; as the memoirs of Sully, Cardinal de Retz, &c. &c. from which *hiſtory* may be compiled and illucidated.

Records are ſtate-papers, preſerved by government, to have recourſe to occaſionally; and, being authentic, furniſh *hiſtorians* with the proofs of what they write.

Anecdotes are collections of private facts, and curious particularities, proper to clear up the myſteries of policy, and develop the hidden ſources of events. We muſt not ſuppoſe, that we have the *anecdotes* of the different ſtates of Europe, when we meet with, in books, a collection of circumſtances, that reveal nothing, and teach us nothing. Procopius is to be credited, when he deſcribes the known

known events of the wars, againſt the Goths and Vandals; but who can believe him, when he relates the ſatyric *anecdotes* of the court of Juſtinian?

A *life*, is the *hiſtory* of an individual, from his birth to his death; giving a full account of every thing that happened to him in life, held out as an example, or a warning to mankind. Such are the *lives* of Plutarch; ſuch are the *lives* of *Les hommes illuſtres*.

Certain, Infallible.

Certain is applicable only to things; *infallible*, to perſons, ſciences, and opinion. An event may be *certain*. The ſucceſs of an enterprize, well conducted, may alſo be *certain*. An oracle is *infallible*. The conſequence, of two ſelf-evident propoſitions, is *infallible*.

An effect is *certain*, which depends on a neceſſary cauſe. A prediction is *infallible*, which proceeds from an eſtabliſhed ſcience. Thus, the riſing of the ſun is *certain*; being in the order of nature. A rule of arithmetic is *infallible*, being founded on proof.

All the conditions of *certain* ſucceſs being performed; if it fails, the natural order of things is ſubverted, and it is an extraordinary caſe. All the motives, for expecting ſucceſs to be *infallible*, being ſuppoſed; if the event deceives us, we have been deceived in our calculations, and it is a demonſtrative error.

When we ſay a thing is *infallible*, we declare it on the beſt of our judgment; when we pronounce it *certain*, we ſpeak with the utmoſt confidence.

Immoderate, Exceſſive, Beyond meaſure.

That which paſſes the mean way, and tends to an extreme, is *immoderate*. That which exceeds due bounds, and ſpreads itſelf beyond them, is *exceſſive*. That which paſſes its meaſure, and pays no regard to proportion, is *beyond meaſure*.

An *immoderate* thing has too much force and action; an *exceſſive* thing, too much abundance and abuſe; and a thing *beyond meaſure*, has too much extent and ſize.

By *immoderate* exerciſe, we hurt our conſtitutions, equally as by *exceſſive* eating; and yet if we take not ſufficient exerciſe, we ſhall grow bulky *beyond meaſure*.

Immunity, Exemption, Privilege.

Immunity, and *exemptions*, are certain ſpecies of *privilege*, which is a private or excluſive law in favour of particular perſons. *Immunity* is a diſpenſation from ſome exaction, or burthenſome command; *exemption*, an exception from a common obligation.

Immunity cannot be uſed properly, but in matters of juriſprudence and finance; it is an *exemption* from civil charges and feudal rights. *Exemption* extends to all kinds of charges, rights, duties, and obligations, from which we can be freed. Thus we ſay, an *exemption* from cares, from vices, from infirmities, impoſts, &c.

Immunity is rather a kind of right, eſtabliſhed and founded in the nature or quality of things. *Exemption* is rather a kind of *privilege*, granted by favour, or on particular conſiderations. The *immunity* of eccleſiaſtical perſons, and things, is an ancient *privilege*, founded on the conſecration of divine worſhip. The *exemption* of churches and monaſteries, from the juriſdiction of biſhops, was a favour, by which the popes proved more their own

own plenitude of power, than their plenitude of juſtice. It was doubtleſs, for this reaſon, that *immunities* carried a degree of reſpectability with them; *exemptions*, a degree of odium.

Immunity is generally applied to *exemptions*, which bodies corporate, communities, cities, and certain citizens enjoy. We uſe the word *exemption*, rather to expreſs particular *privileges*, ſuch as are perſonal, and attached to offices.

Immunity denotes, in a general manner, a diſcharge, or an *exemption* from an obligation, without ſpecifying what. We ſay *exemption*, not *immunity*, from taxes, from homages, from manerial rights; on the other hand we ſay, the *immunities*, rather than the *exemption*, of perſons, places, offices, &c. *Immunity*, then, is beſt applied to objects enjoyed; *exemption*, to objects relieved from. Thus, the *immunities*, belonging to certain offices in the ſtate, *exempt* the poſſeſſors of theſe offices, from certain exactions, certain impoſts, and certain diſagreeable injunctions, which others are obliged to ſubmit to, and are a kind of excluſive *privileges*.

Liberties, franchiſes, *immunities*, *exemptions*, are often aſſociated and mentioned together, as *privileges*: but liberties and franchiſes conſiſt in not being originally ſubject to certain duties, or injunction; whereas *immunities* and *exemptions* conſiſt in being diſcharged from certain duties and injunctions, to which perſons were originally ſubject.

Imprecation, Malediction, Execration.

Imprecation invokes the Deity againſt an object; *malediction* pronounces the curſe; *execration* devotes to Heavenly vengeance. *Imprecation*, is oppoſed to deprecation; *malediction*, to benediction; *execration*, to conſecration.

Inadvertency, Inattention.

I ſhould not have attempted to point out the difference of theſe words, if our authors of dictionaries had not defined *inadvertency* to be want of attention; an act committed without attention to its conſequences; which is preciſely *inattention*, and not *inadvertency*.

Inadvertency is not turning our thoughts to an object that requires it; *inattention*, not fixing our thoughts on an object as we ought. If we ſee a perſon, and don't heed him, but run againſt him, it is *inadvertency*; if we overlook his perſon, and, not paying a proper reſpect to him, offend him, it is *inattention*.

In *inadvertency*, we are off our guard, but were not apprized of it. In *inattention*, we are cautioned to be on our guard, but omit it. In the firſt caſe, we might have avoided the fault; in the ſecond, we ought to have done it. *Inadvertency* is an involuntary accident; *inattention*, a reprehenſible negligence. *Inadvertency*, however, if we can, and ought to avoid it, is as bad as *inattention*. There is want of thought in *inadvertency*; want of care, in *inattention*.

Lively people are apt to fall into *inadvertencies*, puſhing forward to the object in view, without regard to any one about them. Trifling people fall into *inattentions*, finding it difficult to attend one object, whilſt they are thinking of another.

By frequent *inadvertencies*, we are conſidered in ſociety as giddy; by frequent *inattention*, as impolite.

Incapacity, Inſufficiency, Inability.

Incapacity is the reverſe of capacity; which is a faculty ſufficiently capable of undertaking and comprehending

prehending an object. *Inſufficiency* is the reverſe of ſufficiency; which, taken in its true ſenſe, is a power adequate to, or in the poſſeſſion of, the neceſſary means, to ſucceed. *Inability* is the reverſe of ability, which is a quality able to carry a thing into execution.

Incapacity excludes all power, and all hope; *inſufficiency*, the means proportioned to the deſign; *inability*, the art and talent of enſuring ſucceſs, where there is the leaſt difficulty.

Accuſation, Charge.

Accuſation is merely an allegation and reproach; *charge* is a formal act, and a criminal action.

He, who *accuſes* you, provokes you; he, who *charges* you, purſues you; the firſt is your detractor; the ſecond, your enemy.

We exculpate ourſelves from an *accuſation*. We juſtify ourſelves againſt a *charge*. *Accuſations* are often ſlight, but *charges* are heavy.

We *accuſe* a man of a crime, to leſſen his character; we *charge* him with a crime, to bring him to trial: of courſe, *charge* is a judicial *accuſation*.

Incurſion, Irruption.

Incurſion is a running into, or over, a country, to reap ſome advantage; but *irruption* is the breaking into a country, and forcing the barriers, in order to conquer it, or commit ravage.

Incurſion is ſudden and tranſient; *irruption*, violent and ſupported. *Incurſion* is made with a deſign to return; *irruption*, with an intent to conquer and continue.

A barbarous people makes *incurſions* into a country, to pillage it. They would make *irruptions* to take poſſeſſion of it, if they could; or to lay it waſte, if they were not repulſed.

The barbarians, who deſtroyed the Roman Empire, began by *incurſions*, which they renewed often, becauſe the Emperors paid them well for retiring; and finiſhed by terrible *irruptions*; the violence of which was not ſtopped, till they ſat down on the ruins of the empire.

To *Indemnify*, *Make amends*.

Indemnities are, in the order of juſtice, equity, and calculation. *Amends* are made by bounty, beneficence, and charity. We *indemnify* in money, or equal value, to the loſs we occaſion; we *make amends*, by ſome compenſation, for loſſes we have not occaſioned.

A landlord *indemnifies* his tenant, in certain caſes; from a principle of juſtice; that is, makes good any loſs he may ſuſtain, by obeying his injunctions. The rich *make amends* to the poor, for any accidental loſs that may accrue to them; from a ſpirit of humanity.

Fortune often *indemnifies* us, for the property ſhe takes from us in a ſportive mood. The ſweets of life *make* ample *amends* for its bitters.

I ſcarce know any conqueſt that *indemnifies* the expences of war; and, I hardly know any glory, that *makes* a ſenſible heart *amends* for the tears it occaſions it to ſhed.

Alexander ſaid, it was a kingly act, to incur blame, in order to do good. Who does not know alſo, that it is the act of a demon to acquire glory, at the expence of evil to the human race? He would have wanted a new world, to have *indemnified* that which he conquered. He would have wanted to have lived his life over again, even to have begun *making amends* for the ravages he committed. He lived too long;—he lived too ſhort a time, and died an inſolvent debtor to mankind.

To

To *Bury*, *Inter*.

We *bury* all we hide, or depoſit in the earth. We *inter* man, to whom we would render funeral honours. *Inter*, then, is to *bury* with religious obſequies.

An aſſaſſin *buries* the body of a perſon he kills. Miniſters of religion *inter* the faithful. We *bury* any where. We *inter*, properly, in ſacred places.

It would be abſurd to uſe the word *bury*, when perſons are depoſited in vaults. *Burying* implying hiding in the earth; but we may uſe the word *inter*. The kings of England, of late years, have been *interred* in Weſtminſter-abbey. The bodies of traitors are generally *buried* under the gallows.

Alexander ordered his horſe Bucephalus, to be *interred*, determining to *bury* him with the greateſt honours he could beſtow on man.

To *inter*, never departs from its religious character, or is figuratively uſed; which is not the caſe with *bury*. We ſay a man is *buried*, whilſt alive, becauſe he neither lives for the world, nor himſelf. We ſay the foundations of a houſe are *buried*. We are ſaid to *bury* the talent, we make no uſe of; and to *bury* the ſecret, we mean not to reveal.

To *Lead to*, To *Lead into*.

Theſe terms, or phraſes, ſeem to me to have the ſame difference, as is between *conduct to*, and *conduct into*. As we *conduct into* the place where we are, and *conduct to* the place where we are going to; ſo is it with the expreſſions before us.

To *lead* any one *into* temptation, is to tempt him, and put him into a ſtate of trial; whereas, to *lead* him *to* evil, is to engage him to do wrong. By *leading* a man *into* error, we deceive him, in making him

him adopt a falſe thing. By *leading* him *to* error, we make him deceive himſelf, by ſuggeſting ideas that deceive him, if he follows them. In the firſt caſe, we are the immediate cauſe; in the laſt, the ſecondary one.

A principle, ill underſtood, *leads* us *into* error; for we are in error as ſoon as we miſconceive it. A truth, imperfectly known, *leads* us *to* error; for, though we are not deceived in the truth itſelf; if we have not any comprehenſion of it, we are liable to deceive ourſelves.

Unutterable, Unſpeakable, Inexpreſſible.

Want of underſtanding, or liberty of ſpeaking, a thing, renders it *unutterable*; want of proper ideas, and words, renders it *unſpeakable*; want of ſufficient colouring, renders it *inexpreſſible*.

The attributes of God; the myſteries of religion; Divine graces; the ſecrets of Providence, are ineffable, or *unutterable*; we cannot comprehend them properly. The myſterious name of Jehovah, was *unutterable* among the Hebrews; none but the high prieſt being at liberty to utter it. The Latins called thoſe barbarous names ineffable, or *unutterable*, which they were not able to pronounce.

The greatneſs and glory of the God-head, the wonders of nature, the prodigies of creation, the happineſs of the bleſſed, and the miraculous ways of Providence, are objects above the human language, or underſtanding; of courſe, are *unſpeakable*. St. Paul caught up into the third heaven, ſaw, we are told, *unſpeakable* things. The charms and delight of certain ſentiments and ſenſations, the attractions of Grace, communicate *unſpeakable* pleaſures. We are ſenſible of the whole, but cannot define or explain them.

All

All that is beyond expreſſion; all that is ſo forcible, ſo extraordinary, that the tongue, or our language, cannot properly and fully deſcribe, but muſt repreſent weaker; muſt degrade or disfigure it. In ſhort, ſentiments and ideas are *inexpreſſible*.

Inexorable, Inflexible, Implacable, Relentleſs.

The perſon whom we cannot gain over, or remove by our prayers, is *inexorable*. He, whom we cannot perſuade, or bend to our wiſhes, is *inflexible*; he, whom we cannot appeaſe, is *implacable*; he, whom we cannot ſoften by pity, is *relentleſs*.

Severity of juſtice, and the obſtinate jealouſy of power, render *inexorable*. Rigidneſs of principles and ſtiffneſs of character, render *inflexible*. Violence of anger, and deep reſentment, render *implacable*. Ferocity of temper, and inſenſibility of heart, render *relentleſs*.

Humble yourſelf, as you will, before an *inexorable* man, you will never win him,—no favour. Apply, as you will, to the failings of an *inflexible* man, and he will never give way,—no remiſſion. Make all the remonſtrances you can, and all the ſatisfaction in your power, to an *implacable* man, and he will not forget you,—no peace. Throw the moſt affecting objects in the way of a *relentleſs* man, and you never can move him,—no quarter.

The law, ſays Titus Livius, is deaf, and *inexorable*; ſo much the better, I will conſider it only as my guardian. Tyranny is as *inflexible* as a bar of ſteel, well—I will wait, till it breaks. Envy is an ungenerous enemy, and *inplacable*. "What then? How could I excite it?" Remorſe is an infallible and *relentleſs* avenger. Horrid!—Peace to my conſcience!

Death is *inexorable*; let us learn, then, to die. Deſtiny is *inflexible*; let us learn, then, to ſubmit. The paſſions, when rouſed are *implacable*; let us learn, then,

then, to govern them. Misfortunes are as *relentleſs* as wild beaſts; let us learn, then, to bear them.

Infamy, Ignominy.

Shame and cenſure are the common ideas of theſe terms. *Infamy* aggravates theſe ideas, by thoſe of diſgrace, ſtain, and diſhonour; *ignominy*, by thoſe of humiliation, contempt, and ſervility.

Infamy takes away the reputation, and ſtains the honour. *Ignominy* ſullies the name, and makes a villain renowned.

Infamy is attached to certain profeſſions of life; and a man, with a true ſenſe of honour, will not enter into ſuch a ſituation. *Ignominy* ſpreads itſelf over an abject condition, which a man with right ſentiments of dignity, fears and dreads.

Servius Tullius eſcaped the *infamy* of ſervitude, and became a king. Mithridates, being conquered, would not ſubmit to the *ignominy* of the Roman yoke; he knew how to die.

An *infamous* action, ſuch as diſcovers *infamy*, we call alſo an *infamy*. It is an *infamy* to be avaritious; it is an *infamy*, to inſult the unfortunate; it is an *infamy*, to deny one's parents, or conſpire againſt our benefactors. But an *ignominious* action is never called an *ignominy*. This word implies only a great public humiliation. It is an *ignominy* for a king, like Jugurtha, to drag a triumphal car. It was an *ignominy* for Syphax, to fall ironed, at the knees of Scipio; for Louis le Debonnaire, to be ſcandalouſly deprived of the enſigns of royalty; and for Bajazet, to bend at the feet of Tamerlane.

Infatuated,

Infatuated, Faſcinated, Prejudiced.

Prepoſſeſſion is the figurative ſenſe of theſe words; thus, *infatuated* ſignifies literally, to loſe the ſenſes, and become a fool. *Faſcinated*, to be dazzled by, and ſubmit to appearances and charms. *Prejudiced*, literally means to prejudge, or determine, before we are thorough maſters of the ſubject.

Infatuation fills the mind ſo ſtrongly with an idea, or an object, that pleaſes and flatters it, that there is no poſſibility of detaching it. *Faſcination* blinds, or dazzles ſo ſtrongly, that we cannot ſee objects as they really are; but ſee them as we imagine they are, without the leaſt wiſh, on our part, to have a clearer inſpection. *Prejudice* warps the mind, and prepoſſeſſes it ſo forcibly; that we will not liſten to argument, or hear any thing on the oppoſite ſide.

Some are *infatuated* with their birth, their nobility; others with their talents, their deſerts, &c. Charms, deluſions, ſeducing errors, fine appearances, will *faſcinate* the one; and a man's own humour, or natural character, *prejudice* the other.

We are active in our own *infatuations*; it is the vanity of our thoughts that contributes to it; but we are paſſive in *faſcination*; that is to ſay, we ſuffer ourſelves to be *faſcinated*. As to *prejudice*, it ariſes chiefly from natural diſpoſition.

See *Prepoſſeſſed*.

To *Infer, Conclude.*

Theſe terms of philoſophy indicate the action of drawing conſequences from certain eſtabliſhed propoſitions.

The proper idea of *infer*, is to paſs from one propoſition to another, in conſequence of real, or ſuppoſed

poſed relation to each other. The proper idea of *conclude*, is to terminate our reaſoning, in conſequence of the truth we diſcover, in the propoſitions before us, and their ſeveral relatives.

Infer marks the action of carrying the mind from one object to another. Thus, we *infer*, from a principle, or reaſoning, ſomething far diſtant, which is neither announced or foreſeen. For example; From the principle, that man is naturally a free agent, I *infer*, from conſequent reaſoning, that he, whom I employ, is entitled to be paid for his labour. *Conclude* marks the argument that proves the propoſition. We *conclude*, then, our reaſoning, by the conſequences we draw from the argument, as an eſtabliſhed truth, which puts an end to the controverſy. For example: We ſay a being eſſentially good, is eſſentially juſt. God is a being eſſentially good; therefore, he is eſſentially juſt: this laſt propoſition is the *concluſion*.

To *Rail at, Inveigh againſt.*

To *rail at* any one, is to uſe abuſive, or offenſive words. To *inveigh againſt* a perſon, or thing, is to throw out *invectives* againſt them. *Railing*, then, conſiſts particularly in the terms; *inveighing*, in the things and manner.

Invectives, thrown out in cold blood, are more cutting, and more humiliating, than long and bitter *railing*.

A man, who reſpects himſelf, never *rails*; but violently irritated, he *inveighs* with dignity. Groſs abuſe, and violent *railing*, is never heard from the tongue of a noble mind; but *invective* is a fire kindled in a great heart, and which rather purifies the lips, than ſullies them.

We

We *rail* only at perſons; but *inveigh* againſt things, as well as perſons; againſt vices, againſt abuſes, againſt morals.

Defamatory libels often *rail* horribly at individuals. Satire, generally, *inveighs* ſtrongly againſt corruption.

Railing indicates a kind of injuſtice, a thing contrary to right; which *inveighing* does not; but, on the contrary, ſpeaks with truth.

Inſidious, Deceitful.

Lexicographers define theſe words, as equally tending to deceive; and, in ſo doing, deceive their readers. I will admit, however, they both announce an artifice employed, to take in, and abuſe the unwary; yet the word *inſidious* implies an ambuſh; *deceitful*, a dexterity.

By *inſidious* means, the intention is entrapped or lead into error, or fault. By *deceitful* means, its conſent, or ſuffrage, is forced.

Inſidious means are ſoft inſinuations, ingenious ſuggeſtions, and ſubtle fineſſe. *Deceitful* means are ſpecious ſeductions, dazzling illuſions, and fine appearances. The malice of the firſt is concealed, we ſee nothing: the malice of the ſecond is ſet off with outward deceptions; we ſee things differently to what they are; one is ſecret, the other falſe. If the firſt takes you in, your fault is not having been ſufficiently on your guard; if the ſecond does, your fault is, not having ſeen through the deception.

Gallantry is the *inſidious* tie of love. Modeſty is the *deceitful* language of vanity.

How *inſidious* was the tongue of Mithridates, when it ſo ſtruck the heart of Monimia, as to make her unboſom herſelf in a tranſport of joy! How *deceitful* was it, when his genius, riſing above every obſtacle, flew from Aſia to the walls of Rome!

The

The preſents of an intereſted perſon are *inſidious*. Self-love is the moſt *deceitful* of all ſophiſts. Fear the ſerpent beneath the graſs. Dread the melodious ſongs of the ſiren.

Importunate, Preſſing, Urgent.

Importunate is applied only to prayers, demands, ſolicitations, and purſuits, which we follow up with vivacity, continuance, and perſeverance, in order to obtain our wiſhes. *Preſſing* is applied to all that will admit of no delay, but requires immediate execution. *Urgent* is applied to certain things, that ſpur us on, and lead us to labour without pain, or complaining; ſuch as buſineſs, cares, neceſſary wants, and misfortunes.

Importunate ſolicitations, by a kind of violence, and an ardent perſeverance, tend to raviſh our conſent, or determine us in favour of an object, to whom we were not well diſpoſed. *Preſſing* conſiderations ſtrongly impel us to do, what we ſhould otherwiſe neglect; or to expedite, what we ſhould otherwiſe delay; whether for ourſelves, or for others. *Urgent* cauſes conſtrain us to ſatisfy them, or quit the ſituation that torments us, if we would not aggravate the evil.

The cries of the unfortunate, under ſufferings, are the moſt *importunate* ſolicitations: but we take care not to hear them. Perſonal intereſt is the moſt *preſſing* reaſon to be juſt and benevolent; ſince independent of all other advantages, it is a ſelf-gratification, to act uprightly, and to do good. Science is one of man's moſt *urgent* wants, for he is every moment puniſhed by ignorance.

Inward, Internal, Interior.

The firſt two are contraſted by outward and external. *Internal*, is ſeated farther within, than is implied by *inward*.

All that is not apparent, viſible, or to be procured in a body, we call *inward*. We ſay, even an *inward* diſeaſe, an *inward* trouble, an *inward* motion; when theſe things ſhall, perhaps, ſhew themſelves, by ſome ſenſible, or outward ſign, yet we call them *inward*, as having their ſeat in the *interior* part of the body. All that is ſo concealed, ſo cloſe ſhut up, ſo concentered in a thing, that we muſt, in a manner, penetrate the thing itſelf, to diſcover it, we call *internal*. Thus, we ſay, the *internal* principles of life and death; an *internal*, or occult virtue; an *internal* malady, or one not perceivable from without. We ſay, an *inward* fever, though it is announced by outward ſymptoms; but, when theſe ſymptoms are not to be perceived, we call it *internal*.

The *inward* parts of a houſe are not always the moſt private, or retired. The delight and *internal* operations of Grace, are ſecret and ineffable.

The word *interior* is ſeldom, if ever, applied, but to buildings; and is uſed in oppoſition to exterior; as poſterior is to anterior.

Judgment, Senſe.

Intellectual *ſenſe* is the faculty of anticipating, knowing, diſtinguiſhing, and diſcerning objects, their qualities and relations. When this faculty connects theſe relations, and pronounces their exiſtence, we call it *judgment*; determining what is true and right.

Senſe is, as it were, the intelligence, that gives an account of things; *judgment*, the reaſon, that ſubſcribes

ſubſcribes to that account; or, if you will, *ſenſe* is the relator, that tells the fact, and the witneſs that confirms it; and *judgment* is the index that decides for the *judge*, on the report of our *ſenſe*.

Judgment keeps pace with *ſenſe*; for he who has no *ſenſe*, has no *judgment*; he who has little *ſenſe*, has little *judgment*; he who loſes his *ſenſe*, loſes his *judgment*.

It is eaſy to comprehend how it happens, that *judgment* and *ſenſe* are ſo often confounded; being the ſame faculty of the mind, applied to different operations, but combined together. Thus, we ſay, on all occaſions, that *ſenſe* is the faculty of comprehending, and of *judging* reaſonably; but it is clear, that when this faculty *judges*, it is *judgment*; and that the idea of *judging*, is abſolutely foreign to the word *ſenſe*.

A man of great *ſenſe* ſees, at the firſt glance, beyond other men, into the very depth of things; and ſo clear, as to be able to paſs immediate *judgment*. His *coup d'oeil*, is equal to reflexion and meditation. To ſee and to *judge*, with him, is the ſame thing.

In vain is good *ſenſe*, if a man has not ſound *judgment*. Clearneſs of reaſon, is ſufficient for *ſenſe*; but, for *judgment*, it requires alſo integrity of ſoul. Paſſion, which is not powerful enough to take away the *ſenſe*, is malignant enough to corrupt the *judgment*.

Senſe makes a man *ſenſible*; *judgment* makes him *judicious*. A *ſenſible* man has clearneſs, diſcernment, and wiſdom. A *judicious* man exceeds him in reflexion, criticiſm, and depth of knowledge. We liſten to a *ſenſible* man, and conſult a *judicious* one. The firſt claims our attention; the ſecond, our confidence.

It is neceſſary that a writer ſhould be *ſenſible*, that he ſhould write *ſenſibly*; that is to ſay, with wiſdom, preciſion, equality, without affectation, without wandering. It is neceſſary that an author ſhould be *judicious*, that he ſhould have a philoſophic turn; that

that is to ſay, that he ſhould think maturely, reflect profoundly; that he ſhould diſcuſs wiſely, and diſpaſſionately; that he ſhould pronounce modeſtly, and regulate his thoughts methodically.

In a word, *ſenſe* particularly reſpects conduct, buſineſs, and common objects. *Judgment*, conſidered generally, embraces all objects of ratiocination; the ſciences, as well as matters of common life. We expect *judgment*, and not much *ſenſe*, from a poet, and a mathematician. *Senſe* requires only juſt notions of common occurrences; but, *judgment* riſes to the imagination, and to ſcience, even to things the moſt ſublime.

Juſtice, Equity.

I dare venture to affirm, that the diſtinction, commonly eſtabliſhed between *equity* and *juſtice*, are founded on the miſapplication of the words.

The queſtion is, what is the difference, according to the true import of the terms, between the moral virtue of *juſtice*, and the moral virtue of *equity*?

No compariſon can be made between natural *equity*, and legal and diſtributive *juſtice*; charged with ſupporting the rights of every one, and puniſhing the violation of theſe rights, according to poſitive laws and ſtatutes.

Juſtice is ſaid, with reaſon, to be a virtue which renders to every man, that which belongs to him; and *equity* is *juſtice*, not conſidered according to the law, but in a reaſonable moderation. *Equity*, then, according to this idea, is no other than *juſtice* mitigated.

Now, if we ſpeak of natural and eſſential *juſtice*, it is evident this cannot be ſo. For, if *juſtice* requires me to render to every man his own, *equity* cannot leſſen my obligation. More rigid even than *juſtice*,

juſtice, it will oblige me often to give that, which, in the rigor of right, I ought not to give to the aſſiſtance of the unfortunate.

If *equity* ever moderates and ſoftens *juſtice*, it is through a principle of clemency and humanity, inducing us not to execute rigorouſly, the rights which *juſtice* has given us, againſt an unjuſt man. *Equity* forbids inflexibly, what *juſtice* forbids, for it cannot authoriſe *injuſtice*.

A court of *equity* will ſometimes relieve where a court of *juſtice* will not; but this does not prove *equity* leſs juſt; for, as a common court of *juſtice* will not recede from the letter of the law, *equity* will ſometimes take it up, and relieve, where the intention of the offender did not appear to be criminal. This, however, is ſpeaking of poſitive laws, and not of natural law.

Juſtice, properly ſpeaking, conſiſts in obſerving the primitive rule of keeping within the bounds of right. *Equity* conſiſts in obſerving, the primordial principle of natural equality, in employing for the good of others, the advantages and means which nature and fortune have favoured *us* with, and deprived *them* of.

That right, which is rigorouſly the ſource of *juſtice*, is property; you know what belongs to you, and what belongs to me. Other rights, which are ſolely the ſource of *equity*, you likewiſe know, if you know your duty. Duty in one, ſuppoſes a right in another. I, poor as I am, cannot, without wounding *juſtice*, appropriate to myſelf thoſe ſuperfluities which belong to you. You, rich as you are, cannot, without wounding natural *equity*, refuſe me ſome part of that ſuperfluity; which, according to nature and reaſon, is the ſupport of man. I don't touch that which I have not a right to demand; but I demand of you, in a brotherly way, what I have right to expect.

The

The proper object of *juſtice* then, is, in reſpect to property; that of *equity*, in general, is in reſpect to humanity.

Your exiſtence, your faculties, your talents, your labours, the fruits of your labour, your fortune, your reputation, your honour, is your own; *juſtice* forbids that any one ſhould take them from you: but my wants, my miſeries, my faults my wrongs, are human infirmities; *equity* commiſerates them, and urges you to do me good, when good can be done. *Juſtice*, however, in ſome ſort, ſeparates us, and keeps us at variance; but *equity* ties us, unites us as friends, as brothers, as members of the ſame body. Property is excluſive, but equality is communicative. *Juſtice* is derived from *Jus*, right; but *equity*, from *Æquitas*, equality. *Juſtice* ſecures property to certain owners, and leaves a great inequality. *Equity* equalizes that property, and divides it.

Though *juſtice* redreſſes the wrongs you have ſuffered, from the injuſtice of men: *equity* importunes you to redreſs the wrongs, or ills of others. Render good for good. It is a principle of equality.

Do wrong to no one; repair the wrongs you have done. Theſe are the precepts of *juſtice*. Do not to others, what you would not they ſhould do to you. Do to others, what you would have done to yourſelf.—Theſe are grand precepts of *equity*.

Juſtice and *equity*, may be otherwiſe conſidered; but, theſe are the true ſenſes of the words.

Apology, Juſtification.

The word *apology*, now in common uſe, is merely an excuſe made for ſome offence taken; where it was, perhaps, never meant, and as ſuch, is a kind of *juſtification*: but, in its original ſignification, it is a diſcourſe made to exculpate an offender. To *juſ-*

tify, is to ſhew, prove, and declare, the innocence of the accuſed, or the juſtice of a demand.

Juſtification is the end of *apology*; *apology*, the means of *juſtification*. *Apology* is merely the defence ſet up by, or for, the accuſed; the proof, or manifeſtation of his innocence, is his *juſtification*.

A good conduct, conſtantly preſerved and maintained, is an excellent *apology*, ever ready againſt all accuſations. The greateſt injuſtice is, not to hear the *juſtification* of the accuſed, ſuppoſing him even culpable.

Juſtification is, however, ſometimes taken in the ſenſe of *apology*; but it announces a complete proof, or aſſurance of ſucceſs; whilſt every other defence denotes only a deſign, or trial, to exculpate. I make my *apology*, when I ſet up my defence; and my *juſtification*, when my defence is victorious.

Apology ſuppoſes always an attack, an accuſation; it being a defence: but, *juſtification* is often voluntary, in ſupport of our character we think injured, or in maintenance of pretenſions we ſet up.

Lamentable, Deplorable.

Lamentable excites lamentations; *deplorable* draws tears accompanied with cries. *Deplorable* indicates deſpair; which *lamentable* does not.

A *lamentable* object excites, by ſtrong impreſſions, painful and dolorous ſenſations, which vent themſelves in cries, and are not exhauſted by long complaints, or long affliction. A *deplorable* object excites, by moving impreſſions, a ſenſibility ſo lively, that we are obliged to expreſs our grief, not only by cries, but by the bittereſt tears.

The ſight of a deſtruction, which ſeems to put all nature in mourning, and fills the heart with ſentiments of horror, is truly *lamentable*. The ſight of ſuffering

ſuffering humanity, a prey to calamity and diſtreſs, imploring pity, and invoking even death as a mercy, breaks the heart, and is truly *deplorable*. A city, overthrown by an earthquake, is an object equally *lamentable* and *deplorable*.

The ſituation of perſons is often *deplorable*; their very cries, *lamentable*.

Land, Ground.

Land implies extent; which *ground* does not. It is *land* in provinces and farms; *ground*, in fields and gardens.

As a technical word in agriculture, a land is that ridge acroſs a field, which is laid up by the plough, between furrow and furrow. This is done to lay the *lands* dry, which wet *ground* requires.

Laſciviouſneſs, Luſt.

Laſciviouſneſs implies a ſtrong inclination to the pleaſures of ſenſe. *Luſt* implies a violent and irreſiſtible paſſion of one ſex towards the other.

Laſciviouſneſs ſtarts at the ſight of its object, or at the mere idea of pleaſure; deſires it eagerly, and enjoys it voluptuouſly. *Luſt* is carried towards its object, without reſtraint of deſire, or any bounds to its paſſion. The firſt ariſes from an amorous, voluptuous diſpoſition; the latter, from an inſatiable avidity of ſuch diſpoſition, that rather devours its object than enjoys it. Examples on theſe words would be indelicate.

Illegal, Illicit.

Illegal is properly applied to forms, to obſervances, to things preſented by poſitive law, under certain penalties. *Illicit* is properly applied to actions, or things, which the laws of a country conſider as indifferent; but which are morally bad, if forbidden.

An action is *illegal*, if not done according to preſcribed forms, and if the law will not protect it. An action is *illicit* when not authoriſed, or when any where forbidden.

An election is *illegal*, if all the conditions required by law are not obſerved. Commerce is *illicit*, although good in the order of nature; provided it is forbidden by law, in virtue of ſome right.

Keeping of a miſtreſs is *illicit*, becauſe it breaks through the legal conditions required; in virtue of a right the law claims, of eſtabliſhing forms for marriage.

Liberty, Freedom.

Liberty is the natural power of uſing our faculties, and exerciſing our will. *Freedom* is an exemption from reſtraint. *Liberty* is the free unreſtrained power of doing a thing. *Freedom* ſuppoſes ſome obſtacle, or difficulty removed.

Liberty is more extenſive in its meaning than *freedom*; there are ſeveral kinds of *liberty*; natural *liberty*, moral *liberty*, civil *liberty*, &c. *Freedom* has ſcarcely a place in political, civil, or moral order.

We ſay, a nation politically enjoys its *liberty*, when it is governed by itſelf, or by laws of its own making. We ſay, a nation enjoys *freedom*, when it is not ſubject to impoſts.

Liberty

Liberty rather ſuppoſes a right; *freedom*, a privilege. The *liberty* of exerciſing all ſorts of honeſt profeſſions, is, or ought to be common to every nation; but, for the benefit of trade, government has abridged this *liberty*, and confined it to thoſe who have ſerved an apprenticeſhip to particular branches of manufacture; in which caſe they have the *freedom* of following their profeſſions.

In a moral ſenſe, *freedom* is a *liberty* of ſpeaking, exempt from all diſſimulation. *Freedom*, in diſcourſe, excludes conſtraint; but, *liberty* is taken ſometimes for a kind of licence, or independence; an extenſion of power, or right of ſpeaking; an effort againſt ſuperior force. By *freedom*, we ſay what we think. By *liberty*, we dare to ſay what we pleaſe. We ſpeak with *freedom* to our friends, and thoſe who aſk our opinion. We ſpeak with *liberty* to ſuperiors, and to thoſe to whom we owe reſpect. It is right that inſpires *freedom*; boldneſs and courage that inſpire *liberty*. If you muſt ſpeak, ſpeak with *freedom*. If it is dangerous to be ſilent, ſpeak with *liberty*. *Freedom* ſhould have an air of complaiſance. *Liberty* ſhould be covered with reſpect.

A good prince urges his counſellors to *freedom*, and encourages the *liberty* of magiſtrates.

To *take Liberties with*, To *Make free with*.

To *take liberties*, certainly expreſſes more than to *make free*.

The more the women ſtudy to *make free*, and *take liberties*; the more they expoſe themſelves to contempt.

To *take liberties* is ſeldom uſed, but with regard to moral conduct; when we exceed the bounds of duty, reſpect and modeſty. To *make free*, may be familiarly ſaid, of indifferent things, which we

ſhould not dare to do, if we were not very bold; but, in the ſtrict ſenſe of the term, it implies *taking* too great a *liberty*, inſtead of a proper one.

He who *makes free*, will ſoon *take liberties*.

She who *makes free* with the men, invites them to *take liberties* with her. Thoſe who *make free* in words, give reaſon to believe they will *take liberties* in actions.

However familiar you may be with men of rank, never *make free* with them: the firſt thing they will call to mind is, that they are great. Never be familiar with the great, if you would not have them *take liberties* with you. Their familiarity with you, honours you, and it requires a great deal to be taken from them, to put you on a par with them.

Mud, Mire, Dirt.

Theſe words equally denote earth diluted with water, but not in an equal proportion.

Mud, is properly the ſediment of waters; rivers carry and depoſit it. *Mud* makes water thick, the water ſettles, and the *mud* is found at the bottom.

Mire, is earth more diluted, ſo as to be almoſt liquid, more ſpread out than deep. That which is called *mire*, in cities, is called *mud* in the fields. A man of very low origin is ſaid, figuratively, to ſpring from the *mire*.

Dirt is earth, more or leſs diluted, black, filthy, and ſtinking; ſuch as is collected in the ſtreets, after rain. Scavengers carry it away in carts. In a figurative ſenſe, we ſay, he who ſinks from an honourable ſituation, to a vile and contemptible one, has fallen into the *dirt*.

Liſt, Catalogue.

Liſt is derived from the French, and is merely a ſlip of paper, in which we ſet down the names of perſons and things in common, to help the memory. Thus we ſay, a *liſt* of freeholders; a *liſt* of deaths, a *liſt* of viſits, a *liſt* of benefices, a *liſt* of purchaſes we have made, and ſo on. *Liſt*, then, is a continuation, more or leſs long, of ſimple and ſhort notes ſet down, generally one below another.

Catalogue is from the Greek, and implies a detail of words; every thing in particular. *Catalogue*, according to our acceptance of it, is made with a certain diſtribution, or particular deſign. It is not a mere ſimple *liſt*. It contains obſervations, and is often accompanied with remarks. There is a very learned work, under the title of a *Catalogue* of the Popes. A *catalogue* of ſaints, not only gives us their names, but proofs of their holineſs. We ſay, alſo, a *catalogue* of books. This *catalogue* is either well or ill made, according to the arrangement and obſervations therein. A *catalogue* of books, is not a ſimple *liſt* of names, without order. Thus, *catalogue* implies a kind of work, made with method, and arranged with judgment.

Literally, According to the Letter.

Literally marks the natural and right ſenſe of a paſſage. *According to the letter*, or, *the letter of*, marks the ſtrict and rigorous ſenſe. The adverb ſignifies, according to the natural force of the terms, and the grammatical ſignification of expreſſions. The adverbial phraſe ſignifies, in all its moral ſtrictneſs.

Nothing ſhould be taken *literally*, which is ſpoken only metaphyſically. We ſhould not adhere to *the letter*, where a thing is ſaid in joke.

We ſhould conſtrue paſſages of ſcripture, the laws, and all things that bear authority, *literally*, where there is no reaſon to give them any other ſenſe. But we ſhould not always, and in all caſes, interpret them *according to the letter*. For the *letter* kills, but the ſpirit gives life.

There is no tranſlation leſs faithful, than a *literal* tranſlation of fine poetry. It is abſurd to receive a compliment, and conſider it *according to its letter*.

Pomp, Sumptuouſneſs, Magnificence.

Pomp implies great parade. *Sumptuouſneſs* announces greatneſs and opulence in private life. *Magnificence* denotes the ſplendor of a court.

The *pomp* of courts conſiſts, principally, in great ſhew, and outward brilliancy. The *ſumptuouſneſs* of our anceſtors conſiſted, chiefly, in their manner of living, the expenſive tables they kept, the appearance they made, and the hoſpitality they ſhewed on their domains. Royal *magnificence* conſiſts, principally, in a great and prudent expenditure, that gives luſtre to the whole face of an empire, without impoveriſhing it.

There is *pomp* even in poverty. Refined and impoveriſhed ſoftneſs ſubſtitutes delicacies, and conveniences for *ſumptuouſneſs*. *Magnificence* is little more than the ſuperb decoration of a theatre.

At the publication of the golden bull, Charles IV. with all the *pomp* of a King of Kings, was ſerved at table by ſovereigns; but theſe honours were void of power.

Nebuchodonozor, by the *ſumptuouſneſs* of his edifices, and all his works, raiſed the city of Babylon above every other city in the world; and yet Babylon

ſon ſunk under the weight of it. Louis XII. during his reign, and in the midſt of the moſt expenſive wars, kept up, among his people, a *magnificence*, truly royal; and yet this prince, ſimple, modeſt, and frugal, even to a charge of avarice, was the moſt *magnificent* king, and honoured with that moſt glorious name.

Pomp has more ſhew than ſubſtance; *ſumptuouſneſs*, more ſubſtance than ſhew; *magnificence* partakes of both.

Notorious, Public.

A thing, ſeen by a crowd of witneſſes, is *notorious*; known to all the world, is *public*.

There are *notorious* truths, which we feign not to believe; becauſe we like to be ſingular, and combat them: and there are *public* truths, which ſcarce any one is ignorant of, though they take no pains to enquire into them.

It is *notorious*, that in venal adminiſtrations, places have been eſtabliſhed to gratify individuals; and we need only look into the *public* facts conſigned to hiſtory, to ſee the conſequences of their bad policy.

Merchandiſe, Wares.

Both theſe words imply any thing to be bought and ſold; but, where there is a choice, I would uſe *wares*, to denote goods ſold retail; *merchandize*, goods ſold wholeſale.

And it ſtrikes me further, that *merchandize* is beſt applied to things bought and re-ſold; *wares*, to goods ſold at the firſt hand.

Merchants deal in *merchandize*, and manufacturers and ſhopkeepers in *wares*. *Merchandize* is more the object of commerce; *wares* of trade.

Huſband, Spouſe.

Huſband denotes the phyſical quality, and is the natural term. *Spouſe* implies the ſocial tie, and is the moral term. *Huſband* being of Daniſh origin, ſignifies maſter. *Spouſe* being derived from the Latin word Sponſus, implies promiſe or contract.

The word *huſband* announces power; *ſpouſe* declares union. She who takes a *huſband*, takes a maſter; ſhe who takes a *ſpouſe*, takes a companion.

Spouſe is applicable to both ſexes; *huſband* only to the male. He may be called a good *huſband*, who loves and protects his *ſpouſe*.

Solomon called the church his *ſpouſe*, from the ſtrict union he had made with it.

To *Mark, Shew, Denote.*

The proper meaning of the verb *mark*, is to diſtinguiſh an object by marks, and make it diſcernable by its particular characters; in a manner that it cannot be miſtaken, or confounded with any other: that of *ſhew*, is to throw lights upon, or point to an object, which we are ignorant, or in ſearch, of; directing our attention, our ſteps, our care, our thoughts to it; ſo as to find and obſerve it. The proper meaning of *denote*, is to teach, or announce a thing unknown to us before; ſo as that without looking at it, we may know it for a certainty.

A ſun-dial *marks* the hours; the barometer *marks* the weight of the air; a ſeal *marks* our approbation; a manufacturer *marks* his work, by putting his *mark* upon it; wrinkles *mark* old age; a gown and caſſock *mark* the clerical function, &c. All theſe *marks*, or impreſſions, either traced or applied, lead us to diſtinguiſh one object from another, by its excluſive qualities.

The

The index of a book *ſhews* what the book contains, and directs to the places where certain matter is to be found. Your finger *ſhews* a diſtant object, you wiſh to point out. A map *ſhews* the roads. A compaſs *ſhews* the North. An officious man *ſhews* you, where you will find what you are ſeeking for. All theſe things direct you to the diſcovery of a diſtant object.

Smoke *denotes* fire. A ſign *denotes* a ſhop. Tokens *denote* hidden things. The pulſe *denotes* the ſtate of the blood. Footſteps *denote* that ſome perſon has paſſed. All theſe ſenſible ſigns, connected with an object by known relations, give us advice and knowledge of it.

Phyſiognomy only *ſhews* the character, giving us merely preſumptions, or diſtant and uncertain indications; but, the actions of a man's life *denote* his character, and leads us to a determination. Theſe are features ſo *marked*, that no one can be deceived; they not belonging to any other object.

Agriculture does more than *ſhew* the civilization of the people; it ſuppoſes it, eſtabliſhes and demonſtrates it; in ſhort, it *denotes* it, for they are eſſentially connected with each other; but, as agriculture is not the proper *mark*, the diſtinctive feature, the character ſtamped by civilization; ſtrictly ſpeaking, it does not *mark* it.

Maſſacre, Carnage, Butchery.

Maſſacre denotes literally, a great multitude of people, and ſo disfigured, as ſcarce to be known. So we ſay of a work very ill executed, and very much disfigured, that it is *maſſacred*.

Carnage is, properly ſpeaking, cutting a number of people to pieces; panting, as it were, for blood and *carnage*.

Butchery is properly a ſlaughter-houſe, or the place where beaſts are killed, for food; but it expreſſes alſo the action of killing; and, in this acceptation of the word, it implies killing a number of perſons in the ſame place; and in cold blood, like a butcher, to ſatisfy a brutal appetite.

Barbarity, ferocity, atrocity, in all its horror, ordain *maſſacre*. Thirſt for blood, unbridled rage purſues to *carnage*. A ſanguinary diſpoſition, an eagerneſs to devour the prey, and unrelenting cruelty, cauſes *butchery*.

A wicked, atrocious policy, commanded the *maſſacre* of St. Bartholomew; that of the Sicilian Veſpers; that of the Innocents at Bethelem; and that of the Romans, ſpread throughout the ſtates of Mithridates. How vaſt was the field of *maſſacre* in all theſe bloody tranſactions; how numerous the victims; what conſternation and horror it inſpired!

The ferocity of victory, excited by reſiſtance, and raiſed by ſucceſs, purſues *carnage* ſo far, as to ſearch for victims, whilſt the ſword is ſtill bleeding, and the arm able to be lifted; as we ſee in ſo many battles, and towns beſieged; rage for *carnage* encreaſes in proportion as it extends; as if a ſatiety of blood changed the blood of an unbridled ſoldier.

Contempt for human blood becomes cruel and relentleſs, commits horrible *butcheries*; and cuts the throats of a number of wretches, brought together under the hand of the butcher. So did the barbarous right of the conqueror, in the plains of Aſia, make a bloody *butchery* of that troop of priſoners, whom he would not retain as ſlaves. How pleaſing is *butchery* to a tyrant; how much ſo to an inhuman general, jealous of glory, commanding his ſoldiers to give no quarter, but ſlay even to a certain loſs!

I am conſtrained to add, that *maſſacre*, as cowardly as odious, falls on the weak and defenceleſs; *carnage*, on thoſe who defend themſelves, but who drop under

under it; *butchery*, upon men overcome and quiet, who are put to death like animals.

To *Blend, Mix, Mingle.*

Mix is a more general term than *blend*; they both incorporate, compound, and unite various ingredients into one maſs; but the word *blend*, ſeems confined to ſubſtances; whereas, *mix* may be uſed for liquids, as well as ſubſtances; thus, water, ſand, lime, and hair, *blended* together, form mortar; wax, the juice of herbs, and lard, *blended*, form ſalves; and flour, water, and roſin *blended*, form paſte; ſtill theſe are *mixtures*. But, when millers *mix* their flour, we cannot ſay ſuch a *mixture* is *blended*, for we can viſibly ſee the different meal; it is not ſo *blended* as to deceive the eye. *Blending* them, is ſuch a uniting of things, as forms but one viſible maſs, where the articles *blended* are undiſtinguiſhable; *mixing* implies ſuch a union, as ſtill to form but one maſs; but the ſeveral articles *mixed*, are diſtinguiſhable from each other, though not ſo readily ſeparated again; as may be done, where things are only *mingled*, which rather implies confuſion.

Guineas may be *mingled* with ſhillings and halfpence; and yet not ſo *blended*, or *mixed*, but they may be readily ſeparated again.

Chemiſts will ſo *blend* their unguents, and *mix* ſimples of various qualities, as to produce a new ſubſtance; without having the conſiſtence, or taſte, of either of the original ones.

Gardeners, by a *mixture* of different manures, will form ſuch a compoſt; as ſhall have more nutritive qualities, than any one kind of dung by itſelf.

He who *mingles* with a crowd, is not liable to be noticed. Farmers are apt to *mingle* their wheat, to make

make their ſamples better, than in reality they are.

A cook *blends* a variety of meats and ſpices together, to make a ragout. Painters *blend* their colours.

The waters of one river ſhall frequently join, and *mix* with the waters of another. We often *mix* ſeverity with mildneſs. Fabricators *mix* ſilk and wool, of different ſorts and colours, with ſo much art, as to form a tiſſue of a new texture.

We *mingle* cards by ſhuffling them; and papers, by throwing them into confuſion; and books, by placing them without order.

Clemency, Mercy.

Mercy ſeems to riſe upon *clemency*. We crave *clemency* for a breach of the laws; and implore *mercy* for mortal ſins. Thus, we pray to God for *mercy*; petition a prince for clemency.

Both theſe terms imply a power, in the perſon we ſue to, to puniſh or to pardon; but, when we ſay we ſubmit to the *clemency* of any one, we have greater hopes of forgiveneſs, than when we throw ourſelves upon his *mercy*. The firſt carries with it an idea of more juſtification for our offence; the latter, none.

Clemency, alſo, implies conſideration in the perſon we apply to; but *mercy* is ever conſidered as a voluntary protection. An offender, againſt the laws, often meets with *clemency* from a judge, when it is the firſt offence, and the general character of the criminal is a bad one; but, if he is an old offender, he lies wholly at his *mercy*.

We are ſometimes as much at the *mercy* of wild beaſts, and blind cauſes, as at that of the intelligent and humane; and ſeamen are often expoſed to the *mercy* of waves and tempeſts.

Men

Men are often at the *mercy* of a tyrant, who has no *clemency*.

Deſerving, Worthy.

Deſert conſiſts properly in actions, works, ſervices; which, according to reaſon, juſtice, and equity, *deſerve*, and give a claim to reward.

Worthineſs is a claim that riſes above *deſert*, and is diſtinguiſhed by its qualities, its birth, its ſituation, its talents, its virtues, or its *deſerts*; it is a diſtinction announcing a ſuperiority, acquired by different titles, and by the natural advantage over other men.

Thus, we are *deſerving* by actions, by ſervices; we are *worthy* by qualities, by ſuperiority. *Deſert* gives a kind of right; *worthineſs*, a title. He, who is *deſerving*, is rewarded in ſome ſenſe, being *worthy* of reward, and even of favour. A *deſerving* man is rendered *worthy*, by his conduct, of any employ he is adequate to.

I have taken theſe words hitherto, in good part, but they may be equally taken in bad.

As ſoon as we ſuppoſe that man finds himſelf by his diſpoſition, his ſituation in life, ſubject to abide by certain rules of conduct; an attention to theſe rules, is the perfection of his diſpoſition, and his ſituation; and conſequently we allow, that he who anſwers to his appointment, who acts as he ought, and contributes alſo to the perfection of humanity, is *worthy* of our approbation and eſteem; has a right to expect our favour, and thoſe advantages that are the natural conſequences of ſuch conduct. This is the foundation of *deſert*.

Such is the unjuſt diſtribution of rewards in this life, that men often receive them without *deſerving* them; and often *deſerve* them, without having them.

All

All goes by favour, and every one thinks himself *worthy* of favour.

If it is more easy to obtain, than *deserve*; it is more natural to obtain, than to be *deserving*; and those who are most *worthy* of obtaining, perhaps, scarce know how to *deserve*.

If a man asks for the reward annexed to certain services, which he has not performed; in refusing that reward, we do not say he is not *worthy* of it, but that he has not *deserved* it. We do not tax him with incapacity, but with non-performance.

We say, often, a *deserving* man; and sometimes, familiarly, a *worthy* man. Honesty, probity, rectitude, frankness, form the latter; he is *worthy* of esteem, confidence, and attention. Excellent qualities, and the good use of such qualities, distinguish us in our profession, and form the *deserving* man. He *deserves* well of society, his country, &c. To have merit, does not, in this sense of the phrase, stamp the character of a *deserving* man; but a *worthy* man is essentially what we call him. We naturally love a *worthy* man, which is not always the case with a *deserving* one; we rather envy him, than look up to him.

Not well, Ill.

Not well, in a medical sense, implies disorder of the human frame. *Ill*, implies some disease.

A man may *not be well*, from irregular hours, intemperance, or debauch; but, nevertheless, he may not be *ill*.

Not well, then, denotes properly a situation, in which, though ceasing to be well, we are not yet *ill*. *Ill* denotes a situation, where some disease has taken place; without being able to say what that disease is.

So

So, in a general ſenſe, when things do *not* go *well*, we ſuppoſe them not quite to anſwer our expectation: when they go *ill*, we find them to run counter to our wiſhes.

To *Miſuſe*, *Abuſe*.

Both theſe words imply to uſe or treat ill, or improperly; but there are two general ways of uſing ill, ſufficiently important to be diſtinguiſhed; or how would ſo many different nations agree, to receive two words to expreſs one idea? As we have *miſuſe* and *abuſe*; ſo the Latins have *deuti* and *abuti*; the Italians *miſuſare* and *abuſare*; the Germans *mibranchen* and *ubelbranchen*; the French, *méſuſer* and *abuſer*.

It is eaſy to diſtinguiſh the two very different methods of ill uſing. There is the improper, or the bad, uſe of a thing; and the wicked, or ſinful, uſe of a thing; and theſe conſtitute the difference of the two verbs. We *miſuſe* a thing, when we employ it badly, or improperly; we *abuſe* a thing, when we employ it to commit evil. In the firſt caſe, we offend againſt reaſon, againſt wiſdom, againſt our intereſts, againſt good order: in the ſecond, we offend againſt juſtice, againſt equity, againſt probity, againſt the rights of others. We *miſuſe*, by want of method in what we do; according to the vulgar phraſe, in acting without rhime or reaſon. We *abuſe*, by exceſs; either in exceeding our power, our rights, or the rights of liberty.

I *miſuſe* my liberty, if I do a fooliſh thing that proves injurious to me; yet, I have a right to do it, if I pleaſe: but if I make uſe of it to the injury of another, and exceed my right of acting, I *abuſe* it. It is no longer liberty, but licentiouſneſs.

The laws *abuſe* their power, if they are exerciſed againſt

againſt him, who only *miſuſes* his own. It is juſtice to leave every one to enjoy his own rights.

A bad head *miſuſes* our indulgencies; a bad heart *abuſes* them.

It is ignorance that *miſuſes*; malice, that *abuſes*.

There are two things equally common, and almoſt equally bad; namely, to *miſuſe*, with good intentions; and *abuſe*, with bad ones. A good intention does not excuſe him, who ought to have known better; and as to a bad intention, it commits a crime, even in doing good.

An indiſcreet friend will *miſuſe* the confidence you place in him; a perfidious friend will *abuſe* it, and turn it againſt yourſelf.

Girls are too apt to *miſuſe* the liberty they have, ſometimes, of chooſing huſbands for themſelves; and parents very often *abuſe* the right they have of chooſing for them.

It is not enough for a chriſtian not to *abuſe* his wealth; he muſt not even *miſuſe* it. We are not enriched by Providence, to refrain from doing evil to others, only; but we are to employ our riches to do them good.

To *Metamorphoſe*, *Transform*.

Metamorphoſis is applied only to mythology, and denotes a change of form, brought about by the fabulous deities. *Transformation* is equally applicable to natural or ſupernatural order, and denotes every kind of change; of courſe, is a more general term.

Niobe was *metamorphoſed*, or *transformed* into a rock. Jupiter *metamorphoſed*, or *transformed* himſelf into an eagle, a ſwan, a bull. Narciſſus, an idolater of his own beauty, deſerved to be *metamorphoſed* into a periſhable flower. Nebuchadnezzar was *transformed*, not *metamorphoſed*, into a beaſt.

An

An angel of darkneſs may *transform* himſelf into an angel of light;—ſeveral ſpecies of worms are *transformed* into moths and butterflies. Water is *transformed* into air; and one equation is *transformed* into another.

The ancient hiſtory of Heaven is merely a combination of *metamorphoſes*. The ſcene of the world is a continual *transformation*. Allegory makes *metamorphoſes*: *transformations* are the operations of nature.

Metamorphoſis, properly ſpeaking, expreſſes only a change of form. *Transformation* implies ſtill other changes, as tranſmutation, or converſion of metals; tranſubſtantiation, or change of ſubſtance, &c. Enthuſiaſts call that ſtate of a ſoul *transformation*, when it is confounded, and loſt, in the contemplation of God.

But further, *metamorphoſis* announces, in general, a greater and more extraordinary change, than ſimple *transformation*. By the nature of things, to which *metamorphoſis* is ſtrictly applied, it appears to be better uſed in a figurative ſenſe, than *transformation*; and, indeed, it is moſtly ſo uſed.

Metamorphoſis conveys always an idea of ſomething wonderful; which *transformation* does not. Thus, figuratively ſpeaking, *metamorphoſis* is an aſtoniſhing *transformation*; a prodigious change, unexpected, incredible, in ſentiments, character, and manners. *Metamorphoſis* is, beſides, ſo entire a *transformation*, that the object preſents none of its former features, and abſolutely would not be known. *Transformation* is more ſimple and ready, it alters appearances only.

Self-love will, like a Proteus, *metamorphoſe* itſelf, with ſo much art, as in an inſtant to appear what it is not. A falſe devotee will *transform*, by falſe appearances, and falſe conſtructions, his own vices into virtues, and your virtues into vices.

Fanaticiſm

Fanaticiſm *metamorphoſes* a man. Living in the world will *transform* the greateſt ruſtic.

Mutual, Reciprocal.

Mutual, implies change; *reciprocal*, return. The firſt expreſſes the action of giving and receiving; the ſecond, a re-action, or the return made, according to what we have received.

Exchange is free and voluntary; we give in exchange, and this action is *mutual*. Return is either due, or demanded; we pay in return, and this action is *reciprocal*.

Where two perſons love each other, the affection is mutual. When they return one favour for another, it is *reciprocal*.

Voluntary diſintereſted ſervices, rendered each other, are *mutual*. Impoſed, or merited ſervices, returned from one to another, are *reciprocal*. Friends render one another *mutual* ſervices. The ſervices between maſters and ſervants are *reciprocal*.

We give each other *mutual* aſſiſtance; we owe each other *reciprocal* aſſiſtance.

A huſband and wife pledge their faith to each other *mutually*; but their different duties are *reciprocal*.

Sympathy and antipathy, are *mutual* ſentiments, what we feel, we make others feel. Kindneſs and gratitude are *reciprocal* ſentiments. They are not of the ſame kind, but correſpond with, or anſwer each other.

Rights and duties are *reciprocal*, becauſe they ſpring one from another, or are ſuppoſed equal by a neceſſary relation; but they are not *mutual*, being of a different nature, and forming two different things.

Mutual is ſeldom applied but to matters of will, opinion,

opinion, and ſociety. *Mutual* friendſhip; *mutual* obligation; *mutual* gifts. *Reciprocal* extends to a variety of things, foreign to this idea. We ſay, *reciprocal* terms; *reciprocal* verbs; *reciprocal* figures; *reciprocal* influences; to expreſs, particularly, the re-action, correlativeneſs, the return, the *reciprocity*, (if I may uſe the word) or action of returning ſomething ſimilar. Thus, Cicero tells us, that the following propoſitions are *reciprocal*. "If there is divination, or prophecy; there are gods: if there are gods; there is prophecy, or divination."

Nation, People.

Theſe words have ſeveral acceptations, according to which they differ in their meanings. Let us eſtabliſh their original ſenſe, and this will give us their original diſtinction.

Nation is derived from the Latin word *natio*; and this from *naſci*, *natus*, born. It is a collective word, compriſing all thoſe who have the ſame birth, or ſpring from the ſame ſtock.

People is derived from the Latin *populus*, which implies a multitude.

Thus, in the literal ſenſe, *nation* is one great family; *people*, a great aſſembly. The numerous deſcendants, from the ſame father, conſtitute a *nation*. A multitude of men, aſſembled in one place, forms a *people*.

The Gauls of Europe; the Galatians of Aſia; the Gallic Greeks; the Gauls of England; and, probably, the Gauls of Africa, formed the ſame *nation*. Theſe Gauls formed, in the middle of Africa, a wandering, formidable *people*, reſembling the ancient Gauls.

In the ſame ſenſe, the Irroquois, the Hurons, and other ſavage *people*, who, at preſent, only form hordes and tribes, are juſtly called *nations*; and are diſtinguiſhed

diſtinguiſhed as *nations*, by their own traditions, as ſpringing from different chiefs.

The ſame language, in the mouth of two diſtinct *people*, as the Britons and Gauls, tells us, that originally they were but one *nation*. The mixture, or confuſion of languages, in the idioms of a *nation*, ſuch as in the Engliſh language, tell us, that they are a mixed *people*.

Since the word *nation*, then, alludes to birth and origin, it is natural to call the whole of a race, eſtabliſhed from father to ſon, in the ſame country, a *nation*. In this ſenſe, then, *nation* implies the aborigines of a country, or the original inhabitants; whereas *people* implies the inhabitants at large.

A foreign *people*, who form a colony in a diſtant country, are ſtill Engliſh, French, or German; according to the *nation* from which they originated.

At the diſſolution of the Roman Empire, Germany was over-run with a barbarous *people*, who overthrew, and mixed with the German *nations*. This deluge ſpread from the North to the South; and from this chaos ſprung modern Europe.

It reſults from hence, that divers *people*, aſſembled, naturalized, and united by various common relations in the ſame country, form a *nation*; and that a *nation* may be divided into divers *people*.

The Britons, the Gauls, the Danes, the Saxons, and other *people*, naturalized in this country, incorporated together, and united in one particular ſociety, have formed the Engliſh *nation*. The French *nation* is divided into different *people*, Normans, Gaſcoons, Languedocians, and Britons, eſtabliſhed in different provinces.

Politically ſpeaking, *nation* and *people* preſerve their proper characters, and their natural diſtinctions. *Nation* is a great political family, like a natural family. The *people* is a great multitude, aſſembled and united by common ties.

A *nation*

A *nation* is a *people*, living in the ſame country, under the ſame government, and united by the ſame laws.

We do not ſay the Greek *nation*, but the Greeks, or the *people* of Greece; becauſe they did not form one ſtate; but ſeveral independent ſtates, leagued only againſt foreign enemies.

A king is the head of the *nation*, and the father of the *people*.

When a ſtate is conquered, and made to ſubmit to a new order of things, the *nation*, properly ſpeaking, is deſtroyed, but the *people* remain. Thus the Gauls, ſubdued by Cæſar, became, and were called Romans.

People is further diſtinguiſhed from a *nation*, as a particular branch of the ſtate. The *nation* is the whole; the *people* is only a part of that whole, and that part is compoſed of a great multitude. Our *nation* is divided into three orders, and the *people* is the loweſt; for example, the king, the nobles, and the *people*; but, notwithſtanding this, however rich and powerful the firſt, or ſecond order of the ſtate, may ſeem to be; if the *people* be poor and miſerable, the *nation* muſt be poor and miſerable alſo.

Nature, Temperament, Conſtitution, Complexion.

Nature announces the properties, the qualities, the diſpoſitions, the inclinations, the taſte; in a word, the character a man receives from nature, is that with which he is born. This word is generally uſed in a moral ſenſe. Thus we ſay, human *nature*, animal *nature*, good-*nature*, ill-*nature*. It is the *nature* of a man ſo to act.

Temperament is, properly, that which proceeds from the temper, or humour; that which is produced in the animal body, by a mixture of the humours,

mours, temperated, or moderated by each other. Different degrees of cold, heat, dryneſs, and moiſture, form the *temperature* of the air; and the prevailing humour in the body forms a *temperament*, ſanguine, or bilious, hot or cold, haſty or phlegmatic. A good *temperament* reſults from an equilibrium of theſe humours.

Conſtitution extends further. It conſiſts in the compoſition and order of the different elemental parts of the body, which *conſtitute* and eſtabliſh it. All that enters naturally into the human frame, to form its manner, and habitual exiſtence, concurs to its *conſtitution*. The ſoul and body, united, *conſtitute* the man. Matter and form *conſtitute* his natural body. The ſolids, the liquids, all the elements of an animated body, according to the relations they bear to each other, and their natural deſtination, form together its *conſtitution*. The ſtrength, or irritability of the nerves, influence the *conſtitution*; as well as the heat, or coldneſs of the blood, and other branches of the animal ſyſtem. This phyſical, or natural, ſyſtem is to the body, what the fundamental laws and form of government is to a ſtate; its *conſtitution*.

Complexion implies, properly, the habits formed, the ſet taken, the *penchant*, or habitual diſpoſitions; whether they are ſo from *temperament*, or any other conſtituent element of the body. Medical men diſtinguiſh four general *complexions*, according as one or other of the four humours predominate; and determine, by the uſe of this word, the appetites, the taſte, the inclinations, the *penchants*, to which we give way; as when they ſay, an amorous *complexion*, a warm *complexion*, or a tender *complexion*. We uſe *complexion*, alſo, to denote the humour, the capricious will, or the ſingular taſte to which a perſon is ſubject. Thus, Bruyere ſaid of a miniſter, that he had neither humour nor *complexion*, that

that is to say, neither paſſion, foible, or any *penchant* to attack.

Nature, then, is formed of an aſſemblage of natural qualities; *temperament*, of a mixture of humours; *conſtitution*, of an entire ſyſtem of the conſtituent parts of the body; *complexion*, of the prevailing habits which a body contracts.

Nature makes the character, and is the production of that character; *temperament*, the humour; the prevailing humour; *conſtitution* eſtabliſhes the health, and is the baſis, or firſt principle of health; and *complexion* determines the diſpoſition; the habitual diſpoſition of the body.

Naval, Nautical.

Both theſe adjectives relate to ſhipping, but require a diſtinction. *Naval* is beſt uſed when it reſpects veſſels, or ſhips of war. *Nautical*, when it alludes to navigation; I mean the ſcience, or practice of navigation. In ſpeaking of the conſtruction of ſhips, we ſay, *naval* architecture; and, when ſpeaking of obſervations at ſea, and the art of conducting a ſhip, we ſay *nautical* aſtronomy. *Naval* proviſions, and *nautical* problems; *naval* combat, and *nautical* almanack, &c.

Negro, Black.

Negro is certainly derived from *Niger*, black; and the inhabitants of Guinea, when firſt diſcovered by the Portugueſe, called them *negroes*, from their black colour. They were formerly called Ethiopians. Hence the old proverb, "There is no waſhing the Ethiopian white."

The *negro* is then, properly, a native of Guinea, or *Negroland*; but, by a *black*, we mean any *black* man.

We oppoſe *blacks* to white men; but we conſider *negro* as a kind of cattle; and why, becauſe they are *black*?—If it be the colour that makes brute beaſts, our treatment of them is not reprehenſible; but that not being the caſe, we are certainly condemnable; for *blacks*, whether *negros*, or caffrays, are men as well as whites, or mulattoes.

If *blacks* are naturally a different ſpecies of men; how happens it, that *negroes* tranſplanted into other climates, grow whiter and whiter every generation; and that Europeans tranſplanted into a country of *blacks*, change gradually from white to black, in a certain number of generations, without intermixing, or intermarrying with the natives!

To *Defame, Slander.*

By *ſlandering*, is underſtood, belying a man, giving him a bad character he no way deſerves; by *defaming* him, is implied, leſſening his reputation, either by *ſlandering* him, or taking from his merits.

One man may *defame* another, without *ſlandering* him; for example, by being ſilent, when his opinion is aſked of him; ſuch ſilence, implying an unwillingneſs to ſay the ill we are ſuppoſed to know of him, and this leſſens his character in our eſtimation. (See *Detraction.*)

Slander appears to me, to riſe on *defamation*, and to imply a greater injury done. Thus, he who *defames* you, attacks your reputation, and leſſens your merit; his deſign is to injure you. But he who *ſlanders* you, attacks your honour, and would deſtroy your reputation, his deſign is to ruin you. The detracter *defames*. The calumniator *ſlanders*.

Defamation is always malignant, but leſs wicked in itſelf; with a great deal of art, it will attack any kind of reputation, and any agreeable quality, poſ-

ſeſſed

ſeſſed by whom they may; but, *ſlander* vents its malice againſt innocence, virtue, probity, honour, and good morals. He who *ſlanders* you, would make you appear vicious, wicked, and criminal. He who *defames* you, would have you paſs for ignorant, ridiculous, ſilly, &c.

(See *Detraction*, *Defamation*.

To *Declare*, *Notify*.

The ſignification of theſe words is, to publiſh, or make known; but a *notification* implies a more formal notice than *declaration*. To *declare* in law, and to *declare* war, are technical terms, and mean, indeed, a formal notice; but the ſenſe, in which I mean to conſider it, is not a technical interpretation of words, but their general meaning.

We *declare* our intentions in a manner, ſo as to leave no excuſe for ignorance. We *notify* orders in a manner, as to leave no plea for diſobedience. He, who ſpeaks in an authoritative tone of voice, *declares* his intentions, as if he would *notify* orders.

An ambaſſador, when formally preſented, *notifies* his credentials, and is admitted to his office. Some men *declare*, by a direct refuſal, when you preſs them, that even if you had reaſons to urge, they would not hear them; and you remain with your mouth open.

It was once a cuſtom, in Europe, for Powers to *notify* ſolemnly to each other, their *declarations* of war, by heralds. This ceremony had ſomething frank and noble in it, and diſtinguiſhed the war of ſuch powers, from a war of plunderers. Banditti *declare* their reſolutions in a different manner. They diſcover them and carry them into execution.

Nouriſhing, Nutritive, Nutritious.

Nouriſhing is that which nouriſhes much; *nutritive*, that which has the faculty of *nouriſhing*, and of being converted into the ſubſtance of the thing it feeds; *nutritious*, that which brings about nutrition.

Nouriſhing meats abound in *nutritive* parts, from which the ſtomach extracts a great quantity of *nutritious* juice.

There is in wheat a mucous ſubſtance, which has ſo ſenſible an affinity with the chyle, that it ſeems to be the proper food of man. It is this that makes bread ſo *nouriſhing*. The *nutritive* quality of foods, is in the ſugar they contain. Milk abounds with ſugar. The *nutritious* juice, formed by this mucous ſubſtance and ſugar, is a mucous, ſweet fluid, which is converted into blood in the meſenteric veins; and which, by the lymphatics, ſpreads itſelf through all parts of the body, and there ſo aſſimilates, as to become part of ourſelves.

Succulent foods are too *nouriſhing*; the ſuperabundance of their *nutritive* parts, excites ſuch an irregular fermentation in the ſtomach, as tends to putrefaction. Hence, the *nutritious* juice becomes vicious, and lays the ground of ſlow diſeaſes, which ſcarce any remedy can directly act upon; and which cannot be expelled but by a ſtrong perſpiration.

Nouriſhing is the word moſt in uſe. *Nutritive* is a dogmatical word. Phyſicians ſay, a remedy is purgative and *nutritive*; diſtinguiſhing by *nutritive*, thoſe ſubtle particles of food, proper for *nutrition*, from the groſſer parts ſeparated by the effervescence of the ſtomach. *Nutritious* belongs, properly, to the natural philoſophy of animal bodies, and eſpecially to plants. The ſap of trees is their *nutritious* juice.

Numeral,

Numeral, Numerical.

These two adjectives by no means imply the same thing; for, what is *numeral*, forms always a number; whereas, what is *numerical*, does not. Three is a *numeral* name, or the name of a number; but a *numerical* difference, is not a difference in numbers, but that of one individual from another. *Numeral* signifies that which names one number; *numerical*, that which relates to many numbers. *Numeral* letters supply the place of figures. *Numerical* proportions are extracted from numbers. *Numerical* arithmetic substitutes figures for letters.

The *numeral* letters of the Romans, I. II. III. IV. &c. are not adapted to *numerical* calculation: such calculation is best made with arithmetical figures, introduced from Arabia, as 1, 2, 3, 4, &c.

To *Observe, Keep, Fulfil.*

The sense, in which I would consider these words, is that of performing and executing what is prescribed, by an ordinance, or law.

The proper sense of *observe*, is to have the object under our eyes; to fix our eyes, or our attention on it; that of *keep*, is to hold and guard it in our possession; that of *fulfil*, is to complete, or accomplish it.

We *observe* the law by our attention, in executing that which is prescribed. We *keep* the law, by a continual care and watchfulness, not to violate it in any point. We *fulfil* the law, by a full and final performance of it.

Observe implies, properly, the fidelity of our duty; *keep*, the perseverance and continuance of it; *fulfil*, the perfection, or consummation of it.

By a conſtant *obſervance* of religious duties, we *keep* the commandments of God, and *fulfil* the law.

It is too true, that there is nothing we *obſerve* better in ſociety, than its faſhions, and its ceremonies! There are perſons who religiouſly *keep* their word, and yet never pay their debts. What are we to judge of theſe?—There is no one but thinks himſelf happy, if he can *fulfil* his deſires; but wait the effects of this happineſs: this will be the beſt proof of its reality.

We find men more *obſervant* of their ſuperſtitions, than their religion. I would voluntarily tell him, who, without a motive, would give me a ſecret to *keep*, to *keep* it himſelf. It is man's greateſt happineſs, that his wiſhes are rarely *fulfilled*.

Odorous, Odoriferous.

Odoriferous adds an idea to that of *odour*, by the addition of the ſyllable *fer*, which implies producing, caſting, or ſpreading. Pliny gives Arabia the epithet of *odoriferous*, becauſe it produced perfumes (*Arabia odorifera, in quâ naſcuntur odores.* Lib. v. c. 11.) He does not uſe the word *odorous*, as that would not have come up to his idea.

Odoriferous expreſſes the property of producing *odours*, or ſweet ſmells, of exhaling them from its boſom, and ſpreading them abroad; whereas, *odorous*, denotes only the thing that poſſeſſes odour. An *odoriferous* body is naturally very *odorous*. We ſmell that which is *odorous*; we put our noſe to it. We have no occaſion to ſmell to that which is *odoriferous*, it meets our noſe. A roſe is *odorous*; a honeyſuckle *odoriferous*. Some woods are *odorous*, as cedar, &c. Perfumes and aromatics are *odoriferous*.

Odorous things yield an agreeable ſcent. Montaigne tells us, that the ſweat of Alexander was *odorous* and ſweet-ſmelling; and that the King of Tunis, who had an interview at Naples with Charles the Fifth, ſtuffed his viands with *odoriferous* drugs, that when he cut up a bird, they filled the palace, and even the ſtreets round about, with a very ſweet ſmell.

Odour, Smell.

Smell is a more general term than *odour*, and is uſed in bad part, as well as good. We ſay a bad *ſmell*, or a fine *ſmell*: but an agreeable *odour*. *Odour* always implying ſweet-ſmelling.

Look, Glance.

Look is not underſtood here, in the ſame ſenſe as the verb to *look*, which means to have the power of ſeeing; but, I mean to conſider it as a partial view, directed to a particular object, among many, conſidering with the eye; and even in this ſenſe it is different from *glance*, which implies a quick view, caſting the eye by deſign, but obliquely, and, as it were, by ſtealth.

Looks are more fixed than *glances*. We can reprove, or applaud by a *look*. *Glances* have, generally, a viſible intereſt. We throw amorous, jealous, animated, favourable *glances*.

Every paſſion has its particular *look*, and the *look* takes all ſorts of characters; they are a kind of natural language. There are *looks* of pity, *looks* of anger, forgiving *looks*, revengeful *looks*, &c.

Lovers often betray, by amorous *glances*, what they wiſh to conceal.

Work, Workmanſhip.

Work is a thing done; *workmanſhip*, a thing wrought, and brought about by labour and art. Good chriſtians perform good *works*; good workmen produce good *workmanſhip*. We ſay, the *work* of creation, and *workmanſhip* of ſix days labour.

In the *works* of nature, we admire the efficacy; and in its *workmanſhip*, the beauty.

Work is beſt uſed, when ſpeaking of what the heart and paſſions engage us to perform; *workmanſhip*, where it reſpects that which depends on the mind and ſcience.

Thus, we ſhould ſay, the *works* of compaſſion, and the *works* of iniquity; but, the *workmanſhip* of taſte, and the *workmanſhip* of genius. We ſay the *works* of authors, which, indeed, is the labour of ſcience; but this is, becauſe *workmanſhip* has no plural number, and *works* are ſubſtituted in its ſtead. We judge of the *work* by its *workmanſhip*; that is, we judge of things done, by the labour and art with which it is done; reverting to my firſt principle, that *work*, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is any thing done, or executed. *Workmanſhip*, is the labour of art and induſtry.

Nature gives talents, and fortune gives them *work*. Fortune alſo, by its influences, ſtamps a value on the *workmanſhip*.

There is a great deal of *workmanſhip* in a clock; and, if well executed, the *work* ſpeaks for itſelf.

Place, Office, Employ, Miniſtry.

Place implies a ſituation reſponſible, or otherwiſe, with a ſalary annexed, whether there is any employment attendant on it or not; for there are laborious *places*, and ſinecure *places*; that is, *places* where there is nothing to perform.

Office,

Office implies ſomething to perform. He who has an *office*, has ſome function to diſcharge; ſome obligations to acquit.

Employ implies ſome occupation to purſue, and indicates a determinate, or ſettled labour.

Miniſtry ſignifies ſervice we have to render to a ſuperior, or maſter, acting in his name, as his repreſentative.

Thus, a *place* is a proviſion, or maintenance of ſome kind or other, whether eaſy or laborious. *Office* obliges us to be uſeful to ſociety. *Employ* implies the execution of orders; and *miniſtry* performs the duty of another.

Place denotes reſponſibility; *office* impoſes a duty; *miniſtry*, a ſervice; and *employ* announces occupation.

Place gives credit; *office*, authority; *miniſtry*, a title to repreſent; and *employ* claims a ſalary, or emoluments.

There are a number of *places* about the king, that give a man rank, and yet have neither employment or ſalary annexed. State-*offices* are deſirable things; they have but little duty to perform, and large emoluments. They who labour in the public *miniſtry*, whether eccleſiaſtical, or political; if they perform their duty conſcientiouſly, and act well their part for them, for whom they act, may have an enviable *place*; but have an arduous taſk to fulfil. *Employs* are always ſubaltern; they may be honourable, they may be diſhonourable; but they are ever under command.

Offering, Oblation.

In the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, *oblation* is the action of *offering*, and *offering* is the thing offered; but, if common uſe has overthrown the diſtinction, and attributed equally to *oblation*, the idea of *offer-*

ing, and to that of *offering*, the idea of *oblation*; there is not leſs a difference in theſe words.

It has been ſaid, that *offerings* are made to ſaints, and even to miniſters; whereas, *oblations* are made only to God.

Oblation, then, is a true ſacrifice; *offering* is only a religious gift.

The bread and wine, in the ſacrament of the Lord's Supper, is an *oblation*. The money put into the plate, is an *offering*.

Oblation has a more limited ſenſe than *offering*, and is uſed only to expreſs the ſacrifice, or gift preſcribed, and made with religious ceremonies; of courſe, all *offerings* are not *oblations*; and the idea of a gift, only, is ſufficient to conſtitute an *offering*, without any ceremony.

Oblation is a term of the liturgy. *Offering* is a common term, though it even partakes of a ſtrict *oblation*.

Oblation cannot be uſed but in a religious ſenſe; but, poets and orators uſe the word *offering*, to denote what is preſented with reſpect and lively zeal. The proverb ſays, "To each ſaint his *offering*," implying, that we ſhould render to every man ſervices that are agreeable to him, that the world may be favourable to us.

To *Eclipſe*, *Obſcure*.

To *eclipſe* means to *obſcure* from the view, by the interpoſition, or oppoſition of ſome body, or obſtacle. To *obſcure* expreſſes the ſimple action, of removing the light, or brightneſs of an object, without any cauſe aſſigned. By *eclipſing*, we only dim the object; by *obſcuring*, we hide it, when we loſe ſight of it.

The ſun is *eclipſed*, by the interpoſition of the moon between that and us. It is often *eclipſed* by clouds,

clouds, which *obſcure* it, and take from us its light.

The heat may be ſaid to *eclipſe* the complexion, by tanning it, and leaving, as it were, a maſk upon the face. The complexion is alſo *obſcured* by age.

Paſſions *obſcure* the underſtanding, by the commotions they occaſion. They *eclipſe* it, by clouding it.

A view, intercepted by a tree, is rather ſaid to be *eclipſed* than *obſcured*; a wall could only *obſcure* it.

A pretty woman, painted, is truly *eclipſed*; though her complexion, far from being *obſcured*, is brightened.

Grandeur *eclipſes* us, and tries to *obſcure* us.

The glory of Miltiades only *eclipſed* the ſpirit of Themiſtocles; but the glory of Themiſtocles *obſcured* that of Miltiades.

Idle, Slothful.

Theſe words equally announce inaction, and inutility. To be *idle*, is to be about nothing, not from unwillingneſs to work, but from a deſire to reſt, or having nothing to do. To be *ſlothful*, implies a ſloth and unwillingneſs to work.

He, who is *idle*, is doing nothing: he, who is *ſlothful*, has no inclination to do any thing. *Idleneſs* is a ceſſation from action; *ſloth* continues in inaction. The firſt implies a ſtate of paſſing, between action and inaction; the ſecond, an habitual indigence, or employment about uſeleſs things.

Scipio uſed to ſay, he was never leſs *idle*, than when he was *idle*; meaning, that he was more occupied in his leiſure, or when he had no commands to execute.

Solon would puniſh the *ſlothful*, though ſloth is a puniſhment of itſelf; but he would not puniſh the *idle*, as repoſe is neceſſary.

Nature ſeems *idle* in the winter. Matter is, in itſelf, *ſlothful*.

He, who is not well employed, is ſaid to lead an *idle* life. He, who lives in indolence, does nothing, or any thing that is good, is ſaid to live a *ſlothful* life. Inaction, then, ſtamps the *idle* life; inutility, the *ſlothful* one. *Idle* money is that which lies unemployed. The *ſlothful* are thoſe to whom any kind of work is a burden.

To *Order, Command.*

Of theſe two words, *command*, in the common acceptation of the term, ſeems to allude to the greater authority; but it is the reverſe. He, who governs, *orders*; he, who executes thoſe orders, *commands*; *command* being literally the notification of *orders*. By virtue of authority, we *order* him, who is bound to obey: by virtue of power, or office, we *command* him, who is bound to execute.

Orders are regularly given out in agreement, by him who has the firſt authority; and he, to whom theſe orders are directed, is to *command* the execution of them.

A maſter *orders*; a chief *commands*; a general *orders* the troops to attack, and the principal officer *commands*, or conducts it.

Particulars, given to *commanders*, are *ordered* in the name of the King. The phyſician, who governs a ſick man, *orders* the medicines. He who employs a workman, *commands* him to do the work as he directs.

Origin, Source.

Origin is the firſt beginning of things; that which brings into exiſtence, what was not in being before. *Source* is the principal, or cauſe, which produces a ſucceſſion;

ſucceſſion; that which ſpreads abroad what was ſhut up in its own boſom. The *origin* teaches us at what inſtant, in what place, and in what manner objects firſt ſaw the day. The *ſource* diſcovers the fruitful principle, from which things flow, or proceed with more or leſs continuance, or abundance.

Families draw their *origin*, from ſome known man in former times, whom they call their great anceſtor; becauſe, from him they derive their nobility: but they forget, that this great anceſtor had, perhaps, a father, and anceſtors unknown, and are ignorant of the *ſource* of his greatneſs, and how fortune raiſed him to nobility.

All *origin* is ſmall. The embryo of a giant is not leſs imperceptible than that of a dwarf. Every *ſource* is at firſt weak; the greateſt rivers, like the brook you ſtep over, ſpring from a thread of water.

The *origin* of evil is a great queſtion; but I am ſatisfied with the account religion gives of it; and would take more pains to diſcover the *ſource* of thoſe evils, of which we are the victims.

The *origin* of a thing frequently diſcovers the *ſource* of it. But there are things, whoſe *origin* is known, but whoſe *ſource* is ſtill concealed.

Language takes its *origin* from the creation of the world; but the *ſource* of language is in the conſtitution of man. His ſenſibility, ſtruck by divers objects, expreſs different ſenſations, by different ſounds of the voice; and the human underſtanding, accuſtomed to diſcover the ſame ſenſations, by the ſame ſounds, and to diſtinguiſh different ſenſations, by a diverſity of ſound; at laſt, fixed upon certain words, or ſounds of the voice, to communicate thoſe ſenſations to others. Hence, the formation of language.

Pale, Wan, Livid.

The complexion is *pale*, when it has not recovered its carnation-hue after ſickneſs; or when the blood retires from the face, as in fear. The face is *wan*, when the looks are languid, and not ſufficiently animated. The fleſh is *livid*, when black and blue.

An object is *pale*, either naturally, or accidentally. This epithet is applicable to perſons, colours, all ſorts of light, even to luminous bodies. We ſay a perſon is *pale*, a colour is *pale*, a light is *pale*, the ſun is *pale*.

Wan is applicable only to perſons, and is properly the air, the look, the face, altogether.

Livid is an appearance, that carries the face of putrefaction, and ariſes from ſickneſs, or contuſions. We call thoſe blue or black ſpots *livid*, that form on the ſkin, in putrid diſeaſes. It is the ſame in tumours. Envy has a *livid* hue.

Parade, Oſtentation.

In a moral ſenſe, theſe words have been uſed as ſynonymous, though no two are more different.

Parade denotes the action and the end; *oſtentation*, the manner of the action, and the principle on which it acts.

We rather make a *parade* of a thing, than an *oſtentation*. Common uſe expreſſes the action by the firſt of theſe words.

We do a thing, not with *parade*, but with *oſtentation*, which denotes the manner of doing it.

We do a thing *for parade*, and *through oſtentation*. *For* marks the end, *through*, the principle.

Parade implies only the outward appearance; *oſtentation* alone is the vice.

Parade may be uſed in a favourable, or indifferent ſenſe. *Oſtentation* carries always an idea of blame

blame. There are habits of *parade*, for ceremonies. He who is reduced to the neceſſity of ſtamping a value on his character, by the cloaths he wears, dreſſes himſelf out with *oſtentation*.

Parade, then, is the ſhow, or diſplay of things, which we conceive adds a luſtre, and make us appear to advantage. *Oſtentation* is a vain ſhew, or a proud diſplay of things, which we think proper to blazon forth, in order to eclipſe others. If there is vanity in *parade*, *oſtentation* is an exceſs of vain glory.

He, who makes a *parade* of his abilities, is afraid his natural talents will not be noticed, unleſs he publiſhes them. He, who diſplays an *oſtentation* in words, fears he ſhall not be remarked, in talking as others do.

There is a modeſty in *parade*; it conſiſts in making a ſhow of what we would be ſuppoſed to conceal. There is a ſilent *oſtentation*; it conſiſts in ſubſtituting an air and geſtures of diſdain on words.

Beauty, when made a *parade* of, draws only the eye and criticiſm of cenſure. *Oſtentation* of virtue, in women, is the ready way to excite the curioſity and intrigues of men.

True virtue, and true merit, want no *parade*. True grandeur, and true glory, are without *oſtentation*.

Paralogiſm, Sophiſm.

Theſe words are of Greek derivation. In the Greek language, *parologiſm* denotes a deception brought about by artificial reaſoning, captious arguments, and fallacious concluſions; whereas, *ſophiſm*, denotes rather ſome fraud, ſubtlety, ingenious artifice, without any particular application to reaſoning, or diſcourſe expreſſed by *logos*, or *log*, in *paralogiſm*; for *ſiph*, the root of *ſophiſm*, ſignifies wiſdom, ſcience, faculty. But, even in this ſenſe,

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it is natural to apply it to reaſoning. It has no other import in our language. The difference of the Greek words, does not appear ſtronger in the Engliſh; and if we give to *paralogiſm* the ſenſe it has in the Greek, it will be difficult to diſtinguiſh it from *ſophiſm*. Let us go back then to the literal ſenſe of the words, in their decompoſition.

Para, then, implies oppoſition; of courſe, *paralogiſm* is only a falſe reaſoning, a vicious argument, a concluſion ill drawn, and in oppoſition to rule. Now, *ſophiſm* being formed of *ſoph*, and taken in bad part, will be always a feature of artifice, an inſidious reaſoning, a captious argument. Such is the allowed diſtinction.

Paralogiſm and *ſophiſm* lead to error; the firſt by a defect of light, or application; the ſecond, by fineſſe, by inſidious ſubtlety. By *paralogiſm*, I deceive my underſtanding; by *ſophiſm*, I abuſe it. *Paralogiſm* is contrary to the rules of reaſoning; *ſophiſm* is a deviation from right intention. Plato compares *ſophiſts* to hunters, who lay ſnares; and *paralogiſts* to travellers, who loſe their way by inattention and ignorance. A *ſophiſt*, then, is a man that, by artful reaſoning, lays ſnares to entrap you. A *paralogiſt*, one who deſigns well, but reaſons ill.

We ſay the *ſophiſtry* of the heart, the *ſophiſtry* of ſelf-love; but we cannot uſe *paralogiſm* in this ſenſe. Self-love, and the human paſſions, ſeldom, indeed, reaſon in form; but, in feigning to reaſon, they ſeduce us, perſuade us, and conſtrain us. *Paralogiſm* is merely an error of underſtanding; it deceives us, but without deſign; whereas, *ſophiſm* labours to deceive us; if I may ſo expreſs myſelf.

It muſt be allowed, that we often call falſe reaſonings *ſophiſms*, when uſed without any intention to miſlead; in ſuch caſes, I would uſe it only, when I wanted to denote a reaſoning, which has appear-

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ance only without ſolidity, that is, a fallacious reaſoning.

Paraſite, Flatterer.

Though theſe words are frequently uſed as ſynonymous, none have a wider diſtinction. By *flatterer* is meant, one flatters upon all occaſions. *Paraſite* is a trencher-gueſt, and is one who gets a welcome at a great man's table, by *flattering* the maſter of it; what the faſhionable world now call a toad-eater.

A *paraſite*, not only among the Greeks, but among the Gauls, Polybius ſays, was even an honourable character; being inſtituted by Solon to partake with the prieſts, of the fleſh of the ſacrifices, as their aſſeſſors, or next in dignity; but when there were at Athens many rich people, who kept great tables; a ſwarm of convivial men found an introduction there, and became *flatterers* of their notions, and, of courſe, their trencher-mates; they were called, in ridicule, *paraſites*.

To *Perſevere, Perſiſt.*

To *perſevere*, ſignifies to continue with ſpirit and attachment; or rather to purſue, by a long conſtancy, that which we have begun, and even continued. To *perſiſt*, is to ſupport with ſpirit and attachment, and confirm with determined aſſurance, that which we have decided on, and reſolved upon.

Perſevere, then, denotes the actions and the conduct; *perſiſt*, the opinions and the will. It is in the practice and exercise of a thing, in good or evil, in a kind of occupation or life, that we *perſevere*. It is in ſentiment, determination, reſolution,

tion, in our manner of thinking and willing, that we *perſiſt*.

We *perſiſt* not in work, or ſtudy, but *perſevere*; but we *perſiſt* in an argument. To *perſevere*, we muſt always act with the ſame ſpirit, and without relaxing. To *perſiſt*, we muſt remain firm, without varying. He who *perſeveres* in a revolt, is always in rebellion; he ſhould be ſtopped in his progreſs. He who *perſiſts* in his revolt, is firmly attached to his opinion; we ſhould endeavour to change his ſentiments.

In ſaying, that *perſevere* denotes attachment, I would be underſtood to mean, a maintained aſſiduity; and, in ſaying, that *perſiſt* denotes attachment, I would be underſtood to mean, a form, or reſolved will. It is ſufficient, in a re-examination, that a witneſs ſhould *perſiſt* in his depoſition. It requires a ſucceſſion of proofs, to make us *perſevere* in our faith. We *perſevere* by habit; *perſiſt*, by force of reſolution.

It is not ſufficient to continue, we muſt *perſevere*. It is not ſufficient to reſolve, we muſt *perſiſt*. If we *perſiſt* not in our good ſentiments, we ſhall not *perſevere* in our good works. It requires virtue to *perſevere*; ſtrength of mind, to *perſiſt*.

By *perſevering*, we arrive at our end; by *perſiſting*, we continue in the ſame ſtate. Nothing reſiſts him who *perſeveres*. He who *perſiſts*, reſiſts every thing. He who *perſeveres* to the end, ſhall be ſaved. He who *perſiſts* always, is headſtrong and opiniative. If he is opiniative, he *perſiſts* in a falſe opinion, or in a bad reſolution, without a deſire to be ſet right.

By theſe laſt phraſes, it appears, that to *perſevere* is always taken in good part, and it is thus that the ſubſtantive *perſeverance* denotes a virtue. To *perſiſt*, does not imply in itſelf either praiſe or blame; but it makes a man often opiniative.

Peſtilential,

Peſtilential, Infectious.

Peſtilential is that which holds the contagion, that which has the character of peſtilence. *Infectious*, is that which ſcatters the contagion abroad.

A thing is *peſtilential*, which has power to excite, or communicate venom. Thus, we ſay, a *peſtilential* fever, a *peſtilential* breath, a *peſtilential* air, &c. *Peſtilential* implies peſtilence, a ravaging plague, an eſtabliſhed contagion, an epidemic influence. *Peſtilential* diſeaſes, like malignant fevers, will bring on deadly epidemicks.

Infectious marks the end, the power, the activity, and obſtinacy of contagion. Thus we ſay, *infectious* diſcourſe, *infectious* ſentiments, *infectious* doctrine.

Peſtilential ſeems to carry greater miſchief with it than *infectious*. *Infectious* does not ſeem to ſcatter the contagion ſo wide as does *peſtilential*. *Infection* will often ſpread only through a ſick chamber; *peſtilence*, through a whole country. *Infection*, ſometimes, brings ſickneſs only. *Peſtilence* is often the forerunner of death.

Poſture, Attitude.

Poſture is a manner of leaning, or placing the body, more or leſs foreign to its common actions. *Attitude* takes into its idea, the fixed countenance. A perſon in pain, need only change his *poſture*, to obtain relief.

A man of firm mind, will preſerve a long time the ſame *attitude*.

It is forced poſitions, thoſe ariſing from whim, caprice, or load, which we call *poſtures*: it is noble, agreeable, and expreſſive forms of body and countenance, which we denominate *attitudes*.

Poſtures

Poſtures are to the body, what grimaces are to the face. *Attitudes* are to the body, what air is to the figure. Tumblers throw themſelves into ridiculous *poſtures*, to create laughter. Actors take certain *attitudes* to preſent characters.

He, who in walking, aſſumes the *attitude* of a dancer, puts on a ridiculous *poſture*. Thoſe *attitudes* that are eaſy and elegant in dancing, are affected and ridiculous *poſtures*, at any other time.

Poſture is a common term; *attitude*, a term of art, uſed by painters, ſculptors, dancers, &c.

In ſhort, *poſture* includes the poſition of the whole body; whereas, *attitude* takes in often but a part of it, ſuch as the head, &c.

Prepoſſeſſion, Prejudice.

Theſe terms expreſs a diſpoſition oppoſed to the knowledge of truth. *Prepoſſeſſion* is a diſpoſition, that prevents the mind from acquiring that knowledge, neceſſary to judge of things properly; and *prejudice* is a precipitate judgment of a thing, on an imperfect, inſufficient, examination.

Prepoſſeſſion is a ſtate of mind, ſo full, ſo poſſeſſed of certain ideas, that it cannot underſtand, or conceive the contrary. *Prejudice* is an anticipated judgment, or a belief eſtabliſhed without a ſufficient knowledge of a thing, or an adequate enquiry into it. *Prepoſſeſſion* takes away the liberty of the mind; *prejudice* renders it blind and headſtrong.

Prepoſſeſſion is never good for any thing; it prevents even truth from defending itſelf. *Prejudices* are, ſometimes, allowable, when they are founded on ſtrong preſumptions.

Syſtematic philoſophers ſuffer their ideas to gain ſuch an aſcendancy over their minds, that *prepoſſeſſion* will not permit them to ſee objects in any other light, than according to their own ideas. Some

perſon

perſon has ſaid, that *prejudices* are the ſupplements of reaſon; they are even reaſon itſelf to the greater part of men; for how many thouſands are there that believe, to one that knows?

Jealouſy is a continual *prepoſſeſſion*; it is never to be cured. Incredulity is, generally, but a *prejudice* conceived of bad faith. Attend the danger and you will ſee it.

If our paſſions get the maſtery of us, it is by that perpetual *prepoſſeſſion* which holds the mind. If opinion is the queen of the world, *prejudice* is then the tyrant; for *prejudice* is opinion ſet up in reaſon, in rule, and in law.

Prepoſſeſſion ſprings from ſome lively and deep impreſſion, which its object makes upon the mind, and thus captivates the thoughts. *Prejudices* riſe chiefly from weakneſs and indolence of the mind, which likes better to judge and believe, than to doubt and to learn.

Prejudices, thoſe idols of the ſoul, ſays Bacon, originate either in the nature of the underſtanding, which gives to all an intellectual exiſtence; or in the *prepoſſeſſion* of judgment, which flows from obſcurity of ideas; is the diverſity of impreſſions, founded on the diſpoſition of the ſenſes, or the influence of the paſſions, ever fluctuating and changing.

Preſumption, Conjecture.

Preſumption is an opinion, founded upon credible motives. *Conjecture*, an opinion eſtabliſhed on mere appearances; of courſe, the former has more reaſon than the latter. *Preſumption* forms a lawful prejudice. *Conjecture* is only a ſimple prognoſtic.

Preſumption is real, founded on certain facts, known truths, and commencement of proofs. *Con-*

jecture

jecture is ideal, drawn from reaſonings, interpretations, and ſuppoſitions.

External motives, ſuch as circumſtances of time, place, and perſons; valid, but indirect titles, proofs of facts; in ſhort, probabilities, which eſtabliſh ſtrong ſemblance of truth, without proving it directly form *preſumptions*. Vague reports, foreign inductions, imperfect analogies, reaſons that never riſe but to ſemblance of truth, produce only *conjectures*.

The univerſal belief of all people, and at all times, is a ſtrong *preſumption*, in favour of moral truth, without being a direct demonſtration. Of all *conjectures*, or rather of all hazarded hypotheſes, touching the action of the ſoul upon the body, and the body upon the ſoul; there is not, perhaps, a more ingenious, or a better, than the harmony preeſtabliſhed, in the ſucceſſion of movements in the one, and that of thoughts in the other, and *vice verſa*.

On a pretence, Under a pretext.

Theſe two modes of ſpeech are good, and equally in uſe; but, whatever may be their uſe, it is natural to think, that each has its peculiar ſenſe. We found, we eſtabliſh, or ſupport *on*; we cover, we diſſemble, we hide, *under*. Thus, we found and build our deſigns and actions, *on a pretence*, and conceal our deſigns and motives *under a pretext*.

Pretence implies falſe reaſoning, or falſe poſtulata; *pretext*, falſe appearances. When, therefore, we do a thing upon falſe reaſoning, or falſe grounds, we do it *on a pretence*; implying, that our pretenſions are ill founded: when we do it on reaſons, which we diſſemble, or on illuſive motives; we do it *under a pretext*, or under a falſe cover. In the firſt caſe, we would authoriſe and exculpate; in the ſecond,

ſecond, diſguiſe and impoſe. We ſearch for a *pretence*, on which we may find any evil we are inclined to do; and imagine a *pretext*, *under* which we may paſs an action, or deſign, for any other than it is. The object of the firſt, is to deceive by a falſity; that of the ſecond, to ſeduce by an impoſture. We take a reſolution *on a* plauſible *pretence*, and diſguiſe our true motives *under* a ſpecious *pretext*.

We ſuffer evil to paſs unnoticed, *on a pretence*, that it is impoſſible to remedy it; and we countenance abuſes in things, *under a pretext*, that they tend to things uſeful; when, in fact, they are uſeful only to thoſe who countenance them. The *pretence*, in the firſt caſe, is a bad reaſon for ſuch conduct; and the *pretext*, in the ſecond, a diſguiſe of the true motives.

On the pretence of human weakneſs, there are perſons who pardon their own faults. But *under the pretext* of juſtice, their malevolence will not pardon thoſe faults in others.

We find ſome who, *on a pretence*, that it would be ridiculous not to do as others do, make themſelves very ridiculous. And we ſee others, where it is convenient to drop faſhionable cuſtoms, quit them *under a pretext*, that they cannot diſſemble. It would be better to quit them, without ſuch *pretext*.

To *Pray*, *Supplicate*.

To *pray*, is to aſk with reſpect and importunity. To *ſupplicate*, is to *pray* with reverence and humility, and with much ardour and fervency. *Supplication* adds to *prayer*, ſigns that ſuppoſe a great diſtance between him that prays, and the perſon prayed to; or the wants and urgent petitions of him who *ſupplicates*. All the world knows the poſture of a *ſupplicant*, who, according to the derivation of the word,

word, bends his body, and proſtrates himſelf before the perſon he *ſupplicates*.

In formal applications to men in office and power, we uſe the word *pray*. "And your petitioner ſhall ever pray." But we *ſupplicate* the throne for mercy.

In a religious ſenſe, *prayer* is a word rather ſuperior to, and more general than *ſupplication*; being conſecrated by religious uſe, as a duty and exerciſe of piety. To *pray* here, is to ſay our *prayers*. *Prayer* is ordained as a means of ſalvation. We are to watch, and *pray*, without ceaſing. Thus we ſay, *pray* to God, not *ſupplicate* God; unleſs we particularly ſpecify the grace, or favour we aſk; in which caſe, we may uſe the word *ſupplicate*. Thus, we *ſupplicate* Heaven, to beſtow length of days on our King; we *ſupplicate* Heaven, for ſucceſs againſt our enemies; but we *pray* to Heaven, in our general wants.

Honeſty, Integrity, Probity.

Honeſty is the quality of a man, firm and conſtant in reſpecting the rights of others, and rendering to himſelf what he is entitled to, according to the ſtrict rules of juſtice. *Integrity* is the quality of a man, firm and conſtant in fulfilling his duty, without the leaſt intermiſſion. *Probity* is the quality of a man, firm and conſtant in the practice of morality, according to the rules impreſſed by nature on the human heart.

Honeſty has an upright heart; its principle is love of order and character. *Integrity* has a pure heart, and a ſcrupulous conſcience; its principle is love of duty. *Probity* has a good heart, naturally good; its principle is a love of virtue.

Honeſty excludes all injuſtice; *integrity*, all corruption;

ruption; *probity*, all evil; and, indeed, all good that tends to evil.

It requires only a lie to violate *honeſty*; for, it would as ſoon betray, as deceive; or fail in thought, as its word. It is very difficult to preſerve our *integrity* of manners; for even an improper thought will deſtroy purity. The ſun, however, has ſpots; but they neither alter its beauty, the purity of its light, nor its benign influences. It is neceſſary to practice inſtantly what *probity* inſpires, in order to acquit ourſelves well. Perfect *probity* is virtue itſelf. This virtue not only does that which it ought to do; but a good deal more than is ſtrictly required. It not only renders to every one that which is his due, but makes ſacrifices; is always doing good, trying to do better, and is of ſo divine a nature, as to bring men nearer to God.

Honeſty is the firſt virtue of the poor, *integrity*, of the citizen; and *probity*, of the great.

To *Proceed*, *Ariſe*, *Iſſue*, *Flow*, *Derive*.

Theſe terms mark the relation of things with their origin.

Proceed indicates particularly the principle, and a certain order of things; *ariſe*, the ſpring, or origin of, or manner of, acting; *iſſue*, a ſource and efflux; *flow*, the ſource, and the way of ſucceſſive running; *derive*, the ſource, or root; the action of drawing from a thing, its modifications.

I ſaid, that *proceed* denotes a principle, or that which makes things as they are. Diſcourſe *proceeds* from thought. Evil *proceeds* from vice. Order *proceeds* from good arrangement: I add, that this word imports an idea of order; this idea is included in its different acceptations, and in all the words of the ſame family. Thus, we *proceed* with order in

affairs. *Procedure* forms good management. A *proceſs* of art is a method. *Proceſſion* is a cavalcade, or march, well regulated.

I ſaid, that *ariſe* denotes origin, or manner of acting. Thus, to know whence things *ariſe*, we muſt go back from effects to their cauſes, and explain how cauſes produce their effects. An eclipſe *ariſes* from the interpoſition of an opake body, which intercepts the light of a ſtar. Licentiouſneſs *ariſes* from impunity. Sterility *ariſes* from drowth, and ſo on.

Proceed and *ariſe* have a much greater ſemblance to each other, than the other three words. *Proceed* is more uſed in common diſcourſe; *ariſe*, when ſpeaking philoſophically. We enquire from whence ſenſible, common, natural, or moral effects *proceed*; but whence metaphyſical and intellectual objects *ariſe*.

Iſſue, I have ſaid, announces a ſource, an efflux, an emanation, ſpreading abroad far and wide, the character of an active and fruitful power. It is thus that light *iſſues* from the body of the ſun; that a great principle *iſſues* from innumerable truths; that ſubtle particles *iſſue* in abundance, and without ceaſing from bodies; that laws *iſſue* from power.

I have ſaid, *flow* indicates rather a ſource, from whence things run, and the way by which they run, with more continuity than activity: it is thus water *flows* from its ſpring, through a water-pipe; that ſweat *flows* from the body through the pores; that the conſequence *flows* from the premiſes through reaſon; that eloquence *flows* from the lips of an orator. *Flow* is, properly, more applicable to fluids, whoſe running is perceptible and ſucceſſive, ſuch as water. But *iſſue* alludes rather to abundant emiſſions of ſubtle fluids, ſuch as light.

I have ſaid alſo, that *derive* denotes things drawn and directed from their ſource, from which they

ſpread

ſpread more or leſs. Thus, the water in a canal, is *derived* from a river. Public revenue is *derived* from taxes. Local evil is ſometimes *derived* from diſtant diſorder. Different words are *derived* from one common root. Hence it was, I ſaid, that this verb indicated a root; for grammar has dedicated it to denote words which *ariſe* from other words. Some are radical, others are *derivative*.

Production, Work.

The principal acceptation of *production* is, that of engendering, giving birth to, and cauſing, by its own efficacy; and this acceptation is that in which I mean to conſider it with *work*. It is thus we ſay, the *productions* of the earth, nature, the mind, the genius; indeed, of every cauſe which produces of itſelf; which gives being to that which had not being before; which draws a thing from its own ſubſtance. *Work* implies labour, the operation of induſtry. We ſay joiners *work*, bricklayers-*work*; *works* of embroidery, tapeſtry, which are not *productions*. In *productions*, it is the ſubſtance of the thing we conſider; and in *works*, the form only. *Production* and *work*, placed in oppoſition, differ as do *producer* and *workmen*. The *producer* gives being: the *workman* manufactures the *production*, or the thing *produced*.

Production is the *work* of fecundity; *work*, the reſult, or *produce* of labour. *Production* has within it, the productive cauſe. *Work* proceeds from the hands of an induſtrious workman.

A tree is the *production* of the earth. Carpenters-*work* is formed of this *production*. The earth, from a germ, *produces* a tree, by its own fecundity. The carpenter faſhions the wood which the earth has ſo *produced*.

The univerſe is the *production*, or creation of an infinite Power, that could form it out of nothing. It is the *work* of a Being infinitely intelligent, who has given matter ſuch wonderful forms, and ſuch ordinances, as throw a ſenſible ſoul into extacy.

The *works* of art are the *productions* of the earth, converted to the uſe of man.

I know that good writers have ſaid, as well *productions of art*, as *productions of nature*; but very improperly, if in the ſtrict and natural ſenſe of the words; very properly, if in the moral and figurative ſenſe, alluding to the underſtanding, and the merit of invention. Thus we ſay, with propriety, the *productions* of the mind, of the imagination, of genius, of talents; becauſe theſe powers produce, or give birth to thoughts, which thoughts give exiſtence to inventions. By the ſame reaſoning, *works* are very improperly called *productions* figuratively, if they have not the merit of invention, or novelty. We ſay, the *productions* of an author, being the produce of his brain; but, the *work* of an amanuenſis, he being merely the writer of what another dictates.

To *Pronounce*, *Articulate*.

To *pronounce*, is to utter words as they ought to be ſpoken. To *articulate*, is to *pronounce* them diſtinctly, according to the ſyllables.

The difference of countries and cuſtoms, will make the inhabitants of one place *pronounce* the ſame words, differently to what others do; and will prevent their *articulating* certain ſyllables, which others find no difficulty in doing: however, labour and practice will often get the better of ſuch impediments. Some birds will *articulate* ſyllables and words, as accurately and diſtinctly as the human voice.

When

When the channel of the noſe is obſtructed by cold, it is no longer poſſible to *articulate* well; we ſay, ſuch a one ſpeaks through his noſe; when, in fact, the defect is, that he does not ſpeak through his noſe. Perſons who ſpeak the ſame language, do not *pronounce* the words all alike. Each province has its peculiar dialect.

Proverb, Adage, Maxim.

Theſe are ſhort ſententious phraſes, familiar, or popular. *Proverbs* are *maxims* of the people, and *maxims* are the *proverbs* of good men; *maxims* being general principles, or leading truths, ſuch as that "Man is a free agent." "God is juſt." Happineſs is within every one's reach:" But as the word *maxim* is ſeldom, if ever, uſed as ſynonymous with the other two, I ſhall dwell no further on it.

We ſcarce ever uſe the word *adage*, without adding the epithet *old* to it. Is it, that reaſon grows old, or that we cannot find *adages* but among the ancients?

Proverb is an expreſſion, or ſentence, ever in the mouth of the people. *Adage* is a ſentence, or rather a *proverb*, which has ſomething ſmart and pointed in it, which calls our attention. *Proverb* announces a ſimple truth, drawn from obſervation; *adage* gives to this truth a point to render it more ſenſible and penetrating. There is merely ſenſe and preciſion in a *proverb*. There is ſpirit and wit in an *adage*. *Proverbs* inſtruct; *adages* excite. If *proverbs* add motives of action to inſtruction, they are *adages*.

"All is not gold that glitters." "No man is a prophet in his own country." "Like maſter, like man." Theſe are ſimple *proverbs*, that teach us what has been obſerved, without any remarkable circumſtance, than the preciſion of the phraſes.

"A good name is better than a gold ſaſh." "A bird in the hand is worth two in the buſh." "A priſon pays no debts" "Safe bind, ſafe find." Theſe are *proverbs* that become *adages*, inviting us to action, by a rule of conduct which they hold out.

All the wiſdom and prudence of a nation, is contained in its *proverbs*, and all its ſpirit in its *adages*.

Purity, Chaſtity, Modeſty, Continence.

Let us conſider theſe words in a moral ſenſe, relative to carnal pleaſures, which I beg to be underſtood, to mean, when I uſe the ſingle word *pleaſures*.

Moral *purity* denotes, in general, integrity, uprightneſs, honour, and a natural innocence of manners: in its reſtrained ſenſe, it is *chaſtity*, a kind of *purity*, which has great influence on good morals, and is ſo recommendable in the eyes of reaſon and religion. But the word *chaſtity* implies ſomething ſtill more pure, more perfect, exempt from all pollution, from every thing that can ſully it, or ſtain it. Natural *purity* is the ſymbol of moral *purity*, and deſerves a name of itſelf. And *chaſtity* is, properly, the veſtment of this *purity*, and the mode of its pleaſures; if pleaſures are permitted, let us draw the nuptial veil over them.

Modeſty is a marked averſion to depravity of manners, to all that is lewd and ſhameful. It is a chaſte and artleſs ſhame, generally expreſſed by bluſhes, and riſing from a pure heart.

It is that quality that prevents our doing any thing to create a bluſh, and which often bluſhes at that which is permitted in ſecret.

Continence ſenſibly expreſſes the action and effect of ſelf-reſtraint, even in the enjoyment of lawful pleaſures. Thus, the *continence* of Scipio was not that

that of Chriſtian celibacy. Celibacy is a ſtate of abſolute *continence*.

Let us adapt the proper ideas of theſe terms to uſe.

Purity is a ſtate of ſoul, that preſerves the flower of innocence from the leaſt breath of corruption, without the ſmalleſt ſtain. *Chaſtity* is a ſevere virtue, which brings the body into ſubjection, purifies it, and keeps its appetites and enjoyments in ſtrict ſubordination to law. *Modeſty* is a delicate and virtuous quality, that always veils its deſires and pleaſures with baſhfulneſs, to avoid the ſhame of immodeſty. *Continence* is the ſublime merit of invincibly reſiſting a thirſt for pleaſures, and depriving nature herſelf of her gifts, by a continual ſacrifice of her inclinations.

Imprudent parents who forget, before their children, the reſpect that is due to *purity* of innocence, know not what they do. They corrupt their children before they are able to diſcern evil from good. *Chaſtity* is a great rule of manners, it extends its views to every thing, that relates to the object it would regulate; to thoughts, diſcourſe, reading, attitudes, geſtures, choice of food, occupation, ſociety, kind of life, &c. and is the glory of the female ſex. As *chaſtity* conſiſts in the non-enjoyment of pleaſures, otherwiſe than as the law allows them; *continence* conſiſts in abſtaining from them, even though allowable by law. Thoſe vain women, who feel a pride in their triumphs, forget that their conduct raiſes up a number of enemies againſt their *modeſty*; and that ſhe who practiſes the art of ſeducing, lays herſelf open to the ſnares of the ſeducer.

To *Purge*, *Purify*.

Theſe words expreſs literally the action of making pure; but, when analyzed, or decompoſed, have very ſenſible diſtinctions. *Purge* is derived from *purum agere*, and marks the action, or labour, in rendering pure. *Purify* is derived from *purum facere*, and ſignifies to produce purity by its non-action. Thus then, the action of *purging* tends to make pure; that of *purifying* to produce purity.

Let us then, in the particular acceptation of each of theſe terms, ſearch the proper and diſtinctive difference of their ideas.

What is the common idea of the different acceptations of the word *purge*? It is to free it from every thing filthy, or injurious to it. Thus, we *purge* the body by evacuations, in expelling all that is injurious to health. We *purge* metals, by ſeparating from them all foreign ſubſtances that degrade them, or leſſen their value. We *purge* a country, by freeing it from thieves and raſcals. We *purge* the conſcience, by clearing it from guilt. We *purge* the mind of errors and prejudices, and ſo on. We *purge*, then, in removing all foreign matters from a thing, that either ſpoil or injure it.

The common idea, of the different acceptations of *purify*, is to diſſipate, or deſtroy that which is bad and vicious in the ſubſtance of things themſelves. Fire *purifies* metal, by fuſion. The winds *purify* the air, which, like water, becomes corrupt by ſtagnation. Waters, in dividing and filtrating, depoſe their bad qualities, and *purify* themſelves. The heart is *purified* by repentance, which, figuratively ſpeaking, breaks it, reforms it, and animates it with a new ſpirit. Good principles, inſtilled, *purify* manners. All theſe common applications, of the word *purify*, ſuppoſe a cauſe, or an active virtue, penetrating

penetrating into ſubſtances, conſuming or diſſipating what is impure; refining, ſubtilizing, ſpiritualizing, changing them from good to better.

*** Though I have not been ſo minute and particular, throughout this work, by entering into the etymology of the words I have defined, by analyzing and decompoſing them; I could have done it, as I have done here, but thought it unneceſſary, and found it would ſwell the work beyond meaſure.

Kindred, Conſanguinity.

Kindred is a more general term than *conſanguinity*. The firſt denotes relationſhip, by birth, or marriage; the ſecond, by blood only.

Conſanguinity exiſts between couſin-germans, aſſpringing from the ſame grandfather; and between the children and grand children, and other deſcendants of ſuch couſin Germans, being all of the ſame blood. But *kindred* ſubſiſts not only among ſuch relations, but between a man and his wife's relations, a woman and her huſband's relations.

Whatever line or degree of *conſanguinity*, the relations of one of the parties married, are in to each other; they are all in the ſame line, or degree of *kindred* to the other.

Alliance, by marriage, does not found any real *kindred*; it is no more than a kind of fiction, introduced on account of the near relation between huſband and wife; but *conſanguinity*, though by the law of nature, it is no obſtacle to marriage, except it be in the direct line of deſcent; is conſidered by the church ſo near of kin, that it is prohibited to the fourth degree, or generation, incluſively.

Race, Lineage, Family, Houſe.

Race relates to the ſame ſtock, or common origin; *lineage*, to the ſame common deſcent; *family*, to the relations living; *houſe*, to the ſame anceſtry.

Race brings to mind the author, or founder; *lineage*, the children, or deſcendants; *family*, the chiefs, and members; *houſe*, the original progenitors.

The *race* of the Heraclides, ſprung from Hercules; the *race* of Brutus, from him who hunted kings; and the *race* of the Capetians, from Hugo Capet. Thus, pointing to the original ſtock, or ſource, we ſay, Chriſt was of the *lineage* of David. George the Third, king of England, is of the *lineage* of James the Firſt, in a direct line of deſcent, from James the Firſt's daughter, married to the king of Bohemia; thus pointing to the immediate ſucceſſion. We ſay, the *houſe* of Lorraine; the *houſe* of Brunſwick; the *houſe* of Howard; the *houſe* of Cavendiſh; to diſtinguiſh great *families*, ſpringing from the ſame place, the ſame *houſe*, pointing to their common and paternal habitation, raiſed by the additional idea of grandeur.

The Athenian general Iphicrates, ſon of a ſhoemaker, reproached by Hermodius, with his birth, replied, "I had rather be the firſt of my *race*, than the laſt." He was, in fact, the author of his nobility. God promiſed to Abraham a *lineage* as numerous as the ſtars of heaven; and this patriarch had an innumerable poſterity. *Families*, of which parents and children, and their ſeveral relatives, ſcarce know each other, and who have nothing in common but their name, ill deſerve the appellation of *families*. In China, the idea of *houſe* is loſt; for there nobility is not hereditary; and if the illuſtrious actions and virtues of a man, do not give luſtre to his *lineage*, how can they form illuſtrious *houſes*?

I will not enter into the different acceptations of theſe words, it is ſufficient to point out their diſtinction in the general one.

To *Ravage*, *Deſolate*, *Lay waſte*, *Sack*.

The actions expreſſed, by each of theſe terms, are are ſo frequently, and ſo naturally mixed in the generality of caſes, in which we are accuſtomed to uſe them, that I am not ſurprized their diſtinctive ideas are ſo often confounded and reduced to one common idea.

Whilſt the ſtrict idea of *ravage* is overthrowing, and deſtroying productions and wealth, by a ſudden, violent, and impetuous action; that of *deſolate* is diſſipatory, chaſing, exterminating, deſtroying population, ſo as to leave a country without inhabitants; that of *lay waſte*, is cauſing ſuch a devaſtation, and depopulation; as, by unbridled fury, ſhall deſtroy every trace of cultivation, throughout a great extent of country, and leave it an uninhabited deſart; that of *ſack*, is to deliver over to carnage and murder; to overwhelm a city, or populous place with blood, with rage and cruelty, armed with inſtruments of death, deſolation, and deſtruction.

Torrents, flames, tempeſts, will *ravage* a diſtrict. War, peſtilence, famine, will *deſolate* a country. All theſe dreadful ſcourges, with the addition of exchequer tyranny, and inroads of barbarians, will *lay waſte* an empire. An unbridled ſoldiery, cruel conquerors and barbarians will *ſack* a city taken by aſſault.

A country is ſometimes more *ravaged* by a cloud of inſects, than by wild beaſts; and it is thus, that the officers of a ſubah, will *ravage* a country more than deſpotiſm itſelf. When a volcano happens to *deſolate* an iſland, it leaves, at leaſt, upon the land, a fertile lava, that calls back and re-animates population; but a great capital, that conſumes the ſubſtance of neighbouring provinces; at the ſame time that it ſpreads abroad a mortal infection, *deſolates* without reſource, We talk much of tyranny, which

has

has *laid waſte* ſome empires; but we ſay little of anarchy, which will *lay waſte* all. Though it is true, that a thirſt of blood occaſions ſome towns to be *ſacked*; it is as true, that a thirſt of gold, will *ſack* a hundred times more.

Say what we will of tyrants, ſoldiers, and exchequer-officers, every army *ravages*. Every vice of government is a kind of mortality that *deſolates*. We have only to ſuppreſs cultivation, to *lay waſte* a ſtate. Of all ferocious animals, man is more ferocious than all the reſt together; he it is only that *ſacks*.

Rebellion, Inſurrection.

Theſe words equally denote a common riſing againſt, or violent oppoſition in a nation; but it is clear, that *inſurrection* has not the odious character of *rebellion*: *inſurrection* announces diſobedience; *rebellion*, perfidy. The firſt makes head againſt authority that preſſes; the ſecond againſt the ſociety to which it has ſworn obedience. The object of *inſurrection*, is to oppoſe the immeaſurable ſtrides of power, or ſome defect in the conſtitution; that of *rebellion*, to deſtroy the power, and the laws that countenance it. *Inſurrections* may be commendable. *Rebellion* is always criminal. *Inſurrection* is taking arms; *rebellion* is declaring war. *Inſurrection* commences what *rebellion* completes. *Inſurrection* ſhould be quelled in its birth, that it may not end in *rebellion*.

Thus, *rebellion* has always ſomething in it great, violent, terrible, and dreadful; whilſt *inſurrection* is, ſometimes, only a diſobedience, or oppoſition; a reſiſtance, culpable, without doubt, and puniſhable; but without great troubles, or great danger.

Inſurrections are, generally, againſt oppreſſions of government.

government; *rebellions*, againſt government itſelf. *Inſurrections* are often partial; *rebellion* is general.

A ſcarcity of corn, dearneſs of proviſions, an oppreſſive law, have ſometimes occaſioned *inſurrections* of the people, in particular places, where the evil has been moſt felt. Claims to the crown of a realm, has occaſioned parties, and raiſed a *rebellion* among the people.

The riſing of the people in this country, under Wat Tyler, Jack Straw, and other inſurgents, were *inſurrections*. The wars between the houſes of York and Lancaſter; the oppoſition of Monmouth to James II. and that of the Pretenders, to George I. and II. and that of the Americans to Great Britain, were *rebellions*.

Pardon, Remiſſion, Abſolution.

It is only in a religious ſenſe, that theſe words have been uſed as ſynonymous, and yet very improperly.

The true idea of *pardon*, forgives the fault wholly, without the leaſt reſtriction. *Remiſſion* diſcharges the offender from the puniſhment he has incurred; and *abſolution* re-eſtabliſhes him in his innocence, after puniſhment, and in the re-enjoyment of his liberty and all his rights.

Pardon has an eye chiefly to the perſon who forgives; *remiſſion*, to the puniſhment incurred; and *abſolution*, to the ſtate of the offender.

Pardon of ſins ſtops the vengeance of Heaven. *Remiſſion* leaves the ſinner, nothing, to account for; and *abſolution* abſolves in heaven, as well as earth.

Tender-

Tender-hearted, Delicate-hearted.

Almoſt every one boaſts of having a heart *tender* and *delicate*, injudiciouſly confounding the two qualities. I will aim at a diſtinction.

A heart may be *tender*, without being *delicate*; but it can never be *delicate*, without being *tender*.

Tenderneſs of heart is often to be met with in people of very confined ideas; but *delicacy* either ſuppoſes good ſenſe, or produces it. *Tenderneſs* of heart may, ſometimes, be accompanied with groſs vices; but *delicacy*, on the contrary, contains the ſeeds of every virtue.

A man who is moved at the wretchedneſs of another, and is eaſed, by ſoftening that wretchedneſs, may be called a *tender-hearted* man. This kind of tenderneſs is moſt often found in thoſe who have once ſuffered themſelves; the ſight of another's misfortunes awakens in them a painful remembrance of what they felt in the like ſituation; they haſten to baniſh the diſagreeable idea that pains them, and ſo leave the object, leſs to do them a pleaſure, than rid themſelves of uneaſy ſenſation; of courſe, it partakes more of weakneſs, than knowledge, or goodneſs. Whereas, a man who has a *delicate* heart, knows all the degrees of misfortune, and proportions its aſſiſtance to the ſituation of the unhappy; there is no occaſion to awaken its tenderneſs, in order to put it in action; it gueſſes at weakneſs not publicly known, and even anticipates ſorrows which do not yet exiſt.

But a heart, truly *delicate*, is always *tender*; and hence ariſe the pains to which it is continually expoſed. It is torn by the leaſt appearance of ingratitude. The *delicate heart* raiſes up phantoms to encounter with. The leaſt omiſſion, the ſlighteſt failure wounds, inquiets, and torments it.

Tender-hearted perſons are very uſeful in ſociety; they

they are ſo diſpoſed to indulgence, that we may offend them with impunity; and if they do not change their conduct towards us in experiencing our ingratitude; it is, that they are too jealous of the ſatisfaction they receive, to deprive themſelves of it; becauſe the perſons they relieve, are inſenſible of their good offices. In ſhort, they are ſeldom hurt by ingratitude; whereas, a *delicate-hearted* man, though he ſhall have nothing to reproach the object of its attachments with; yet his abſence, his ſickneſs, his diſquiet, are all ſo many ſtings to a *delicate* heart.

While, Whilſt.

In the uſe of theſe words, which, in fact, mean one and the ſame thing; there are occaſions, when one may be better adopted than the other.

Before a word which begins with a conſonant, I would uſe the word *while*; before one beginning with a vowel, that of *whilſt*; and for this reaſon, that *while*, terminating with a vowel, does not read ſo ſmooth when it precedes a word beginning with a vowel, from the eliſion it occaſions. Examples are needleſs.

Reverie, Dream, Imagination.

A *reverie* differs from *imagination*, in that the perſon in a *reverie* is more attentive to his own thoughts, or leſs diſturbed by foreign objects; more of his ideas are deducible from cuſtom, or experience; and fewer from new impreſſions.

In all caſes of *imagination*, and *reverie*, the thoughts depend, in part, upon the then ſtate of the mind, or body.

Dreams

Dreams are nothing but the *imaginations*, fancies, or *reveries*, of a ſleeping man. The ſcenes in *dreams* repreſent themſelves as real; not as the work of *imagination*, or fancy.

Reveries are, as it were, the *dreams* of a man awake. When we become quite inattentive to external objects, the *reverie* puts on ſo far the nature of a *dream*, as to appear reality.

Our *dreams* are originally wild and inconſiſtent; *reveries* not ſo. *Dreams* are pleaſant or unpleaſant, according to the well, or ill, ſtate of the body.

Conſtitution, Government.

Of theſe words, *conſtitution* is the baſis, on which *government* is erected.

A *conſtitution* is a thing antecedent to a *government*; and a *government* is only the creature of a *conſtitution*.

The *conſtitution* of a country does not proceed from its *government*, but from the people *conſtituting* a *government*. It is the body of elements, to which we can refer, article by article, and contains the principles on which the *government* ſhall be eſtabliſhed, the manner in which it ſhall be organized, the powers it ſhall have, the mode of elections, the duration of parliaments, or what other name ſuch bodies ſhall be called; the powers which the executive part of the *government* ſhall have; and, in fine, every thing that relates to the complete organization of a civil *government*, and the principles on which it ſhall act, and by which it ſhall be bound.

A *conſtitution*, therefore, is to a *government*, what the laws made afterwards by that *government*, are to a court of judicature. The court of judicature does not make the laws, neither can it alter them;

them; it only acts in conformity to the laws made, and the *government* is in like manner, *governed* by the *conſtitution*.

Mr. Paine, in his Rights of Man, ſays, that the Engliſh *government* having been eſtabliſhed by conqueſt, and not formed by ſociety; though it has been much modified, from opportunities of circumſtances, was to benefit the people, is, in fact, without a *conſtitution*; a *conſtitution* conſiſting of ſuch elemental laws, as are eſtabliſhed by ſociety for their future *government*.

The members of the firſt National Aſſembly, in France, were delegates of the nation, in its original character, as an aſſociation of men. Theſe met to organize a *conſtitution*; and future aſſemblies will be delegates of the nation in its organized character, to legiſlate, or *govern*, according to the principles of the *conſtitution*, formed by the firſt aſſembly; and, if experience ſhould ſhew, that alterations are neceſſary, the *conſtitution* will point out the mode, by which ſuch things ſhall be done, and not leave it to the diſcretionary power of the future *government*.

Under the ideas given to theſe words, the parliament of England, have no right to alter, or interfere with the *conſtitution*, unleſs the Houſe of Commons, was choſen by the people for that very purpoſe. If they did, it would be an arbitrary proceeding in the *government*; for example, by our *conſtitution*, parliament are to ſit but ſeven years. If, therefore, parliament ſhould determine to ſit for leſs, it would be an infringement of *government* upon the *conſtitution*.

To no purpoſe, Ineffectually, In vain.

We work *to no purpoſe* when we meet not with the reward we expected to receive; *ineffectually*, when

when that which we have done, anſwers not the end propoſed; *in vain*, when our work is of no uſe whatever.

I ſhall have worked *to no purpoſe*, if theſe ſheets meet not with the approbation of the public; *ineffectually*, if after all my trouble, I have not been able to ſhew the true difference between words reputed ſynonymous; and, *in vain*, if the book is found to be neither amuſing nor inſtructive.

FINIS.

AN

ALPHABETICAL TABLE,

OF THE

WORDS TREATED OF IN THIS WORK.

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